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Free speech includes the right “to offend, to shock or to 
disturb the State or any part of the population”. It does not 
include the right to incite violence and hatred.  
   Věra Jourová 
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General Abstract 
Hate on the Internet, and particularly the role of Social Networking Sites (SNSs) in shaping 
online hate, the topic of investigation in this thesis, has been neglected in psychological and 
hate crime literature. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of online hatred (i.e. expressions of 
hateful content on the Internet), points out the gaps in current online hate research and 
emphasises the importance of studying this concept in an applied psychological context. 
Chapter 2 describes two studies, which together develop an explicit prejudice measure 
towards Roma and Travellers, as a) there was no specific one for these groups and b) they 
were the target groups in the study discussed within Chapter 3. The first study tested the 
general statement suitability of an existing prejudice measure (i.e. Levinson & Sandford’s 
1944 Anti-Semitism scale) to measure non-group specific prejudice. Sixteen statements 
were identified as suitable to measure non-group specific prejudice. The second study tested 
the specific appropriateness of the 16 non-group specific statements for describing 
stereotypes associated with Roma and Travellers. Here, 10 out of the 16 statements were 
rated as appropriately describing stereotypes associated Roma and Travellers. Chapter 3 
describes a study that aimed to investigate the persuasive effects (i.e. changes in levels of 
prejudice) of online discussions on small ‘like-minded’ groups of participants. Groups of 
participants with similar levels of prejudice (i.e. low, intermediate, high) towards Roma and 
Travellers (the target groups) discussed the eviction of a particular British Roma and 
Traveller site via instant messaging online. During the discussions, a confederate expressed 
views which aimed at either increasing or reducing prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. 
Results revealed that only participants with intermediate levels of prejudice towards Roma 
and Travellers were influenced by the discussions (i.e. participants became more 
prejudiced). Yet, participants with intermediate levels of prejudice resisted online influence 
which aimed at reducing their levels of prejudice. Overall, the results indicate that 
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participants with intermediate levels of prejudice (i.e. weak attitudes) gave in to online 
influence, whereas those with low or high levels of prejudice (i.e. strong attitudes) resisted 
it. Chapter 4 explores how polarised and non-polarised YouTube users responded to racist 
online content. In particular, 71,000 user comments made in response to a video clip, 
depicting a woman on a London tram who racially abused ethnic minority passengers, were 
analysed using thematic analysis. The analysis revealed that the exposure to hateful online 
content does not lead to an automatic endorsement of hatred. More specifically, some 
YouTubers responded by trying to account for the woman’s behaviour, as well as with 
hateful comments in response to viewing the hateful video clip. It also revealed that many 
YouTubers attempted to position themselves and other users according to their stance on 
racism. In addition, most responses focused on a more complex issue, namely the 
contestation of Britishness in relation to immigration. Chapter 5 discusses a survey, 
exploring the permissibility of online hatred among Social Networking Site (SNS) users. 
The survey specifically explored SNS users’ perceptions towards what constitutes online 
hate, the association between online and offline hate and the role of online anonymity on 
expressing online hatred. Results were somewhat contradictory and thus not entirely clear. 
In particular, whilst most participants did not connect online with offline hatred, they blamed 
the victims of online hatred for their abuse but not the creators of hateful content. Further, 
they did not agree with legislation governing hate speech (i.e. pointing towards the 
permissibility of online hatred). Participants also rated hateful content to be criminal and 
admitted that online anonymity would aid their own anti-normative behaviour (i.e. implying 
online hatred is not permissible). Chapter 6 summarises the main findings from this thesis 
and discusses their implications, methodological considerations, and suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
 1 
1.1 Overall Rationale to Research 
An awareness of hate and its consequences have been of long interest to me. I was 
born and grew up in Germany, where the consequences of a history concerning hate were 
thoroughly taught in school. My curiosity about this aspect of German history also made 
me question members of my family who lived in Germany during the second world war. 
This knowledge provided me with an initial sense of moral righteousness concerning 
people’s diversity and their right to equality.  
The specific interest in online hate was developed during my undergraduate degree. 
Here, I had the opportunity to select a hate-based unit which again reinforced my interest 
in the general area of hatred. During this unit, I was also given the chance to make contact 
with independent hate crime experts and a member of the Ministry of Justice from the area 
covering hate crime policy. These experts initially highlighted the immediacy and pressing 
importance for research into online hatred. In response, I set up an email alert to keep up to 
date with worldwide hate-related headlines and policy changes. Many of these alerts 
referred to online hatred, and particularly racial hatred expressed online. As a result, the 
focus shifted from a general interest into hate to a more specific online hate one. In 
addition, my consideration for the difficulty to construct realistic empirical work for some 
other forms of hatred (e.g. disability, sexual orientation) further narrowed the focus from 
general expressions of online those of racial hatred.  
Moreover, the undertaking of this research programme, including user responses to 
online hatred, strengthened my initially developed stance on expressions of hatred. This 
stance is best represented by Věra Jourová’s quote (see above), as it mirrors my views 
concerning the importance of freedom of expression whilst it sets it apart from online hate 
speech. In doing so, it highlights my shared view that there should be no room for online 
hate speech. 
CHAPTER 1 
 2 
1.3 Thesis Outline  
The central aim of this thesis is to explore the role of hateful racial online content, 
expressed on Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms (SMPs), in 
shaping people’s views towards others. In line with this, it should be noted at this early 
stage of reading this thesis that there will be some offensive language throughout which 
could upset, shock or distress the reader. An additional aim of this thesis is to explore the 
social and social-psychological processes underlying the development of online hate. This 
PhD thesis comprises five studies written in the European article format, which means that 
the four distinctive chapters describing these studies will be in the format of a journal 
submission/publication. This also means that there is some repetition throughout the thesis 
and that each chapter will include a reference list. Both qualitative and quantitative 
methods will be applied. Based on a range of psychological theories and evidence, these 
studies explore different aspects of if and how hateful online content/views might shape 
other people’s views and their subsequent online behaviour. All empirical work described 
in this thesis conforms to the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) code of human 
research ethics (2014) and has been approved in its accordance by the University of 
Portsmouth Ethics Committee.  
Chapter 2 Developing an Explicit Measure of Prejudice: Determining Attitudes 
Towards Roma and Travellers (Studies 1a & 1b). 
This chapter describes two quantitative studies which together aim to develop an 
explicit prejudice measure towards Roma and Travellers in an online (i.e. explicit) context. 
The measure serves to establish changes in levels of prejudice towards these groups in the 
study discussed within Chapter 3. Whilst prejudice has been frequently linked to the 
development of hate, corresponding research into explicit expressions of negative attitudes 
often faces the risk of people responding in line with social desirability. There are, 
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however, certain groups (e.g. Roma and Travellers) which frequently elicit explicit 
negative prejudice because social norms do not prohibit open discrimination against them, 
thus making them appropriate for explicit prejudice research. Yet, no specific instrument to 
measure explicit prejudice towards Roma and Travellers exists. Therefore, the first study 
described within this Chapter uses an existing explicit prejudice measure (i.e. Levinson & 
Sanford’s 1944 Anti-Semitism - AS scale) as a basis to develop such a new measure. Its 
associated stereotypes are said to overlap with the stereotypes associated with Roma and 
Travellers (Barnett, 2013). Based on an imagined, unspecified group, 111 participants 
rated 46 prejudice statements of the AS scale from which the original group affiliations 
had been removed to test the general suitability of the statements to measure prejudice for 
other, non-specific groups. A MANOVA, follow up factor analysis and reliability analysis 
identified 16 prejudice statements as suitable to measure prejudice towards groups other 
than the original target group. The second study tested the appropriateness of the 16 
statements to measure prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. Seventy-four participants 
rated each statement for its particular relevance in describing prejudice associated with 
Roma and Travellers. Mean scores and reliability analysis deemed 10 of the statements 
appropriate to measure prejudice towards these groups. The 10 prejudice statements 
therefore form the new Anti-Roma and Traveller (ART) scale. 
Chapter 3: The Influence of Group Discussions with ‘Like-Minded’ Others on 
Individuals’ Levels of Prejudice. 
This chapter describes a quantitative study, carried out across two sessions, which 
investigates whether online group discussions (e.g. the experimental task) could influence 
participants’ levels of prejudice towards a specific target group (i.e. Roma and Travellers). 
In the first session, 124 participants completed the ART scale (developed in Chapter 2) to 
determine their pre-task levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. It also served to 
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cluster participants with similar levels of prejudice into three ‘like-minded’ groups (low, 
intermediate, high prejudice) of three-to four participants, including one confederate. In the 
second session, the ‘like-minded’ groups discussed the eviction of a particular British 
Traveller site in an Instant Messaging (IM) chat (both explained in detail in Chapter 3). 
During the chat, the confederate attempted to influence participants’ views by either 
expressing favourable or non-favourable views towards Roma and Travellers. Online 
influence (i.e. changes in levels of prejudice) was determined by comparing the pre- and 
post- task prejudice scores, measured by the ART scale. Three separate ANCOVAs (i.e. 
one for each prejudice group (i.e. low, intermediate, high) revealed that only participants 
with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice were influenced by the online discussion. In 
particular, participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice who were exposed to 
a confederate who expressed non-favourable views about Roma and Travellers during the 
discussion, indicated significantly higher levels of post-task prejudice. Yet, participants 
with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice who were exposed to a confederate who 
expressed favourable views about the target groups during the discussion resisted online 
influence. Consequently, the evidence suggests that although most participants (i.e. those 
with low or high levels of pre-task prejudice) resisted online influence, those with 
intermediate levels of pre-discussion prejudice were most susceptible to negative online 
influence. Overall, these findings suggest that people’s susceptibility to online influence 
relates to their existing levels of prejudice and the type of argument to which participants 
are exposed.  
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Chapter 4: “Who is really British anyway?” – A Thematic Analysis of Responses to 
Online Hate Materials 
This chapter discusses a qualitative study, which explored how polarised and non-
polarised Social Networking Site (SNS)/Social Media Platform (SMP) users1 responded to 
one specific type of online hate material (a YouTube video clip depicting racial abuse). 
Seventy-one thousand YouTube comments in response to the video clip were analysed, 
using Thematic Analysis. Overall, the analysis revealed that the exposure to the video clip 
does not lead to an automatic escalation in the level of hatred expressed by YouTubers. 
Instead, a degree of contestation, concerning predominantly YouTubers’ national identity 
(i.e. here, Britishness), as well as their stance on racism, was observed. The analysis also 
identified four superordinate themes: (1) Making sense of Emma, which captures 
YouTubers’ efforts to explain the perpetrator’s behaviour depicted in the video clip; (2) 
Meeting hatred with hatred, which comprises YouTubers’ attempts to oppose any racist 
views, expressed in the video clip or by other YouTubers, with an equally hateful tone; (3) 
Us versus them, which encapsulates YouTubers’ propensities to group themselves and 
others, according to their stance on racism, into relevant in- and out-groups; and (4) 
                                                
1 Although Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms SMPs) are 
not the same, YouTube’s commenting feature allows users to socially interact with each 
other (e.g. communicate/network, form relationships, share information). Social interacting 
is a feature attributed to both, SNSs and SMPs (see Glossary). Therefore, references made 
throughout this thesis, and particularly in Chapter 4, which refer to YouTube as a SNS and 
SMP are to be understood based on this overlap in definition but not on people’s usage or 
membership. 
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Contesting Britishness, which describes YouTubers’ efforts to define and contest the 
meaning of Britishness amongst each other.  
Chapter 5: The Permissibility of Online Hatred: Exploring the Relationships between 
Hatefulness and Criminality, Online and Offline Hatred and the Role of Anonymity in 
Expressing Hatred 
This chapter describes a quantitative study, which investigates how SNS users 
perceive the permissibility of online hatred. One hundred and sixty-four participants took 
part in an online survey. The survey explored three areas of interest in relation to online 
hatred: (i) what constitutes online hatred, (ii) the relationship between online and offline 
hatred, and; (iii) the role of online anonymity in hateful expressions online. The areas were 
assessed across six purposely designed attitude measures, which were developed using 
relevant Principal Component Analyses (PCAs) and reliability analyses: (1) Hatefulness 
and criminality, in which participants rated 18 statements for their perceived hatefulness 
and criminality; (2) effects of online hatred on the offline world, which determined 
participants’ attitudes towards the consequences of online hatred in offline contexts; (3) 
severity of online versus offline hatred, which explored whether online or offline hatred is 
perceived to be worse for its victims; (4) freedom of expression, which determined whether 
online hatred should or should not be governed by legislation; (5) responsibility-
accountability, which explored participants’ attitudes towards who should be held 
responsible for online hatred; and (6) online anonymity, which investigated how 
participants perceive their own online anonymity and its role in determining their 
subsequent behaviour. Frequency analysis, a one-way within subjects ANOVA, and 
follow-up paired t-tests revealed that participants largely agreed on what content was 
considered hateful and/or criminal and that participants’ perceptions of hatefulness and 
criminality largely matched current legislation. In addition, correlations showed that 
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hateful content was not automatically considered criminal. A one-sample t-test between 
participants’ overall mean scores of the effects of online hate on the offline world measure 
and the neutral score revealed that participants did not connect online with offline hatred. 
Moreover, means, frequencies and one-sample t-tests between participants’ overall mean 
scores of the severity of online versus offline hatred measure and the neutral score showed 
that participants did not agree upon whether the consequences of online or offline hatred 
are worse for its victims. Furthermore, means, frequencies and a one-sample t-test between 
participants’ overall mean score and the neutral score of the freedom of expression measure 
analyses revealed that more than half of the participants objected to there being legal 
consequences for online hatred. In addition, means, frequencies and one-sample t-tests 
between participants’ overall mean scores for the responsibility/accountability measure 
(attributing blame for online hatred either to the victims, the posters, the police or Internet 
Service Providers - ISPs) and the neutral score revealed that most participants blamed the 
victims of online hatred for their abuse, rather than the poster, the police or ISPs. Finally, 
means, frequencies and one-sample t-tests between participants’ overall mean scores of the 
online anonymity measure and the neutral score showed that the large majority of 
participants did not feel anonymous online, that participants were indifferent about 
whether their perceptions of online anonymity had changed over time (i.e. with the 
introduction of modern technology, media attention for online hate offences) and more 
than half declared that online anonymity determines their own (anti-normative) behaviour. 
Overall, these results concerning the permissibility of online hatred are mixed (i.e. some 
suggest its permissibility and some the opposite) and thus highlight the complexity of 
online hatred.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
This concluding chapter discusses the main findings of the thesis, whilst 
incorporating their practice, policy and research implications in the areas of spreading or 
preventing online hatred, social identification, online anonymity and victimisation and 
offender rehabilitation. Next, the chapter discusses methodological considerations relating 
to the studies within this thesis, such as social desirability and the generalisability of the 
findings, and concludes with a range of suggestions for future research.  
1.4 Introduction 
1.4.1 Importance of Studying Online Hate 
Scholars generally agree that defining and conceptualising hatred is a challenging 
task –  and its inherent complexity has given rise to a range of definitions of hate and hate 
crimes (Hall, 2010, 2014). Adding to this complexity are the many forms that expressions 
of hatred can take, including anger, negative stereotyping, aversion to others, negative 
prejudice, bullying, harassment, discrimination, bigotry, hostility, social exclusion, racism, 
homophobia, sectarianism, domestic violence, global/political acts of terrorism, extremist 
ideology or, in its most extreme form, extermination and genocide (Hall, 2014). In 
addition, new means through which hate can be expressed, such as the Internet and 
particularly Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms (SMPs), present 
further challenges for policy makers and law enforcement.  
This PhD thesis examines how racial, ethnic and nationality hatred is expressed on 
SNSs and SMPs. It should therefore be noted that the broad term online hatred adopted 
throughout this thesis, including the findings of any empirical work reported here, does not 
intent to be automatically generalised to all other forms of online hatred (e.g. disability, 
homophobic, religious, gender, transgender hate). It should also be noted that although 
there is much overlap between the areas of hate, terrorism, radicalisation and extremism 
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references to these areas are not to be understood as being the same. Whilst arguably all of 
these areas contain aspects of hate and hate-motivated ideologies/views (the focus and 
parameters of this thesis), there are distinctive differences between them (e.g. in policies 
and/or motivations). For example, whilst hate crimes are generally not politically 
motivated and target individuals and/or groups (Green McFalls & Smith, 2003), terrorism 
tends to be politically motivated and tends to target large groups/nations of people (Saif-
Alden Wattad, 2006). Yet, the outcomes of hate crimes and terrorism can ultimately be 
similar (i.e. fear and, in the worst case, the death of people). Therefore, some have argued 
that genocide (i.e. the most extreme form of a hate crime) is indeed a terroristic act (e.g. 
Cooper, 2001), whilst others have attributed hate crimes to small scale crimes (e.g. Craig, 
2002). For the purpose of this thesis, potential criminal behaviours expressing online hate 
and hate-based crimes committed on the Internet are defined as: 
Any crime or incident where the perpetrator’s hostility or prejudice against an 
identifiable group of people is a factor in determining who is victimised. This is a 
broad definition. A victim does not have to be a member of the group. In fact, 
anyone could be a victim of a hate crime. (College of Policing, 2014, p. 3) 
In recent years, hateful Internet messages and content have been increasing on 
SNSs, including Da’esh propaganda videos on YouTube and hateful tweets and Facebook 
messages (e.g. Fox News, 2016; NBC News; 2015; The Guardian, 2014). Yet, criminal 
convictions for inciting online hate remain overall rare, although there has been a recent 
global increase in arrests and convictions for online hate crimes (e.g. for inciting ethnic or 
religious hatred, extremism). For example, in the UK recent convictions for the incitement 
to (racial) hatred/violence on the Internet include Joshua Bonehill-Paine (Jewish News 
Online, 2015) and Anjem Choudary (Grierson, Dodd & Rodrigues, 2016). There have also 
been publicised cases in China, Germany, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Russia, and United 
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Arab Emirates where several people have been convicted of inciting hate on SNSs (e.g. 
Alkhanashvili, see: Kazakhstan Newsline, 2015; Benjamin Sch., see: Hasselmann, 2015; 
Mukhtar, see: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2015; Shevtsova-Valova, see: Radio Free 
Europe Radio Liberty, 2015; Schmitz, see: Focus Online, 2016; Sven Lau, see: Zeit 
Online, 2015; Tyumentsev, see: Reuters, 2015; Zhiquaing, see: Phillips, 2015).  
However, the still relatively small number of convicted cases should not be read as 
indicating an absence of hateful online behaviour. Instead, they might be considered as 
presenting the tip of the iceberg. In line with this, a recent survey suggests that a quarter of 
UK citizens were victims of hate crimes in 2015, 28% of which were experienced online 
(BBC News, 2016). In line with this, the EU commission along with popular SNSs such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google and Microsoft have recently released a code of 
conduct to tackle and prevent online hate speech (Johari, 2016). The release therefore 
supports the recognition of online hate as an increasing global issue. Yet, in countries such 
as the UK, online hate crimes are not separated from offline hate crimes within official 
hate crime statistics. Consequently, there is no official record of the number of people who 
have experienced or are affected by online hate and thus the extent of the problem cannot 
be determined.    
In addition, the small number of convictions might be explained by the lack of a 
global legal consensus of what constitutes an online hate crime and what lies within the 
domain of freedom of speech/expression. Specifically, in the US hate speech remains 
somewhat ‘protected’ by the First Amendment (Hall, 2005), which has in the past resulted 
in the inability to prosecute most cases. For example, whilst there can be prosecutions 
where there is a clear and immediate threat to individuals and/or groups in both online and 
offline contexts, what exactly constitutes a threat is harder to prove in online contexts.  
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In addition, there are issues relating to the location, which concerns the place where 
the crime was committed (e.g. posted) and to the legal position of the country in which the 
service is provided (e.g. the Internet server’s host country). Although a hateful expression 
on an SNS might constitute an online hate crime in the country where it was committed, it 
may not be regarded as such in the country through which the service was provided. In the 
UK, the legal case of Sheppard and Whittle (see: Crown Prosecution Service, 2009; 
5RB.com, 2010) established that offenders should be tried in the country in which the 
crime was committed, thus providing some clarity on the issue.  
In line with this, some countries (e.g. Australia, Brazil, China, Canada, Germany, 
India, UAE, UK) have started to amend and introduce legislation governing online hate. 
Whilst the issue of an absent global legal definition for what constitutes online hate 
remains, these legislative changes, in line with the newly released code of conduct by the 
European Commission and popular SNSs, indicate first steps to deal with the problem. It 
also further highlights that online hate currently presents a worldwide issue and thus needs 
to be fully understood.     
In addition to the legal issues online hate crimes present, there is a lack of 
understanding concerning the specific role of hateful online content in potentially 
influencing people’s views towards others. In particular, it remains largely unknown if and 
how hateful online content might shape negative attitudes, prejudice and the incitement of 
criminal/hateful behaviour towards certain identifiable individuals and groups. As with the 
issue of the absence of a global definition of what constitutes online hate, there is also no 
global consensus on who is protected by legislation governing it.  
In the UK, hate crime legislation tends to refer to those who are targeted for their 
perceived disability, gender-identity, race, religion or sexual orientation (Home Office, 
2012), as well as those who are targeted because they are perceived to be transgender or 
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belong to an alternative sub-culture.2 Yet illegal online hate content refers only to inciting 
hatred on the grounds of someone’s race, religion and/or sexual orientation (True Vision, 
2016). It should be noted, however, that hateful online content based on someone’s 
disability or transgender (as well as their race, religion and/or sexual orientation) can also 
be considered a hate crime if it threatens or harasses individuals or groups (True Vision, 
2016).  
Therefore, given the large range of potential victims of online hate, an 
understanding of the role of hateful online content in influencing people’s views is vital for 
efficient law enforcement and the successful outcome of criminal investigations. In 
particular, police require clear guidelines to be able to respond to online hate crimes 
adequately. Thus, a better understanding of how online hate might affect online users is 
necessary to implement effective preventative, counteractive and intervention strategies 
and to provide more effective policing of the problem.   
1.4.2 Gaps in the Online Hate Crime Literature 
Much of the existing literature and research on hate crime attempts to identify the 
factors that cause hate-motivated behaviour (Hardaker, 2010; Jacobs & Potter, 1998; 
Rauch & Schanz, 2013; Steinfeldt et al., 2010; Sullivan, 1999, Wojcieszak, 2010). 
                                                
2 Agencies of the criminal justice system (e.g. the police, Crown Prosecution 
Service, Prison Service and other agencies) decided in 2007 upon a common definition of 
five ‘strands’ of hate crimes to be recorded and monitored (e.g. disability, gender-identity, 
race, religion sexual orientation; Home Office, 2012). In 2013, Greater Manchester Police 
also started to record hate crimes committed against members of subcultures (e.g. Goths, 
Emos, The Blogging Goth, 2015) – though, they have not been adopted as an official 
monitored strand across the UK yet. 
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However, despite extensive (social) psychological research into hate, prejudice and 
stereotypes (e.g. Allport, 1954; Baron & Byrne, 1994; Brown, 1995), we still know little 
about the underlying social psychological processes that may contribute to hateful 
offending behaviour (Bowling, 1999; Hall, 2010b). Specifically, little is known about the 
extent to which hateful online content is a potential causal risk factor, that contributes to 
shaping negative attitudes and subsequent hateful actions (Hardaker, 2010; Rauch & 
Schanz, 2013; Sibbitt, 1997; Green, McFalls & Smith, 2003).  
To date, research investigating (online) hate crimes has largely focused on 
individuals and groups who have already expressed polarised/hateful views towards others 
online and offline. In particular, online hate research has tended to focus either on hateful 
web content (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Cammaerts, 2009; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; 
Doane, 2006; Gerstenfeld, Grant & Chiang, 2003; Wojcieszak, 2010) or on the producers 
of hate speech (e.g. DeKoster & Houtman, 2008; Erjavec & Poler Kovačič, 2012; Ezekiel, 
2002; Glaser, Dixit & Green, 2002; Green, Abelson & Garnett, 1999). Whilst this 
outcome-focused approach has been useful in identifying some specific personality traits 
associated with hate speech and how hateful ideologies are shared on the Internet, it is also 
problematic. In particular, this approach largely ignores individuals who have not yet 
expressed hate (are not yet polarised).  
The recent introduction of the code of practise (Johari, 2016) and amendments to 
existing legislation and policy governing hateful online behaviour clearly suggests that 
governments across the world believe that SNSs, and particularly interactions with others 
online, can shape people’s attitudes and behaviours negatively. Yet, in the context of 
shaping and exacerbating hate, very little is known about the specific role played by SNSs 
and online interactions in this context. In particular, there is a lack of empirical research 
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investigating the link between the exposure to online hate (i.e. online interactions, 
including expression of opinions, and/or hateful content) and people’s (existing) attitudes.  
Yet, there are some cases which support the notion that exposure to hateful online 
content influences or provokes hateful offline behaviour. In particular, criminal 
investigators have found hate-promoting videos and websites on computers seized from 
terrorist suspects. Specific cases include the Boston bombers (NBC News, 2015), a man 
who planned a terrorist attack in the style of the Lee Rigby murder (Simpson, 2016), the 
2015 Charlie Hebdo attack (Spiegel Online, 2015) and the recent beheading of a girl by her 
Russian nanny who explicitly claimed to have been inspired to commit the act by ISIS 
videos (Perring, 2016).  
In line with this, there is literature on the influence that films, violent games and the 
media have on aggression, violence and crime. This literature predominantly suggests that 
exposure to violent films, video games and media violence makes people more aggressive 
and can lead to criminal behaviour (e.g. Anderson & Bushman, 2001; 2002a; Anderson & 
Dill, 2000; Anderson, Murphy, in press; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Bushman & 
Huesman, 2001; Dahl & Della Vigna, 2008; Funk, Bechtholdt Balacci, Pasold & 
Baumgardner, 2004; Johnson, Cohen, Smailes, Kasen & Brook, 2002; Sherry, 2001; 
Uhlman & Swanson, 2004). Given that the link between the exposure to aggressive films 
and aggressive behaviour has already been established, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
there might also be a link between the exposure to hateful online views/materials and 
hateful behaviour.  
Moreover, whilst some have argued that social networking spaces allow 
for/facilitate debate, public dialogue, knowledge exchange and exposure to political 
difference (e.g. Brundidge, 2010; Dahlgren, 2005), others have argued that SNSs/SMPs 
can reinforce existing political views (i.e. echo chamber effect; Sunstein, 2001; Mutz & 
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Martin, 2001). The latter argument is supported by other research which found that online 
users have a tendency to search for, interact with and evaluate the views of ‘like-minded’ 
others (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Kushin & Kitchener, 2009; Stroud, 2010), as such 
interactions are thought to be experienced positively (selective exposure theory, Festinger, 
1954). One consequence of such selective interactions is the creation of homogenous 
groups which share the same views. Another consequence relates to the potential for 
individual’s and group’s opinions to become more extreme (Sunstein, 2001), as the ever 
more filtered information they process prevents the exposure to other (e.g. 
opposing/alternative) views/arguments (Pariser, 2011). 
1.4.3 Issues Concerning Online Hate Research 
Online and explicit offline hate research suffer from social desirability. This is not 
surprising given that explicit expressions of racial attitudes might be perceived in general 
to be socially unacceptable (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Furnham, 1986; Gawronski, LeBel 
& Peters, 2007; Joinson, 1999; Steinfeldt et al., 2010). As a result, asking people about 
their attitudes towards others might result in them responding untruthfully. Whilst racial 
attitudes can also be measured implicitly (e.g. the implicit association test; Greenwald, 
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005), online hate is 
inevitably expressed in an overt, explicit manner. Therefore, in the context of exploring the 
influence of hateful online views/content on people’s views, explicit measures seem to be 
most appropriate for online hate research.  
On the basis of the evidence outlined above, and given that the (social) 
psychological processes underlying the development of online hate are a relatively new 
and under-researched area, this PhD thesis will examine the role of hateful online content 
in shaping people’s attitudes towards others.  
  
CHAPTER 1 
 16 
1.5 References 
Adamic, L., & Glance, N. (2005). The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. election: 
Divided they blog. Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Link 
Discovery. New York, NY: ACM. 
Allport, G.W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Co. 
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive 
behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and 
prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. 
Psychological Science, 12, 353–359. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9280.00366 
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002a). The effects of media violence on society. 
Science, 295, 2377–2379. DOI: 10.1126/science.1070765 
Anderson, C. A., & Dill, K. E. (2000). Video games and aggressive thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior in the laboratory and in life. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78, 772–790. DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.78.4.772 
Anderson, C. A., & Murphy, C. R. (2003). Violent video games and aggressive behavior in 
young women. Aggressive Behavior, 29, 423-429. DOI: 10.1002/ab.10042 
Angie, A. D., Davis, J. L., Allen, M. T., Byrne, C. L., Ruark, G. A., Cunningham, C. B.,     
. . . Mumford, M. D. (2011). Studying ideological groups online: Identification and 
assessment of risk factors for violence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 41, 
627-657. DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00730.x 
Barnett, R. (2013). Jews & Gypsies: Myths & reality. Ruth Barnett. 
Baron, R. A., & Byrne, D. (1994). Social psychology: Understanding human 
interaction (7th ed.). Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon. 
CHAPTER 1 
 17 
BBC News (2016, January 27). Quarter of people have witnessed hate crime, poll suggests. 
BBC News UK. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35415988 
Beal, V. (n.d.). Term- social networking site. Webopedia. Retrieved from 
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/social_networking_site.html 
Bowling, B. (1999). Violent racism: Victimisation, policing and social context. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, 77-101. DOI: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
British Psychological Society (2014). Code of human research ethics. Retrieved from 
http://www.bps.org.uk/system/files/Public%20files/code_of_human_research_ethic
s_dec_2014_inf180_web.pdf 
Brown, R. (1995). Prejudice: Its social psychology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brundidge, J. (2010). Encountering “difference” in the contemporary public sphere: The 
contribution of the Internet to the heterogeneity of political discussion 
networks. Journal of Communication, 60, 680–700. DOI:10.1111/j.1460-
2466.2010.01509.x. 
Bushman, B. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2002). Violent video games and hostile expectations: 
A test of the general aggression model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
28, 1679–1686. DOI: 10.1177/014616702237649 
Bushman, B. J., & Huesmann, L. R. (2001). Effects of televised violence on aggression. In 
D. G. Singer, & J. L. Singer (Eds.), Handbook of children and the media. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Cammaerts, B. (2009). Radical pluralism and free speech in online public spaces: The case 
of north Belgian extreme right discourses. International Journal of Cultural 
Studies, 12, 555-575. DOI: 10.1177/1367877909342479 
CHAPTER 1 
 18 
Coffey, B., & Woolworth, S. (2004). “Destroy the scum, and then neuter their families:” 
The web forum as a vehicle for community discourse? The Social Science Journal, 
41(1), 1-14. DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.001  
College of Policing, (2014). Hate crime operational guidance. Retrieved from http://report-
it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_operational_guidance.pdf 
Cooper, H. H. A. (2001). Terrorism: the problem of definition revisited. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 44, 881-893. DOI:10.1177/00027640121956575 
Craig, K. M. (2002). Examining hate-motivated aggression: a review of the social 
psychological literature on hate crimes as a distinct form of aggression. Aggression 
and Violent Behaviour, 7, 85-101. DOI: 10.1016/S1359-1789(00)00039-2 
Crown Prosecution Service (2009, January 8). Two guilty of inciting racial hatred against 
Jews. CPS.ORG.UK. Retrieved from 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/101_09/index.html 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354. DOI: 
10.1037/h0047358 
Dahl, G., & Della Vigna, S. (2008). Does movie violence increase violent crime? NBER 
Working Paper No. 13718. 
Dahlgren, P. (2005). The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion 
and deliberation. Political Communication, 22, 147–162. 
DOI:10.1080/10584600590933160. 
DeKoster, W., & Houtman, D. (2008). ‘Stormfront is like a second home to me’. 
Information, Communication & Society, 11, 1155-1176. DOI: 
10.1080/13691180802266665 
CHAPTER 1 
 19 
Dictionary.com (n.d.). Definition of ISIS. Retrieved from 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/isis 
Doane, A. (2006). What is racism? Racial discourse and racial politics. Critical Sociology, 
32, 255-74. DOI: 10.1163/156916306777835303 
Erjavec, K., & Poler Kovačič, M. P. (2012). “You don't understand, this is a new war!” 
Analysis of hate speech in news web sites'. Comments, Mass Communication and 
Society, 15, 899-920. DOI: 10.1080/15205436.2011.619679  
Ezekiel, R. S. (2002). An ethnographer looks at neo-Nazi and Klan groups: The racist mind 
revisited. American Behavioral Scientist, 46, 51-71. 
DOI:10.1177/0002764202046001005 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–
140. 
Focus Online (2016, February 22). Strafbefehl gegen Internet-Hetzer aus Bautzen. Focus 
Online. Retrieved from http://www.focus.de/regional/dresden/volksverhetzung-auf-
facebook-strafbefehl-gegen-internet-hetzer-aus-bautzen_id_5305101.html 
Fox News, (2016, May 23). Muslim woman behind viral selfie hailed as heroine until 
hateful tweets revealed. Fox News Europe. Retrieved from 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/23/muslim-woman-behind-viral-selfie-
hailed-as-heroine-until-hateful-tweets-revealed.html 
Funk, J. B., Bechthold Baldacci, H., Pashold, T., & Baumgardner, J. (2004). Violence 
exposure in real-life, video games, television, movies and the internet: Is there 
desensitization? Journal of Adolescence, 27, 23-39. DOI: 
10.1016/j.adolescence.2003.10005 
Furnham, A. (1986). Response bias, social desirability and dissimulation. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 7, 385-400. DOI: 10.1016/0191-8869(86)90014-0 
CHAPTER 1 
 20 
Gawronski, B., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2007). What do implicit measures tell us? 
Scrutinizing the validity of three common assumptions. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2, 181-193. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00036.x 
Gerstenfeld, P. B., Grant, D. R., & Chiang, C. P. (2003). Hate online: A content analysis of 
extremist internet sites. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3, 29-44. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1530-2415.2003.00013.x  
Glaser, J., Dixit, J., & Green, D. P. (2002). Studying hate crime with the internet: What 
makes racists advocate racial violence? Journal of Social Issues, 58, 177-193. DOI: 
10.1111/1540-4560.00255 
GlobalGreen, D. P., Abelson, R. P., & Garnett, M. (1999). The distinctive political views 
of hate-crime perpetrators and White supremacists. In D. A. Prentice & D. T. Miller 
(Eds.), Cultural divides, (pp. 429-464). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Green, D. P., McFalls, L. H., & Smith, J. K. (2003). Hate crime: An emergent research 
agenda. In Perry, B. (Ed.). Hate and bias crime: A reader. (pp. 27-48). New York, 
Routledge. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. L. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. DOI: 10.1037//0033-
295X.109.1.3 
Grierson, J., Dodd, V., & Rodrigues, J. (2016, August 12). Anjem Choudary convicted of 
supporting Islamic State. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/16/anjem-choudary-convicted-of-
supporting-islamic-state 
Hall. N. (2005). Hate crime. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
CHAPTER 1 
 21 
Hall, N. (2010). Law enforcement and hate crime: Theoretical perspectives on the 
complexities of policing hatred. In N. Chakraborti (Ed.). Hate crime: Concepts, 
policy, future directions. (pp. 169-193). Collumpton: Willan Publishing. 
Hall, N. (2014). Hate crime (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. 
Hardaker, C. (2010). Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From 
user discussions to academic definitions. Journal of Politeness Research. 
Language, Behaviour, Culture, 6, 215-242. DOI: 10.1515/jplr.2010.011    
Hasselmann, J. (2015, September 5). Polizeieinsatz nach zynischem Jubel über totes 
Flüchtlingskind. Der Tagesspiegel. Retrieved from 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/polizei-justiz/nach-rassistischer-hetze-auf-
facebook-polizeieinsatz-nach-zynischem-jubel-ueber-totes-
fluechtlingskind/12281654.html 
Home Office (2012, September 13). Hate Crimes, England and Wales 2011 to 2012. 
Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crimes-england-
and-wales-2011-to-2012--2/hate-crimes-england-and-wales-2011-to-2012 
Jacobs, J. B., & Potter, K. (1998). Hate Crimes: Criminal law and identity politics. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Jewish News Online (2015, December 17). Extremist Bonehill jailed for three years for 
inciting racial hatred. Jewish News Online. Retrieved from 
http://jewishnews.timesofisrael.com/extremist-bonehill-guilty-of-inciting-racial-
hatred/ 
Johari, S. (2016, June 3). EU commission & internet COS to take down online hate speech 
in 24 hours. MEDIANAMA. Retrieved from 
http://www.medianama.com/2016/06/223-eu-commission-online-hate-speech/ 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 22 
Johnson, J. G., Cohen, P., Smailes, E. M., Kasen, S., & Brook, J. S. (2002). Television 
viewing and aggressive behavior during adolescence and adulthood. Science, 295, 
2468–2471. DOI: 10.1126/science.1062929 
Joinson, A. (1999). Social desirability, anonymity, and internet-based questionnaires. 
Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 31, 433-438. DOI: 
10.3758/BF03200723 
Kazakhstan Newsline (2015, August 3). New person sentenced for ‘inciting religious 
hatred’ in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan Newsline. Retrieved from 
http://www.newsline.kz/news.php?y=15&m=08&d=03#0 
Kushin, M., & Kitchener, K. (2009). Getting political on social network sites: Exploring 
online political discourse on Facebook. First Monday, 14, 1–16. 
Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1944). A scale for the measurement of anti-Semitism. 
The Journal of Psychology, 17, 339-370. DOI: 10.1080/00223980.1944.9917200 
McQuail, D. (2005). McQuail’s mass communication theory (5th ed.). London: Sage 
Publications. 
MiriamWebster.com (n.d.). Definition of social media. Retrieved from 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media 
Mutz, D. C., & Martin, P. S. (2001). Facilitating communication across lines of political 
difference: The role of mass media. American Political Science Review, 95, 97–
114. 
NBC News (2015, March 19). Boston marathon bombing jury sees jihadist material taken 
from Tsarneav devices. NBC News Boston Bombing Trial. Retrieved from 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/boston-bombing-trial/bombing-jury-sees-
jihadist-material-taken-tsarnaev-devices-n326736 
CHAPTER 1 
 23 
Oxforddictionaries.com (n.d.). Definition of television. Retrieved from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/television 
Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. New 
York: Penguin Press. 
Payne, B. K., Cheng, S. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for 
attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 89, 277-293. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.277 
Perring, R. (2016, March 15). Islamic nanny who beheaded little girl was inspired by 
online ISIS videos. Express. Retrieved from 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/652683/Burka-nanny-behead-girl-inspired-
ISIS-video-Islamic-State-Islamic 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986a). Communication and persuasion: Central and 
peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986b). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In 
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, (pp. 123-205). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Phillips, T. (2015, December 22). Pu Zhiqiang given three-year suspended sentence. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/pu-
zhiqiang-chinese-human-rights-lawyer-sentenced-to-three-years 
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (2015, July, 31). Another Kazakh sentenced for inciting 
ethnic hatred online. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. Retrieved from 
http://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-ethnic-hatred-man-sentenced/27163239.html 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 24 
Rauch, S. M., & Schanz, K. (2013). Advancing racism with Facebook: Frequency and 
purpose of Facebook use and the acceptance of prejudiced and egalitarian 
messages. Computers in Human Behavior, 29, 610-615. DOI: 
10.1016/j.chb.2012.11.011 
Reicher, S. D., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (1995). A social identity model of 
deindividuation phenomena. European Review of Social Psychology, 6, 161-198. 
DOI: 10.1080/14792779443000049. 
Reuters (2015, December, 30). Russian court jails blogger for five years for ‘extremist’ 
posts. Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/idUKKBN0UD16O20151230 
Saif-Alden Wattad, M. (2006). Is terrorism a crime or an aggravating factor in sentencing? 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4, 1017-1030. DOI:10.1093/jicj/mql078 
Sherry, J. L. (2001). The effects of violent video games on aggression: A meta-analysis. 
Human Communication Research, 27, 409–431. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
2958.2001.tb00787.x 
Sibbitt, R. (1997). The perpetrators of racial harassment and racial violence. Home Office 
Research Study No. 176. Retrieved from the Great Britain Home Office Web site: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors176.pdf 
Simpson, F. (2016, May 15). Man, 25, jailed over planned terrorist attack inspired by Lee 
Rigby murder. News Shopper. Retrieved from 
http://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/14493976.Man__25__jailed_over_planned_te
rrorist_attack_inspired_by_Lee_Rigby_murder/?ref=mrb&lp=10 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 25 
Spiegel Online (2015, November 19.) ‘Punching in the dark’: Why Islamic state is winning 
the online war. Spiegel Online International. Retrieved from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/authorities-struggle-to-control-islamic-
state-online-a-1063490.html 
Steinfeldt, J. A., Foltz, B. D., Kaladow, J. K., Carlson, T. N., Pagano Jr., L. A., Benton, E., 
& Steinfeldt M. C. (2010). Racism in the electronic age: Role of online forums in 
expressing racial attitudes about American Indians. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic 
Minority Psychology, 16, 362-371. DOI: 10.1037/a0018692  
Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of 
Communication, 60, 556–576. DOI:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x. 
Suler, J. (2004). The online disinhibition effect. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 7, 321-326. 
DOI: 10.1089/1094931041291295. 
Sullivan, A. (1999, September 26). What’s so bad about hate? The illogic and illiberalism 
behind hate crime laws. The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/26/magazine/what-s-so-bad-about-hate.html 
Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. 
Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-
48). Pacific Grove, CA: Books/Cole. 
The Blogging Goth (2015, August 18). Sylvia Lancaster and light in Manchester. 
Retrieved from https://theblogginggoth.com/2015/08/18/sylvia-lancaster-at-
darkness-and-light-in-manchester/ 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 26 
The Guardian, (2014, September 24). ISIS in duel with Twitter and YouTube to spread 
extremist propaganda. The Guardian World. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/24/isis-twitter-youtube-message-
social-media-jihadi  
True Vision (2016). Internet hate crime: Offensive material and the law. Retrieved from 
http://report-it.org.uk/reporting_internet_hate_crime 
Uhlman, E., & Swanson, J. (2002). Exposure to violent video games increases automatic 
aggressiveness. Journal of Adolescence, 27, 41-52. DOI: 
10.1016/j.adolescence.2003.10.004 
Wojcieszak, M. (2010). ‘Don’t talk to me’: Effects of ideologically homogenous online 
groups and politically dissimilar offline ties on extremism. New Media Society 12, 
637-655. DOI: 10.1177/1461444809342775  
Zeit Online (2015, December 15). Bundesanwaltschaft lässt Sven Lau verhaften. Zeit 
Online. Retrieved from http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-
12/sven-lau-verhaftung-salafisten-scharia-polizei 
5RB.com (2010). Judgement EWCA-CRIM-65. 5RB.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.5rb.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/R-v-Shepherd-and-Anor-2010-
EWCA-Crim-65.pdf
  27 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Developing an Explicit Measure of Prejudice: 
Determining Attitudes Towards Roma and 
Travellers (Studies 1a & 1b)
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2.1 Abstract 
The purpose of the two studies reported in this chapter was to develop a tool in order to 
measure explicit prejudice towards a group that is less likely to elicit participant responses 
prompted by social desirability (e.g. Roma and Travellers). The measure will be applied in 
a subsequent study (discussed within Chapter 3) that serves to measure changes in 
participants’ levels of prejudice in an online context. The first study used Levinson and 
Sanford’s (1944) Anti-Semitism (AS) scale as a basis to develop this more generic measure. 
After removing all Jewish references from each of the original AS scale’s prejudice 
statements, 111 participants judged 46 of the adapted prejudice statements with a non-
specified group in mind. This was in order to test each statement’s general suitability to 
measure prejudice against groups other than the original target group. A MANOVA 
followed by factor analysis and reliability analysis resulted in the selection of 16 non-group 
specific attitude statements. The second study tested these 16 prejudice statements for their 
specific appropriateness for Roma and Travellers. Particularly, 74 participants rated each 
statement for its in-/appropriateness for these groups. Mean scores and reliability analysis 
revealed that 10 statements could be deemed as appropriate to measure prejudice towards 
Roma and Travellers. The 10 statements together form the new Anti-Roma and Traveller 
(ART) scale, which serves to measure (changes in) levels of prejudice towards Roma and 
Travellers in Chapter three’s study.  
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2.2 Introduction 
In psychology, attitude research in the context of prejudice has focused on 
(measuring) people’s implicit and explicit attitudes towards certain social groups (e.g. 
Black/Jewish people/women/homosexuals). Implicit attitude measures examine 
participants’ performance during certain tasks, which, to the participant, might seem 
unrelated to the group in question (e.g. Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005). For example, implicit measures include recording 
participants’ reaction times or use of word pairing words tasks. Whilst these measures do 
not measure attitudes directly, responses to such tasks are believed to reflect underlying 
attitudes (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007). 
Explicit attitude measures, on the other hand, examine people’s overt responses to 
questions or issues and rely on the assumption that people are responding truthfully. An 
advantage of this approach is that explicit measures can easily be administered in the form 
of questionnaires or interviews. Explicit attitude measures are also appropriate for settings 
where researchers aim to elicit participants’ free expressions of their opinions, such as in 
online interactions. However, here the main disadvantage of the explicit measurement 
approach is that participants’ responses may not always be truthful. In particular, people 
may respond to questions in line with social desirability and therefore responses may be 
distorted (Jellison, McDonnell & Gabriel, 2004). This is especially relevant in contexts 
where the topic in question may be perceived as sensitive or where societal norms disallow 
the expression of particular attitudes (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Furnham, 1986; 
Gawronski et al., 2007; Joinson, 1999). 
Nevertheless, there is one particular explicit attitude context that has received 
increased interest in recent years, namely, investigations into the expression of prejudice 
and hate-based attitudes online (e.g. Amichai-Hamburger, 2005; Angie et al., 2011; 
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Erjavec & Poler Kovačič, 2012; Joinson, 1999; McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010; 
Peddinti, Ross & Cappos, 2014; Rauch & Schanz, 2013, Steinfeldt et al., 2010; 
Wojcieszak, 2010). In particular, expressions of prejudice and hate-based attitudes are 
increasingly displayed on Social Networking Sites (SNSs), such as instant messaging, 
blogging, tweeting, and commenting (Citron & Norton, 2011). The emerging research 
interest in this area might stem from growing concerns that the accessibility, immediacy 
and popularity of the Internet has the potential to be exploited by those wishing to incite 
hatred against particular groups (Deshotels & Forsyth, 2007; Home Office, 2009). 
Another reason for the interest in this area could be recent news reports of people 
increasingly expressing their negative attitudes online, including prejudice and racial 
hatred (e.g. five Scottish men, see: Hebditch, 2015; Kaiheng, see: BBC News, 2016; 
Konvicka, see: TOL, 2015; Nyman, see: Balona, 2015; Sakhwat Hossain, see: BD News 
24, 2015; UAE national, see: Agarib, 2016;). In London alone, arrests for expressions of 
negative attitudes on SNSs have increased by 37% over the past five years (Corfield, 
2016). Whilst not all of the cases reported in the news resulted in criminal convictions, the 
stories tended to stir up much debate and controversy, both online and offline. This, in 
turn, sometimes appeared to escalate further the prejudice and hatred initially expressed 
online.  
In the UK, some of the cases that resulted in criminal convictions included: R v 
Burgess (Crown Prosecution Service, 2011), who was found guilty to inciting racial hatred 
via comments on Facebook; R v Hamza (Crown Prosecution Service, 2006), who was 
convicted of three counts of using threatening words or behaviour likely to stir up racial 
hatred; R v Heaton and Hannington (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010), who were found 
guilty of inciting racial hatred on the Aryan Strike Force’s online forum; R v Hemingway 
(Crown Prosecution Service, 2010), who was convicted for distributing racially 
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inflammatory recordings on YouTube; Neil Martin (BBC News, 2006), who was charged 
with inciting racial hatred on Anthony Walker’s condolence web page; R v Rahman, 
Saleem, Javed and Muhid (Crown Prosecution Service, 2007), who were found guilty of 
solicitation to murder and stirring up racial hatred arising out of protests over the 
publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad; and Teenager X (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2010), who pleaded guilty to inciting racial hatred for posting hate-filled videos 
on YouTube. It is therefore important and not surprising that researchers have become 
interested in this area. 
The online expressions of prejudice/hate-based attitudes mentioned above are 
inevitably explicit, as they require people to type and subsequently respond to each other in 
an overt manner. Therefore, in the context of examining and evaluating online expressions 
of prejudice/hate-based attitudes, in the form of online interactions, explicit attitude 
measures seem to be the most suitable and straightforward approach. Also, as online set-
ups (i.e. remote designs) do not allow for the direct monitoring of participants’ actions, the 
use of implicit measures (e.g. reliance on reaction times) seems unsuitable. 
To date, there are several explicit scales that measure prejudice towards (certain) 
groups, for example, the Anti-Semitism (AS) scale (Levinson & Sanford, 1944), which 
measures levels of prejudice against Jewish people; or the Modern Racism (MR) scale 
(McConahay, 1986), which measures attitudes towards Black people in America. 
However, when considering the nature of online hate, the groups addressed by these 
existing prejudice scales are said to enjoy so called ‘normative protection’ (Franco & 
Maass, 1999). The implications of ‘normative protection’, as with social desirability, are 
that people generally are less likely to give honest public responses when asked about their 
attitudes towards such groups, despite them potentially holding negative attitudes about 
them in private. 
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There are, however, two particular groups which continue to elicit high levels of 
negative prejudice and persecution within the wider society, and particularly within 
Europe: namely Roma and Travellers (Franco & Maas, 1999; James, 2014; Spears & 
Tausch, 2012). These groups are frequently referred to pejoratively as ‘Gypsies’. For the 
unfortunate reason that they continue to elicit much overt prejudice and their reduced level 
of ‘normative protection’ (Franco & Maass, 1999), Roma and Travellers present an 
appropriate group for investigations into explicit prejudice. Yet, to the author’s knowledge, 
to date, there are no explicit prejudice measures for Roma and Travellers. A prejudice 
measure towards Roma and Travellers could be used in a contemporary online context. 
Particularly, such a measure could help assess the social processes underlying the 
development of negative online expressions of prejudice/hate-based attitudes. 
In addition, Barnett (2013) argued that the stereotypes associated with Roma and 
Travellers overlap with those associated with Jewish people. Therefore, it might be 
possible to adapt an existing prejudice measure for Jewish people, such as the AS scale, in 
order to create a new explicit prejudice measure for Roma and Travellers. Yet, despite the 
suggested overlap in stereotypes associated with both groups, it remains unclear at this 
stage whether it is possible to use the statements of the original AS scale to measure 
prejudice against other social groups. In particular, it is not clear whether participants 
perceive all, some, or none of the individual attitude statements that constitute the AS scale 
to be applicable in addressing a group or groups other than Jewish people. It is therefore 
important and of experimental value to first explore participants’ responses to the original 
AS statements, but with them addressing a group or groups other than Jewish people. Then 
it can be determined whether the statement content is appropriate for Roma and Travellers. 
In sum, the two studies that follow aim to develop an explicit prejudice measure for 
online contexts. In particular, the new explicit prejudice measure serves to determine 
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changes in participants’ levels of prejudice in a subsequent study (discussed within 
Chapter 3), focusing on groups which are not ‘yet’ normatively protected (e.g. Roma and 
Travellers) and therefore less likely to elicit responses which are perceived to be socially 
acceptable.  
2.3 Study 1a: Method 
2.3.1 Ethical Considerations 
Participants were informed of the nature of the study (i.e. to develop a scale to 
measure negative attitudes towards others) and pre-warned of expressions of strong 
attitudes prior to their participation (see Appendix II). They were also informed that 
participation was anonymous insofar that participants only needed to reveal their age and 
gender. In addition, participants were told that the study did not intent to label participants 
as prejudiced against others, but instead wanted to establish that the items to be judged 
were scrutinised for measuring the same principle (i.e. prejudice). To minimise the risk of 
psychological discomfort, participants were also able to choose their own target group, 
which they did not reveal to anyone at any time. After their participation, participants 
received detailed debrief information (see Appendix IV), outlining again that the aim of 
the study. 
2.3.2 Participants 
Initially, 155 participants aged between 19 and 59 years were recruited through 
personal contacts. The sample consisted largely of university staff and students. There was 
no requirement for participants to divulge any personal, identifying details other than their 
age and gender. Of those, 44 participants were excluded because of their omission of 
multiple data points (see section 2.3.3 Data preparation below). This resulted in a final 
sample of 111 participants with the mean age of 32 years (SD = 13) with a gender 
distribution of 79 female and 32 male participants. Forty-five participants rated the 
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statements on paper (i.e. on university premises) and 66 online via SurveyMonkey at their 
homes and workplaces.  
2.3.3 Procedure 
The study involved participants rating 46 attitude statements for their suitability to 
measure prejudice towards an undisclosed, imagined, non-specified group. The statements 
were presented in a survey format. Participants were instructed to rate the statements in 
one of two ways, to which they were assigned randomly. In particular, participants were 
instructed to imagine and focus on a group towards which they held either negative (N= 58 
participants) or positive (N= 53 participants) feelings (see Appendix II for full participant 
instructions). The inclusion of asking participants to rate the statements with a positively 
associated group in mind allowed for the judgement of whether the statements truly 
measured negative attitudes. They were also instructed that this group could be/but did not 
need to be linked by ethnicity, religion, occupation, pastime, by being a particular sports 
team, or anything else that linked them together and made participants either like or dislike 
them. Participants were also specifically instructed to only use the ‘not applicable’ option 
if a statement did not seem to fit their specific (imagined) target group.  
2.3.4 Materials  
In order to develop the new explicit prejudice measure via tapping into 
respondents’ prejudice to an undisclosed/imagined target group (see above), this study 
drew on Levinson and Sanford’s (1944) work and the attitude statements of their Anti-
Semitism (AS) scale (see Appendix I for a complete list of original statements). However, 
before administration to participants, six out of their original 52 statements were removed 
because of their lack of contemporary relevance. In addition, some original statements 
were too specific to Jewish people and could not be easily adapted to other groups (e.g. 
One thing that has hindered the Jews from establishing their own nation is the fact that 
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they really have no culture of their own; instead, they tend to copy the things that are 
important to the native citizens of whatever country they are in; or the true Christian can 
never forgive the Jews for their crucifixion of Christ). The remaining 46 attitude statements 
were then adapted to suit a British sample (e.g. reference to White House was changed to 
Whitehall, to reflect the respective seats of power (see Appendix III for a list of the 46 
statements). 
Furthermore, all anti-Semitic references were removed and instead blank spaces 
were left for participants to picture their imagined target group in them. For example, 
participants would be presented with the following statement: The trouble with letting 
_____ into a neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a typical ______ atmosphere. As 
pointed out above, this was to first explore which attitude statements would, in principle, 
be suitable to measure prejudice towards groups other than the target group for which it 
was originally designed, before testing their specific appropriateness towards Roma and 
Travellers in a second study, and then apply them as an explicit prejudice measure for these 
groups in a subsequent study. For the same reason, it was necessary to include an 
additional ‘not applicable’ option. This was despite Levinson and Sanford’s (1944) 
argument that giving participants a hypothetical neutral point (such as `don’t know’ or ‘not 
applicable’) would result in the use of this option as an avoidance-strategy for undesired or 
disliked questions. Here, forcing participants to make an attitude judgement about a 
stereotype that might not only be perceived as sensitive but might also not apply to the 
group they have in mind could result in their refusal to make any further attitude 
judgements. It was therefore crucial to include a ‘not applicable’ option.  
The response scale for each statement ranged from -3 = strong disagreement, an 
absolute misconception, false to +3 = firm, strong agreement, undoubtedly true in general, 
plus the already described ‘not applicable’ option. The data were transformed following 
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the original scoring system (-3 = 1 point, -2 = 2 points, -1 = 3 points, 1 = 5 points, 2 = 6 
points and 3 = 7 points). In order to avoid inflating or deflating any measured effects, the 
‘not applicable’ responses were scored as 0. As a result, the possible scores for each 
respondent in either condition ranged between 46 and 322 where low scores indicated 
low(er) levels or no prejudice, and high(er) scores indicated higher levels of prejudice. 
2.3.5 Data Preparation 
First, the data were checked for missing and anomalous values. Second, 
participants who responded more than five times with ‘not applicable and/or skipped 
making prejudice judgements were excluded. This was representative of 10% of each 
participant’s responses and thus in line with Bennett’s (2001) argument that replacing 
more than 10% of missing data would bias statistical analyses. Third, whilst Levinson and 
Sanford (1944) replaced up to nine missing responses by matching them to responses of 
similar statements, this study replaced only up to five missing data points per participant 
(i.e. ‘not applicable’ and skipped responses) with participants’ individual overall mean 
rating scores (Chong Guan & Saiful Bahri Yusoff, 2011), as this procedure seemed more 
robust. Please note that the ’not applicable’ and skipped-item responses were both treated 
as missing data because the number of skipped items was as few as twelve total responses 
(0.24%) compared to 3.51% of not applicable responses throughout the remaining 111 
participants’ dataset. 
The method of replacing missing data with participants’ overall mean scores has 
been criticised, as it can lead to an underestimation of the standard error (Howell, 2009). 
Nevertheless, this only becomes a concern if either a large number of missing data points 
are replaced, or if the values to be replaced are not random. In this study only up to 10% of 
participants’ individual missing data points were replaced by their own overall mean 
scores. Also, those values could be classified as somewhat random because under 
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inspection of the overall data set, the missing values were not clustered around particular 
items, but instead appeared randomly throughout the entire data set. 
2.4 Study 1a: Results 
A between-subjects MANOVA was conducted comparing the two ways in which 
participants had rated the prejudice statements (positively versus negatively associated 
group) as the only factor and the 46 prejudice statements as dependent variables. Results 
revealed a significant multivariate main effect for condition, Wilks’ λ = .30, F (46, 64) = 
3.196, p< .001, η2 =.697.  At a univariate level, 30 significant effects were revealed. 
However, Levene’s test was significant for 13 of those 30 statements, indicating that there 
was no equal variance between the two attitude conditions for those items. These 13 
statements were therefore excluded from further analyses. For a summary of the remaining 
17 statements see Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 
Summary table of MANOVA results illustrating suitable prejudice statements. 
Statement Negative 
(N=58) 
Positive 
(N=53) 
 
   M SD M SD F  p η2 
 
It would hurt the business of a large concern if it had too many _______ employees. 4.66 1.87 3.26 2.03 14.01 <.001** .114 
______ should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating 
faults, if they really want to stop being persecuted. 
4.84 2.05 3.89 2.08 15.72 <.001** .126 
War shows up the fact that the  _____ are not patriotic, nor willing to make sacrifices for their 
country. 
3.11 1.94 2.26 1.67   6.04  .016* .053 
Much resentment against _____ stems from their tendency to keep apart and to exclude 
people from their social life. 
4.43 1.86 3.29 1.90 10.25 .002** .086 
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Colleges should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of _____ in fields 
which have too many of them now. 
   3.17 1.95 2.40 1.85 4.52 .036* .040 
_____ may have moral standards that they apply in their dealing with each other, but with 
others they are unscrupulous, ruthless and undependable. 
3.98 2.02 2.29  2.03 7.57 .007** .065 
There is something different and strange about _____; one never knows what they are 
thinking or planning, not what makes them tick. 
3.60 1.94 2.64  1.93 6.80 .010* .059 
The _____ problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods   
can ever solve it. 
4.10 2.06 2.78  1.91 12.12 <.001** .100 
The trouble with letting _____ into a neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a typical 
______ atmosphere. 
4.52 2.09 2.76  1.80 22.26 <.001** .170 
______ millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their 
money goes into worthwhile national causes. 
3.98 2.07 3.06  2.09    5.43 .022*   .047 
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_____leaders should encourage _____ to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of professions 
and activities already over-crowded with _____, and to keep out of the public notice. 
2.74 1.84 2.00  1.65 4.98 .028*   .044 
The _____ keep much to themselves, instead of taking proper interest in community problems 
and good government. 
4.48 1.97 3.04 1.98 14.85 <.001**   .120 
_____ tend to remain a foreign element in society, to preserve their old social standards and to 
resist the western way of life. 
4.37 2.08 2.62 1.83 21.97 <.001**   .168 
Districts containing many _____ always seem to be smelly, dirty, shabby and unattractive.    4.06  2.23  2.26 1.91 21.30 <.001**    .163 
There are few exceptions, but in general _____ are pretty much alike.   4.16  2.21  3.15  2.11 5.99   .016* .052 
There seems to be some revolutionary streak in the ____ make-up as shown by the fact that 
there are so many _____ agitators. 
  3.45  1.95  2.65 1.99 4.77   .031* .042 
_____ tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most menial 
work and to live under standards that are far below average. 
  3.17    2.11 2.38 1.86 4.39   .038* .039 
Note. *p<.05., **p<.01
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Responses to the remaining 17 statements were subjected to a Principal 
Components Analysis. The resulting Scree Plot revealed three factors with Eigenvalues 
above 1. Yet, the inspection of the total variance explained showed that two of the three 
factors accounted for only 13.10% of the total variance, leaving one factor accounting for 
48.82% of the variance. Furthermore, the component matrix extracted only one factor. 
Sixteen out of 17 statements loaded high on factor 1 (above .50; see Table 2.2). As these 
statements tapped into general levels of prejudice, the factor was labelled ‘Prejudice’. The 
only statement (Much resentment against _____ stems from their tendency to keep apart 
and to exclude people from their social life) with a loading below .50 was subsequently 
excluded, leaving sixteen statements for further analysis
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Statement Factor 1  
(‘Prejudice’) 
Communality 
The trouble with letting _____ into a neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a typical ______ 
atmosphere. 
.81 .69 
The _____ keep much to themselves, instead of taking proper interest in community problems and 
good government. 
.78 .67 
______ should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating faults, if 
they really want to stop being persecuted. 
.77 .61 
______ millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their money goes 
into worthwhile national causes. 
.76 .57 
The _____ problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods can ever 
solve it. 
.74 .57 
Table 2.2 
 
Summary table showing the one-factor- solution ‘prejudice’ of the factor analysis (descending order). 
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_____ may have moral standards that they apply in their dealing with each other, but with others 
they are unscrupulous, ruthless and undependable. 
.73 .55 
Districts containing many _____ always seem to be smelly, dirty, shabby and unattractive. .72 .52 
Colleges should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of _____ in fields which have 
too many of them now. 
.72 .57 
There is something different and strange about _____; one never knows what they are thinking or 
planning, not what makes them tick. 
.70 .53 
_____leaders should encourage _____ to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of professions and 
activities already over-crowded with _____, and to keep out of the public notice. 
.69 .56 
_____ tend to remain a foreign element in society, to preserve their old social standards and to resist 
the western way of life. 
.67 .75 
There are few exceptions, but in general _____ are pretty much alike. .67 .50 
It would hurt the business of a large concern if it had too many _______ employees. .66 .44 
_____ tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most menial work 
and to live under standards that are far below average. 
.64 .43 
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There seems to be some revolutionary streak in the ____ make-up as shown by the fact that there are      
so many _____ agitators. 
.64 .41 
War shows up the fact that the  ____ are not patriotic, nor willing to make sacrifices for their 
country. 
.63 .44 
Much resentment against _____ stems from their tendency to keep apart and to exclude people from   
their social life. 
.49 .72 
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The remaining 16 statements were subjected to a reliability analysis, revealing a 
Cronbach coefficient of .93. This result is in line with the high reliability of previous 
studies using (attitude statements of) the Anti-Semitism scale, which have ranged from .96 
to .98 (Levinson & Sanford, 1944; Jones-Wiley et al., 2007). 
2.5 Study 1a: Discussion  
This study served as the first step towards the development of an explicit prejudice 
measure in order to determine changes in people’s levels of prejudice in an online context 
in a subsequent study. Its specific purpose was to explore and identify if any prejudice 
statements of an existing prejudice measure (i.e. the Anti-Semitism scale) would be 
suitable to measure prejudice towards other groups. Results identified 16 prejudice 
statements as suitable to measure explicit prejudice towards a range of non-specific target 
groups.  
With regard to reliability, one could argue that the procedure of selecting the 16 
prejudice statements was more robust than the procedure of similar studies (e.g. Levinson 
& Sanford, 1944). For example, this study used a stricter, more conservative and less 
subjective scheme for replacing missing data. However, this scheme also led to the 
exclusion of 44 sets of participant data (28%). Despite this seemingly large exclusion rate, 
similar studies (e.g. Levinson & Sanford, 1944) also excluded large numbers of 
participants (22%) due to missing data. Here, participants’ missing data might suggest that 
they either refused to rate some statements because they did not like them, or they might 
have perceived that those statements were simply ‘not applicable’ to the specific group 
they had in mind. The difference between participants’ refusals or perceptions of 
statements as ‘not applicable’ cannot be determined here, as responses were treated equally 
as missing data. Yet, it seems unlikely that participants refused to judge the statements 
because they did not like them as there were only a few missing (non-judged) data points. 
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In the latter case, future research would need to investigate the specific target groups for 
which these statements are considered in-/appropriate.  
In addition, the negative wording throughout the prejudice statements can be 
criticised in contexts where they ‘simply’ measure prejudice because it can create a general 
negative view in participants and thus lead to an inflation of the measured levels of 
prejudice. However, here the consistent negative wording of the statements should have 
aided the process of selecting the most suitable statements. In particular, participants 
should have judged the items that are most suitable to measure prejudice towards their 
respective imagined groups at the end of the rating scale, compared to items which are not 
suitable. Specifically, participants who judged the statements with a negatively associated 
group in mind should have indicated their strong agreement (i.e. indicating high prejudice) 
to them. In addition, participants who judged the statements with a positively associated 
group in mind should have indicated their strong disagreement (i.e. indicating no 
prejudice) to them. Consequently, in addition to the obvious ‘not applicable’ ratings, 
unsuitable statements should have received less strong participant ratings, thus 
discriminating between suitable and unsuitable statements.  
Finally, the extent to which the 16 adapted attitude statements derived from the AS 
scale can be used as a suitable measure towards specific target groups (e.g. Roma and 
Travellers) is subject of the next study (see below). For instance, some of these statements 
may be perceived as accurately depicting stereotypes associated with Roma and Travellers, 
but others may not. In particular, the study that follows aims to test to what extent the 16 
prejudice statements are appropriate to measure prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. 
This is, as pointed out before, to apply them in a subsequent study (see chapter 3) where 
they serve to determine changes in people’s levels of prejudice towards Roma and 
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Travellers as the target group. The next study therefore aims to determine the extent to 
which each statement taps into stereotypes associated with Roma and Travellers. 
2.6 Study 1b: Method 
2.6.1 Ethical Considerations 
Participants were informed of the nature of the study (i.e. the development of a 
scale to measure prejudice towards Gypsies1 for a contemporary setting) prior to 
participation (see Appendix V). They were also informed that the only identifiable 
information they needed to provide was their age and gender. In addition, participants 
learnt before their participation that the study intended to establish whether the statements 
to be judged were appropriately describing Roma and Travellers and not to measure their 
own levels of prejudice towards them. After participation, participants received detailed 
debrief information (see Appendix VI). 
2.6.2 Materials 
First, Roma and Travellers were specified as the target group for each of the 16 
prejudice statements identified in the previous study (e.g. The Gypsies keep much to 
themselves, instead of taking proper interest in community problems and good 
government.). Second, response ratings were changed from dis/agreement to each 
statement to a 10-point Likert scale to tap the appropriateness of each statement for 
measuring prejudice against these particular target groups. A rating of 1 indicated that 
participants perceived the statement as completely inappropriate to describe, and therefore 
                                                
1 Please note that whilst this thesis refers to the target group as Roma and 
Travellers, the statements participants judged referred to the pejorative term ‘Gypsy’ 
because people tend to be more familiar with the term. However, outside of the parameter 
of this thesis, Roma and Travellers are seen and to be understood as two distinctive groups. 
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measure, prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. A rating of 10 indicated that participants 
perceived the statement as completely appropriate to describe, and therefore measure, 
prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. Only statements which received mean ratings of 
six and above were deemed appropriate to measure prejudice for Roma and Travellers.  
2.6.3 Participants and Procedure 
Seventy-four third-year undergraduate criminology students, of whom 52 were 
female, 21 were male and one did not indicate their gender, and with a mean age of 24 
years (SD = 10.5) rated the 16 statements, based on their appropriateness for measuring 
prejudiced attitudes towards Roma and Travellers.2 In particular, participants were asked to 
circle each corresponding number between 1 and 10 on one out of 16 Likert scales. The 
study was administered on paper and did not ask participants to divulge any personal, 
identifying details other than their age and gender.  
2.7 Study 1b: Results 
Descriptive statistics showed that 10 of the 16 statements received mean scores 
above six, indicating their suitability/appropriateness as measures of prejudice towards 
Roma and Travellers (see Table 2.3 below). Consequently, the six statements that received 
scores below six were considered inappropriate and hence excluded, leaving 10 statements 
for further analyses. Responses to the remaining 10 statements were then subjected to a 
reliability analysis, revealing a Cronbach alpha of .92. This reliability coefficient remains 
in line with the reliability coefficient obtained for the 16-statements in the first study (.93).  
 
 
                                                
2 The inspection of the data revealed that participants had rated all of the statements 
and therefore no data were excluded from or replaced in the analysis. 
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Table 2.3 
 
Summary table of statements’ appropriateness towards ‘Gypsies’ (descending order). 
Statement M   SD 
Gypsies keep much to themselves, instead of taking proper interest in community problems and good government. 8.30* 1.61 
Gypsies tend to remain a foreign element in society, to preserve their old social standards and to resist the Western way of 
life. 
8.05* 1.92 
Gypsies may have moral standards that they apply in their dealing with each other, but with others they are unscrupulous, 
ruthless and undependable. 
7.96* 1.33 
There are a few exceptions, but in general, Gypsies are pretty much alike. 7.56* 2.14 
The trouble with letting Gypsies into a neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a typical Roma and Traveller 
atmosphere. 
7.26* 2.15 
Gypsy millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their money goes into worthwhile 
national causes 
7.22* 2.24 
Areas containing many Gypsies always seem to be smelly, dirty shabby and unattractive. 6.80* 2.73 
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It would hurt the business of a large concern if it had too many Gypsy employees. 6.75* 2.54 
Gypsies should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating faults, if they really want to stop 
being persecuted. 
6.73* 2.56 
The Gypsy problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods can ever solve it. 6.39* 2.57 
Gypsies tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most menial work and to live under 
standards that are far below average. 
5.97 2.98 
There is something different and strange about Gypsies; one never knows what they are thinking or planning, not what 
makes them tick. 
5.59 2.84 
There seems to be some revolutionary streak in the Gypsy make-up as shown by the fact that there are so many Gypsy 
agitators. 
5.45 2.89 
War shows up the fact that the Gypsies are not patriotic, nor willing to make sacrifices for their country. 5.28 2.86 
Gypsy leaders should encourage Gypsies to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of professions and activities already over-
crowded with them, and to keep out of the public notice. 
5.07 2.54 
Colleges should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of Gypsies in fields which have too many of them 
now. 
4.82 2.93 
*Statements to be retained for further analyses and as part of the second study of this chapter. 
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2.8 Study 1b: Discussion 
This study was part of the development of an explicit prejudice measure towards 
Roma and Travellers which is to be applied in a subsequent study discussed in the third 
chapter. It specifically aimed to test the appropriateness and reliability of 16 prejudice 
statements towards these groups. Results showed that 10 out of 16 statements were rated as 
appropriate and reliable measures of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. These 10 
items were therefore retained and form the new explicit prejudice measure towards Roma 
and Travellers, which serves to determine changes in participants’ levels of prejudice in a 
subsequent study discussed in Chapter 3. 
These findings also support Barnett’s (2013) suggestion that there is an overlap 
between the stereotypes associated with Jewish people and Roma and Travellers. Yet, the 
six prejudice statements participants rated inappropriate for Roma and Travellers also 
indicate that this overlap does not apply to all stereotypes associated with both of these 
groups.  
2.9 Studies 1a & 2b: General Discussion  
Overall, the two studies discussed above aimed to develop an explicit prejudice 
measure for groups that do not enjoy normative protection (e.g. Roma and Travellers) and 
are therefore less likely to receive responses in line with social desirability. In particular, 
this new prejudice measure will be applied to determine changes in people’s levels of 
prejudice towards Roma and Travellers as the target groups in an online context in a 
subsequent study (discussed in detail within Chapter 3).  
The two studies identified 10 prejudice statements as suitable and appropriate to 
measure prejudice towards Roma and Travellers. These 10 prejudice statements together 
form the new anti-Roma and Traveller (ART) scale. The ART scale might be seen as a 
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particularly well-suited tool for investigations into expressions of negative attitudes, 
including online hate, in overt contexts such as in online interactions.  
In line with this, the length of the ART scale is also advantageous because its 
shortness allows for easy and fast administration. For example, the ART scale can easily 
be applied to determine changes in people’s levels of prejudice in experimental designs, 
such as the one adopted in the study described in the third chapter (i.e. the study for which 
it was designed).  
2.9.1 Validity and Reliability Concerns 
Whilst the shortness of the ART makes it an easy-to-administer tool, it also limits 
it. Specifically, whilst the original AS scale consisted of 52 statements tapping into a broad 
range of content associated with the stereotyping of Jewish people, the ART scale does not 
cover a broad content range. In particular, the ART scale only measures some stereotypical 
content associated with Roma and Travellers (e.g. that they are unwilling to integrate; that 
the areas that they live in are always run down; that it is their own fault that they are being 
persecuted by society).  
Consequently, the ART scale can only measure those aspects of people’s prejudice 
towards Roma and Travellers which are addressed by its statements. The consequence is 
that, by not addressing the full range of content associated with the stereotyping of Roma 
and Travellers, the ART scale might indicate different (i.e. lower) levels of prejudice than 
people might hold. Yet, for the purpose of measuring some ‘general’ stereotypes 
associated with Roma and Travellers, and thus indicate a baseline measure of prejudice 
towards these groups, the ART scale presents a useful tool. 
In addition, as pointed out previously, one could argue that the consistent negative 
wording of the ART scale might create a generally negative mind-set in participants. The 
consequence could be that participants might rate the statements and thus the group more 
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negatively than they actually feel. However, as Levinson and Sanford (1944) pointed out, 
not all of the statements are obviously anti-Semitic (here, Anti-Roma and Traveller). 
Specifically, they argued that participants have to understand and evaluate different levels 
and aspects of Anti-Semitism. Their argument is also true for the ART scale, as the 
statement content remains similar to that of the original scale and therefore participants 
would also have to understand and evaluate the particular meaning of each of the ART 
scale’s statements. 
One further point with regard to the reliability of the ART scale relates to the early 
developmental procedure. In particular, the removal of all Jewish references from the 
original Anti-Semitism scale’s statements reduced the degree of consistency. Specifically, 
this process resulted in an inevitably larger range of groups that participants based their 
judgements on than the original Anti-Semitism scale. Yet, arguably, this process was 
necessary in order to determine if there were any suitable statements for the successful 
development of the ART Scale. 
Finally, the gender distribution of participants in both studies was heavily balanced 
on females. In addition, no data on participants’ nationality was obtained in either study. 
Moreover, the sample of the second study consisted of criminology students, which 
arguably were more aware and thus sensitive to the issues explored here. As a result, the 
results may suffer from a potential gender, nationality and expert bias and thus may not be 
completely representative.  
Along similar lines, the participant samples were rather ‘specific’ because they 
consisted predominantly of university staff and students, a sample, one could argue to be 
educated and more broad-minded than the population at large. In line with this, research 
into the association between education and prejudice remains controversial (Kane & 
Kyyrö, 2001). In broad terms, there are two main assumptions about this relationship.  
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First, education is considered to enlighten and therefore reduce prejudice and promote 
social equality (Apostle, Glock, Piazza, & Suelzle, 1983; Farley, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson, 
& Reeves 1994; Lipset, 1960; Stouffer, 1955). Second, education can reinforce social 
inequality and, in doing so, foster prejudice (Jackman & Muha, 1984; Kane, 1995).  
Although there are different views on the relationship between education and 
prejudice, the specific sample here does not seem to have influenced the results of either of 
the two studies. Particularly, neither of the studies measured participants’ levels of 
prejudice per se. Instead, the first study measured the general suitability of certain 
prejudice statements to measure prejudice towards non-specific groups. In addition, the 
second study only measured whether the prejudice statements identified in the first study 
could appropriately measure prejudice towards specific target groups (i.e. Roma and 
Travellers).  
2.9.3 Conclusion 
The overall purpose of the two studies discussed above was to develop a new, 
explicit prejudice measure for the study discussed within the next chapter. There, it will 
determine changes in people’s levels of prejudice towards particular, normatively 
unprotected target groups (i.e. Roma and Travellers) in an online and therefore explicit 
context. Measuring prejudice towards normatively unprotected groups serves to reduce the 
risk of eliciting socially desirable responses. The two studies identified 10 prejudice 
statements as suitable to measure prejudice towards Roma and Travellers, which together 
form the new Anti-Roma and Traveller (ART) scale. Although the ART scale does not 
address every negative stereotype associated with Roma and Travellers, it nevertheless 
presents a useful baseline measure of prejudice towards these groups.    
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3.1 Abstract 
Increasingly, people argue that hate groups use Social Networking Sites (SNSs) to influence 
others to promote their hateful views. Yet, to date, there is little empirical evidence on the 
processes underlying the development of such influence on SNSs. This study explored 
whether participation in online group discussions, via instant messaging chat-rooms, could 
influence (increase or decrease) participants’ levels of prejudice. One hundred and twenty-
four participants completed this two-session study. In the first session, participants 
completed a prejudice measure, tapping explicit prejudice towards Roma and Travellers 
(target group). Based on their responses, participants were divided into three groups (low, 
intermediate, and high level of prejudice towards these groups). In the second session, small 
online groups (including one confederate) of three-to-four participants with similar levels of 
prejudice (low, intermediate, or high) discussed the eviction of a particular British Traveller 
site (i.e. Dale Farm). During the discussion, the confederate used instant messaging either to 
try and increase or decrease participants’ existing (pre-task) levels of prejudice towards 
Roma and Travellers. Results showed that participation in online group discussions 
influenced participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice. In particular, 
participants with intermediate levels of prejudice displayed significantly higher levels of 
post-task prejudice towards Roma and Travellers after the confederate exposed them to 
messages aiming to increase their levels of prejudice. Yet, participants with intermediate 
levels of pre-task prejudice, who were exposed to the argument aiming to reduce their levels 
of prejudice, resisted influence. This suggests that whilst most participants resisted influence 
through online discussions, those with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice are most 
susceptible to negative online influence. Therefore, people’s susceptibility to online 
influence seems to relate to their existing levels of prejudice and the type of argument to 
which they are exposed.  
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3.2 Introduction  
Most people would probably agree that the Internet, including mobile applications 
and other forms of digital networking, present a range of useful and positive aspects, 
including research, information sharing, and social networking. Some people might even 
find it impossible to imagine a world without the Internet. Yet, whilst it clearly offers many 
benefits, some researchers, policy makers, practitioners and charitable organisations are 
increasingly expressing their concern about people’s use of SNSs to spread hateful 
messages and views – that is to influence others negatively (e.g. Angie et al., 2010; 
Association of Chief Police Officers, 2014; Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Home Office, 2009; 
Lee & Leets, 2002; Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2010; Perry, 
2000; Stern, 2012).  
In particular, hate groups are being accused of using SNSs to influence others 
through means of persuasive communication strategies, including online interactions and 
discussions (Wojcieszak, 2010). For example, research has already demonstrated that 
White supremacists and other hate groups use the Internet, and increasingly SNSs, to 
recruit new members (Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Douglas, 2007; Gerstenfeld, Grant 
& Chiang, 2003) and to reinforce their views amongst ‘like-minded’ others (Angie et al., 
2010; DeKoster & Houtman, 2009; Glaser, Dixit & Green, 2002; Green, Abelson & 
Garnett, 1999, Wojcieszak, 2010). Supporting this, according to Price, Nir and Cappella 
(2006) it is now widely accepted that group interactions can influence individuals’ 
opinions and that individuals choose their discussion partners based on them holding 
similar views (Mutz, 2006). Indeed, Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) and Myers and 
Bishop (1970) found that, following ‘like-minded’ group discussions, participants became 
more extreme in their existing views (i.e. more favourable/less prejudiced or less 
favourable/more prejudiced towards target groups). 
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In line with this, a recent survey revealed that more than 25% of people in the UK 
witnessed hate crimes in 2015, of which 28% were on SNSs (BBC News, 2016). Another 
survey of young people revealed that 82% had witnessed online hate on SNSs based on 
race, religion, gender or sexuality in 2015 (Graham, 2016). In addition, Sunstein (2001, 
2009) argued that interactions between ‘like-minded’ people in online groups, including 
those facilitated by SNSs, can influence them insofar that they can become more extreme 
(i.e. polarised) in their existing views. He further argued that such influence would 
ultimately mobilise some people towards engaging in acts of hatred 1, a view shared by the 
UK Home Office (2009). Yet, whilst some have argued that physical acts of hatred tend to 
be carried out by the minority of those who might have been interacting with others online 
(e.g. Sullivan, 1999), some of these consequences (e.g. suicide bombings, nail bombs, 
mass shootings) nevertheless present a serious threat.   
Research investigating the strategies used by hate groups in specific set-ups (i.e. on 
SNSs) remains limited. In particular, social influence (here, exercised during online 
interactions in the form of discussions between ‘like-minded’ multi-users) within the 
context of online hate has not yet been examined. The potential of (social/political) 
influence on Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms (SMPs) through 
means of algorithms (e.g. Wang, Cong, Song & Xie, 2010) and filters/personalising 
information to match/reinforce existing views (e.g. filter bubble; Pariser, 2011; echo 
chamber effect; Adamic & Glance, 2005; Mutz & Martin, 2001; Sunstein, 2001) has 
already been established in other contexts, such as political campaigns and advertising. It 
                                                
1 In this study, the majority of references made in relation to the broad term ‘hate’ refer 
to ethnic hate. However, it does not exclude other forms of hate, such as hate towards 
alternative subcultures, disability, gender, faith or transgender. 
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seems therefore reasonable to suggest that these individual-based concepts do also apply to 
social influence in online hate. Yet, to the researcher’s knowledge, there are no studies on 
the development of hate that have assessed the influence of participation in ‘like-minded’ 
online group discussions.  
Building on this under-researched area, this study aims to address these gaps. In 
particular, an aim of this study is to examine the relationship between online influence (i.e. 
changes in people’s existing levels of prejudice) and ‘like-mindedness’. Specifically, this 
study aims to explore if participating in online discussions with others who hold similar 
levels of prejudice towards a target group, can influence individuals’ existing levels of 
prejudice towards this group. Influence is applied by a confederate in the form of 
statements designed to reinforce or refute existing stereotypes towards the target group. 
Exploring this relationship will therefore enable us to determine if online interactions do, 
indeed, play a role in shaping online hate (i.e. increase or decrease levels of prejudice).  
First, relevant models and theoretical frameworks that explain how participants might 
be influenced by online interactions will be presented. This will include the elaboration-
likelihood model (ELM) of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, b), group polarisation 
(Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) and self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell,1987). In particular, these models and frameworks will help to 
illustrate when and why group discussions are likely to impact on individuals’ levels of 
prejudice. Then, a range of predictions in relation to the role played by participation in 
online discussions amongst multi-users (i.e. groups) and its influence on existing levels of 
prejudice will be outlined. 
3.2.1 The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion 
In order to be influential, communication - including with those who express hate -
requires those targeted to decide whether they agree or disagree (i.e. will be persuaded or 
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not) with the positions presented to them. According to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986a, b) 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), the outcome of any persuasive communication 
attempt depends on the level of mental effort required to process the presented 
information, argument, or position. In particular, they suggest that there are two routes by 
which we can be persuaded, a central or a peripheral route. Together these mark the 
endpoints of a high-to-low mental effort processing continuum (Petti & Cacioppo, 1986a, 
b).  
The central route describes people’s high efforts to process the given information, 
whereby successful persuasion depends on their motivation and ability to process and 
evaluate the position or quality of the argument presented to them (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1981). Here, personal relevance of the message/topic is another important factor for 
successful persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b; Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981). In 
line with this, if we do not understand the message, we are unlikely to be motivated to 
process and thus be influenced by it through means of central processing (Eagly, 1974; Lee 
& Leets, 2002; Woodall & Burgoon, 1981).  
In addition, Petty and Cacioppo (1981) argued that in order for us to change our 
attitudes via the central route, we need to perceive the message, at least in part, positively. 
Consequently, we are unlikely to change our attitudes if we perceive the argument/message 
negatively. In the context of online interactions shaping online hate, members of (hate) 
groups are likely to perceive any persuasive attempt by other ‘like-minded’ individuals (i.e. 
those who hold similar levels of prejudice towards the target group) during online 
interactions, as relatively positive, and thus are likely to be persuaded. Yet, when 
confronted with opposing views (e.g. during online interactions with ‘other’ out-group 
members on public forums and SNSs), (hate) group members are likely to perceive such 
views negatively and thus resist influence/change (Rauch & Schanz, 2014; Rohlfing & 
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Sonnenberg, 2016). In turn, the presentation of counter-attitudinal positions might lead 
people to scrutinise and evaluate them in greater detail (i.e. process them centrally) and 
consequently form strong counter-arguments to resist them (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990). 
Therefore, in the context of this study, people who are exposed to counter-attitudinal 
arguments are not only likely to resist influence, but also might become more hateful or 
exacerbate their pre-existing views (i.e. polarise) through further reinforcement of their 
existing views (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Wojcieszak, 2010). 
The peripheral route represents low mental effort processing, whereby successful 
persuasion requires little motivation and little ability to process and evaluate the position 
presented carefully (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). In particular, when people lack topic 
knowledge or are not motivated to process the presented information, they tend to rely on 
cues/heuristics to help them decide whether they agree or disagree with the message 
content/position. Such cues include first impressions of the communicator, perceived 
credibility, or whether they like the communicator (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Consequently, the peripheral route is more superficial than the central route and persuasive 
effects following peripheral processing have been found to be less enduring than those 
resulting from central processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; 1986a). Subsequently, those 
who form their attitudes through central processing not only hold stronger attitudes 
(Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 1993), but are also more resistant to 
counter-arguments (Petty, Haugtvedt & Smith, 2014) than those who form their attitudes 
through peripheral processing (Stroebe, 2012). Unsurprisingly, strong attitudes (i.e. 
existing ones) are considered to be more resistant to change and are held with greater 
certainty than weak attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Fazio, 1990, O’Keefe, 2004; Petty 
& Krosnick, 1995). 
Little empirical research has investigated strategies and processes underlying the 
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development of online hate. However, persuasiveness of narrative, including receptivity 
(e.g. Lee & Leets, 2002), and frequency of Internet use (Steinfeldt et al., 2010) have been 
found to increase individuals’ level of prejudice and (hateful) message acceptance. Whilst 
this line of research largely focused on persuasion exerted by one individual on another, in 
the context of this study, persuasion is expected to be the result of group influence (i.e. 
persuasion exerted by the group or a group member on (an)other group member(s). 
Therefore, next, this aspect will be considered in more detail. 
3.2.2. Persuasion Exerted by the Group 
In groups, people not only express their attitudes and behaviours amongst other 
‘like-minded’ group members, they also conform to the group’s norms to guide their 
attitudes and behaviours (Hewstone & Martin, 2012). They thereby create and maintain a 
‘like-minded’ belief system. In group settings, including online communication between 
members of hate-groups, members can be influenced for many reasons. For example, 
members try to i) seek the group’s approval and acceptance (normative influence, Deutsch 
& Gerard, 1955), ii) build and maintain social relationships within the group, or iii) 
manage their identity as a member of a ‘like-minded’ group (Kelman, 1958). In addition, 
members can be influenced because they accept the information provided by the group to 
be accurate (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Hewstone & Martin, 2012; informational influence, 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Whilst all persuasion can be incidental or deliberate, persuasion 
in this study will be exerted deliberately. Therefore, some additional theoretical models 
that explain how the group might influence individuals during online interactions will be 
outlined next.    
3.2.2.1 Group polarisation and self-categorisation. Group polarisation suggests 
that group decisions become more polarised than individual ones (Cooper, Kelly & 
Weaver, 2003). In particular, and as discussed as part of the ELM, following interactions 
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with ‘like-minded’ others (e.g. group members), individuals tend to shift their views 
towards more extreme opinions. Whilst the ELM focuses on the cognitive routes in which 
information is processed in relation to persuasion, the Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; 
e.g. Turner et al., 1987) focuses on the social-psychological process by which individuals 
define themselves as members of a particular social group (Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 
2005; Turner, 1991). Part of this includes individuals’ internalising the group’s critical 
values and norms as part of their social identity. In particular, the extent to which 
individuals are influenced by or conform to the group depends on: (1) how much they 
identify with the group; (2) how consistent new ideas and proposals brought to group 
members are with the group’s critical (i.e. group defining) norms and values; and (3) how 
much group members who are trying to influence other group members are perceived as 
(proto)typical (i.e. are representative as group defining; Reicher et al., 2005). Specifically, 
these prototypical members highlight and reinforce, through persuasive arguments, the 
norms and similarities of one’s own in-group (i.e. ‘us’), whilst differentiating the group 
from ‘other’ out-groups (i.e. ‘them’; Reicher et al., 2005). This differentiating serves to 
maximise the differences between both groups (i.e. creating an in- and out-group division; 
Reicher et al., 2005; Turner, et al., 1987), which, in turn, creates the perception of extreme 
group norms to which non-prototypical group members, who positively identify with the 
group, are likely to conform (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990).  
3.2.2.2 Social comparison. In the context of online hate, group polarisation is not 
only based on maximising perceived inter-group differences, but also on the deliberate 
attempt to portray in-groups favourably and out-groups unfavourably (Charteris-Black, 
2006, Turner et al., 1987). In particular, hateful individuals and groups tend to use the 
Internet, and specifically SNSs and online discussions, to recruit new members and 
share/reinforce their ideology amongst ‘like-minded’ people, which, in turn, provides them 
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with a positive and salient social identity (Angie et al., 2011, Beirich, 2014; DeKoster & 
Houtman, 2008). For example, studies investigating the persuasive power of online 
interactions in the context of promoting and exacerbating hate (e.g. Bostdorff, 2004; 
Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc & Lala, 2005; McNamee, Petersen & Peña, 2010; Rauch & 
Schanz, 2014) have found that hate groups use strategies, such as the reinforcement of 
existing negative stereotypes (Steinfeldt, et al., 2010), the presentation of biased 
knowledge (Bostdorff, 2004), ‘out-grouping’ through creations of identity threats 
(Douglas, et al., 2005) and the reinforcement of a shared group identity (McNamee et al., 
2010). In line with the self-categorisation account, these strategies not only maximise 
in/out-group differences (i.e. categorical thinking), and thereby create an even stronger 
sense of ‘like-mindedness’ amongst in-group members, they also have the ability to 
polarise the views of hate group members towards out-groups, which serves to create inter-
group conflict (Gerstenfeld et al., 2003; Glaser, et al., 2002; Green et al., 1999). This inter-
group conflict can then lead to hostility towards members of these out-groups via in-group 
mobilisation (Angie et al., 2011; Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007), and can act as the 
justification for hateful actions towards out-group members (Blazak, 2001; Bostdorff, 
2004; Douglas et al., 2005).  
3.2.3 Study Overview 
A 2 (type of argument: pro versus counter-attitudinal) x 2 (levels of prejudice: pre-
/post-task level of prejudice) factorial study will investigate the persuasive effects of online 
discussions (i.e. changes in levels of prejudice, whereby the discussion serves as the 
experimental task) on groups of ‘like-minded’ participants (here, participants with low, 
intermediate or high levels of prejudice towards a specific target group).  
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The discussion topic will relate to the eviction of a particular Roma and Traveller 
site, namely Dale Farm, whereby Roma and Travellers represent the target group.2 This 
specific group was selected based on the sensitive nature of the task (i.e. being exposed to 
and potentially expressing prejudice towards Roma and Travellers) and their unfortunate 
fate to continue eliciting high levels of explicit negative prejudice and persecution within 
the wider society, and particularly within Europe (Franco & Maas, 1999; James, 2014; 
Spears & Tausch, 2012). Therefore, expressions of prejudice against Roma and Travellers 
should be considered normative by some or all of the participants. 
The dependent variable, changes in levels of prejudice towards Roma and 
Travellers, is measured through a self-report attitude measure (i.e. the ART Scale – see 
Chapter 2) on six-point Likert scales. The two independent variables are the type of 
argument and levels of prejudice. The type of argument is operationalised by two 
positions, namely whether the argument is in line with (i.e. pro) or counter-attitudinal to 
(i.e. anti) its recipient’s views. Levels of prejudice are operationalised by two points of 
measurement (i.e. before and after the discussion task), hence this study will be carried out 
in two sessions. ‘Like-mindedness’ is operationalised by participants’ similar levels of 
existing (i.e. pre-task) prejudice, which were categorised as low, intermediate and high. 
Group identification, in terms of its influence on participants’ views (Karasawa, 1991) and 
                                                
2 For the purpose of this study Roma and Travellers have been grouped together 
because peoples’ perceptions of these groups are often interchangeable. This is also 
evidenced by the pejorative term ‘Gypsies’, which is often used to refer to these groups. 
Yet, it should be noted that outside of the parameter of this study, Roma and Travellers are 
two distinctive groups.  
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commitment to the group (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk, 1999) will be considered as 
additional mediating variables to online influence.  
3.2.4 Hypotheses 
Based on previous persuasion and online hate research, it is predicted that ‘like-
minded’ participants with intermediate levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers 
(i.e. weaker attitudes) will be influenced in the direction of the message source (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005; Fazio, 1990; Lee & Leets, 2002; O’Keefe, 2004; Petty & Krosnick, 2014), 
whereas participants with low and high levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers 
(i.e. strong attitudes) will resist online influence (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & 
Bishop, 1970; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sunstein, 2001; Wojcieszak, 2010; Hypothesis 1). 
It is also anticipated that, in combination with the type of argument (i.e. pro-/counter-
attitudinal), social influence, in terms of influence exerted by other group members and 
group commitment, will further facilitate online influence for those with intermediate 
levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers (Abrams et al., 1990; Reicher et al., 2005; 
Hypothesis 2).  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
Initially, 231 participants (aged between 17 and 66, M = 25.5, SD = 10.7) were 
recruited from the University student and staff population, as well as from the general 
public. A total of 107 participants were excluded before completing the second session (34 
did not respond to the invitation for the second session, 21 did not show for the second 
session, six withdrew after the first session, and 46 fell into a condition which had already 
been filled), leaving 124 participants who completed both sessions. Participants were 
allocated to one of six conditions, depending on their existing prejudice levels towards the 
target group (low, intermediate or high prejudice; see method section- session one below) 
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and their random allocation to one of two within-subjects conditions (i.e. messages aiming 
at either increasing or reducing prejudice towards the target group). This resulted in the 
allocation of 20 participants with low levels of prejudice to the condition which aimed at 
reducing their levels of prejudice; another 21 participants with low levels of prejudice to 
the condition which aimed at increasing their levels of prejudice; 22 participants with 
intermediate levels of prejudice to the condition which was aimed at reducing their level of 
prejudice; another 21 participants with intermediate levels of prejudice to the condition 
which was aimed at increasing their levels of prejudice; 20 participants with high levels of 
prejudice to the condition which was aimed at reducing their levels of prejudice; and a 
final 20 participants with high levels of prejudice to the condition which was aimed at 
increasing their levels of prejudice. There were no significant differences between the six 
groups in terms of gender (p= .160) or age (p= .591). 
3.3.2 Materials 
3.3.2.1 Discussion topic- Dale Farm. As already mentioned, the discussion topic 
related to the eviction of a particular Traveller site, called Dale Farm. Dale Farm used to be 
the largest Traveller site in the UK, which, up until October 2011, housed more than 1,000 
residents, who were predominantly Irish Travellers and some Roma. The six-acre plot of 
land is located within the green belt, a governmental policy for controlling urban growth, 
in the Basildon District in Essex. The site used to be a scrap and breaker’s yard, which was 
bought by members of the Travelling community. Half of Dale Farm was legal with 
planning permission for occupation as a Traveller site, whereas the other half was 
established without authorisation and planning permission. In October 2011, after 10 years 
of legal disputes costing the council an estimated £18 million pounds, the High Court ruled 
the eviction of Dale Farm’s residents, which led to the forcible eviction of its residents. 
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3.3.2.2 Topic related stimulus materials. Out of online newspaper articles 
concerning the Dale Farm eviction, 11 specific pro- and 12 anti-eviction statements were 
developed, also bearing in mind the stereotypes of the Anti-Roma and Traveller (ART) 
scale (see Appendix X for the full list of statements). In particular, these statements 
consisted of favourably or unfavourably worded positions about the eviction and they were 
aimed at either reinforcing or refuting existing negative stereotypes and thus prejudice 
towards Roma and Travellers. Pro Dale Farm Eviction (i.e. reinforcing prejudice) 
statements included for example, I cannot believe that Basildon Council took so long to 
evict those Gypsies and that their best explanation to be allowed to evict them was that the 
Gypsies did not have planning permission!; The reputation of being thieves and uncivilised 
must be true, otherwise why does this reputation follow them literally everywhere they 
go?!; or I would not want to live next to or in the same area as Gypsies! Anti Dale Farm 
Eviction (i.e. refuting prejudice) statements included: I cannot believe that Basildon 
Council evicted the Gypsies just because they didn’t have planning permission!; It is even 
the Gypsies’ land, they bought it off the scrap yard owner and so should they be allowed to 
do what they like?!; or I think it was also the old stereotypes of Gypsies being thieves and 
the general misunderstanding of the general public towards Gypsy culture, putting 
pressure on the council to get rid of them. 
3.3.2.3 Confederate training. Two confederates were trained to introduce 
statements about Roma and Travellers, during the task (i.e. the discussion) without raising 
suspicion amongst the participants. First, the confederates received materials (i.e. 
newspaper articles, advocate web sites) which contained general messages aiming at either 
reinforcing or refuting negative stereotypes and thus prejudice towards the target group. 
These served to familiarise themselves with overall stereotypes and prejudice associated 
with Roma and Travellers. Next, confederates received the specific pro- and counter-Dale 
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Farm eviction statements, which they used to exert online influence. Confederates then 
practised their role during approximately five trial chat discussions, during and after which 
they received feedback from the researcher.  
3.3.2.4 Study access. Participants completed the entire study online and in two 
sessions. Each session required participants to complete a range of task related questions 
(see sessions one and two below), which were administered via the online research tool 
‘SurveyMonkey’. Participants accessed each questionnaire by clicking on relevant web 
links, provided in emails.  
3.3.3 Ethical Considerations  
This study conforms to the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) ethics guidelines 
on Internet-Mediated Research (IMR, 2013). For example, it sought participants’ consent 
prior to their participation, ensured their anonymity and maintained a level of control over 
the discussion task. Yet, the true aims of the study had to be withheld from participants 
until after their participation because of the risk of responses being influenced by social 
desirability. In particular, such knowledge could have acted as form of inoculation 
treatment and could thus have prevented any influence. Therefore, pre-task instructions 
only informed participants that the study explored online interactions and that it would 
involve two sessions including a live online chat with other participants (for full 
instructions, see Appendices VII & VIII). After participation, participants received detailed 
information about the study, including the exact purpose and manipulations of the study 
and the role of the confederate (see Appendix XII). This was vital to avoid any risk of 
‘creating’ prejudiced or even racist participants (i.e. permanently/long-term increase their 
levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers). Participants were also given the 
opportunity to send feedback to the researcher which was taken up by some participants. 
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Such feedback was positive and encouraging throughout and stated their newly gained 
understanding of aspects of online hatred and their agreement to the nature of the research. 
3.3.4 Procedure 
3.3.4.1 Session one – determining existing levels of prejudice. Participants 
completed the ART scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) via an online link to the survey 
software SurveyMonkey. The scale was developed specifically for this study (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2). The scores of this measure determined participants’ existing levels of 
prejudice towards Roma and Travellers which, in turn, allowed allocating participants with 
similar prejudice scores (i.e. low, intermediate, high) into groups of two or three for the 
second session.  
Participants also completed some filler statements, which aimed to disguise the 
target statements (i.e. those concerning to Roma and Travellers and, at the same time, 
served to prevent participants from guessing the full aim of the study. The content of the 
filler statements was loosely based on the explicit prejudice statements towards Roma and 
Travellers, but instead addressed bankers and benefit cheats (e.g. Bankers’ behaviour is so 
entrenched that no democratic actions can ever change it; A major fault of the bankers is 
their conceit and arrogance. They believe that they are untouchable; On the whole, benefit 
cheats have probably contributed less to Western life than anyone else; or The trouble with 
letting benefit cheats into a nice area is that they gradually drag it down and give it a bad 
name). The statements were presented in random order, which further served as a disguise 
for the target group.  
3.3.4.2 Session two – the discussion. A unique chatroom on the website ‘Chatzy’ 
was created for each group prior to the start of their discussion. Two or three participants 
plus one confederate received their instructions explaining when/how to enter the chatroom 
and necessary web links to the study and the chatroom, approximately 15 minutes before 
CHAPTER 3 
 77 
their participation. This time frame allowed enough time for participants to familiarise 
themselves with the requirements and procedure, but at the same time, reduced the risk for 
participants to carefully research the topic (i.e. be influenced) before the beginning of the 
task.  
Next, participants followed the web link to the study, where they were presented 
with a short unbiased3 summary of the Dale Farm Eviction (see Appendix VIX). The 
summary served to increase participants’ processing ability of the argument, as it provided 
them with a range of facts related to the discussion topic. Also, given that the evidence on 
the persuasive communication surrounding the effectiveness of stories and statistics 
remains inconclusive (e.g. Burgoon, 1990; Krauss & Chiu, 1998), the summary consisted 
of both a narrative-like structure and statistical elements. This was to appeal to more 
participants.  
Then participants rated three, six-point scale questions relating to the extent of their 
perceived pre-task topic knowledge, the extent to which they understood the target group’s 
culture before completing the task and their anticipated confidence to engage in the task 
(i.e. I feel I have good knowledge and understanding of the recent eviction of the Travellers 
at Dale Farm; I have a good understanding of the Gypsy and Traveller culture and their 
ways of living; I am confident that I will fully engage with the others during the online 
                                                
3 The creation of the summary involved an initial collection of relevant newspaper 
articles from which known facts were extracted which were then collated to a summary. 
The calibration/piloting process was predominantly based on a pragmatic, face-validity 
approach and not tested formally. However, both, professional stake holders (i.e. an 
academic expert and relevant member of the Ministry of Justice) and other academics 
judged the summary to be ‘unbiased’.  
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interactions). The scales ranged from 1- strongly disagree to 6- strongly agree. Low scores 
indicated little perceived topic knowledge/understanding of the target group’s culture and 
little confidence to engage in the task and vice versa. Whilst, the questions concerning 
participants’ perceived pre-task topic knowledge and understanding of the target group’s 
culture provided pre-task information concerning the target group, the anticipated 
confidence to engage in the task served to motivate and thus increase participation. 
Participants were then prompted, via a message on the screen, to postpone the completion 
of any other questions until they completed the task (i.e. the discussion) and meanwhile 
enter the chatroom by opening it in another browser window via a second web link. 
Participants only used their individually assigned participant numbers to identify 
themselves to each other to reduce the risk of responses being given in line with social 
desirability. The researcher monitored participants’ chatroom attendance and notified the 
confederate (via mobile phone) when to join the chatroom in order to keep the 
confederate’s disguise. The confederate was only instructed to join the chatroom if at least 
two participants had already joined it because the groups required at least two participants.  
Once all participants had entered the chatroom, the researcher instructed them to 
begin discussing their views on the Dale Farm Eviction. The confederate then tended to 
start the conversation by asking the other participants for their views (see Appendix XI for 
two examples of the discussion groups). Depending on participants’ responses, s/he then 
immediately started to introduce the 11 or 12 specific pro or anti Dale Farm eviction 
statements. There was no particular order in which the statements had to be introduced, nor 
constraint to use all statements every time. Instead, the statement-choice depended on 
participants’ responses to each statement and to each other. This was to reduce the risk of 
the discussion appearing scripted, to maintain the confederate’s disguise as another 
participant to the other participants, and to allow for a level of continuation in the 
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conversation flow. It was also the confederate’s responsibility to keep the discussion on 
topic. 
There were 49 discussion groups in total- each lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
The end of the discussion was predominantly determined by conversation flow and by the 
confederate’s ability to introduce as many of the specific pro or anti Dale Farm eviction 
statements as possible. In particular, once the conversation flow slowed down (i.e. 
response times became notably slower/delayed), it became repetitive, or all appropriate 
statements had been discussed, the confederate informed the researcher (via mobile phone) 
who, in turn, instructed the participants to leave the chatroom and return to the remaining 
questions in the first browser window.   
These questions concerned participants’ post-task topic knowledge and their post-
task understanding of the target group’s culture. The questions served to determine pre-to 
post-task changes in perceived task knowledge and understanding of the target group’s 
culture and were thus also measured on six-point scales (i.e. I now have a good 
understanding of the Gypsy culture and their ways of living). Participants then completed 
the ART scale again (Cronbach’s alpha = .90), which allowed for the comparison between 
participants’ pre- and post-task prejudice scores and thus determine changes in their levels 
of prejudice. 
In addition, to determine whether people were influenced by other group members, 
and whether this (social) influence would, in turn, mediate online influence, participants 
completed one of Karasawa’s (1991) identification with group members’ subscale items 
(i.e. Are there many members of the group who have influenced your thoughts and 
behaviour?). Moreover, in order to determine to what extent participants felt committed to 
their discussion group and, in turn, whether group commitment mediates online influence, 
participants completed Ellemers et al.’s (1999) three-item group commitment subscale (i.e. 
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I would like to continue working with my group, I dislike being a member of my group and 
I would rather belong to a different group). In particular, Karasawa’s (1991) group 
identification item, and Ellemers et al.’s (1999) group commitment items (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .67) were used as co-variates to determine whether social influence, in the form of 
group identification and group commitment, would mediate online influence (i.e. changes 
in participants’ levels of prejudice). These statements were rated on 4-point response scales 
and subsequently ranged from 1 = no identification with/commitment to the group to 4 = 
strong identification with/commitment to the group. The items I dislike being a member of 
my group and I would rather belong to a different group were reverse scored.  
Finally, participants completed two questions concerning whether the media 
influenced their views towards Roma/Travellers between sessions (i.e. Since completing 
the first part of this study, have you seen any media reports concerning 
Gypsies/Travellers? and If you have seen any media reports concerning Gypsies/Travellers 
since you completed the first part of this study, do you think that this has influenced your 
opinion towards Gypsies/Travellers?). This was to determine the extent to which any 
changes in participants’ levels of prejudice were attributed to media reports instead of the 
online discussion. 
3.3.4 Data Preparation 
All explicit prejudice statements were rated on 6-point response scales with no 
neutral point (i.e. no ‘0’) and subsequently ranged from -3 = strong disagreement, to +3 = 
strong agreement. The data were then transformed, following the procedure explained in 
Chapter 2, so that -3 = 1 point, -2 = 2 points, -1 = 3 points, 1 = 5 points, 2 = 6 points, 3 = 7 
points. As a result, the possible scores for the target group ranged from 10 to 70 (i.e. total 
score range of 60), where low scores indicated low levels of prejudice and high scores 
indicated high levels of prejudice. During the first session, the total score range was 
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divided by three in order to balance the scores for the three possible prejudice groups (low, 
intermediate, high). As a result, and given that possible scores ranged from 10 to 70, 
participants with scores ranging between 10 and 30 were categorised as having low levels 
of prejudice, participants with scores ranging from 31 to 50 were categorised as endorsing 
intermediate levels of prejudice, and those scoring from 51 to 70 were categorised as 
demonstrating high levels of prejudice.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Pre-Task Responses and Manipulation Checks 
3.4.1.1 Confidence to engage. The majority of participants were confident about 
their engagement during the discussion. In particular, 87 % of participants scored four or 
higher on the six-point Likert scale; whereby 1 indicated low and 6 indicated high 
confidence to engage in the task. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) being the between subjects 
factor and participants’ perceived confidence to engage in the task being the dependent 
variable. The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant difference in participants’ 
confidence to engage in the task between the three prejudice groups, F(2, 121) = 1.869, p = 
.159, ηp2 = .030. These results suggest that participants in the low, intermediate and high 
prejudice groups were equally confident to engage in the task.  
3.4.1.2 Topic knowledge. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as the between subjects 
factor and participants’ perceived pre-task topic knowledge as the dependent variable. The 
ANOVA revealed that there were no significant differences in participants’ perceived topic 
knowledge, F(2, 121) = .851, p = .429, ηp2 = .014. These results indicate that participants 
in all three prejudice groups had approximately the same amount of perceived topic 
knowledge before participating in the task.  
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3.4.1.3 Understanding of target group’s culture. A one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as 
the between subjects factor and participants’ perceived pre-task understanding of the target 
group’s culture as the dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed that there were no 
significant differences in participants’ perceived understanding of the target group’s 
culture, F(2, 121) = 2.291, p = .106, η2 = .037. These results indicate that participants 
across all three prejudice groups (i.e. low, intermediate, high) had approximately the same 
amount of perceived understanding of the target group’s culture before they completed the 
task.  
3.4.1.4 Media influence. With regard to news/media influence, 96% of participants 
reported not to have seen any media reports concerning the target groups between the two 
study sessions. In addition, 3% of the sample reported to have seen media reports but that 
these did not influence their views concerning the target group. Only one participant 
reported that s/he had seen media reports concerning the target group since the beginning 
of the study which had influenced his/her opinions towards the target group. 
3.4.2 Post-Task Responses  
3.4.2.1 Task engagement. The majority of participants indicated that they felt 
engaged during the discussion, with 91.1% of the sample scoring 4 or higher on the 6-point 
Likert scale. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted with level of pre-task 
prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as the between subjects factor and participants’ 
perceived task engagement as the dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference in participants’ perceived task engagement, F(2,121) = 3.304, p = .040, η2 = 
.052. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that participants with high levels of prejudice 
perceived themselves as significantly more engaged in the discussion (M = 5.35, SD = .89, 
95% CI [5.02, 5.68]) compared to participants with low levels of prejudice (M = 4.76, SD 
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= 1.34, 95% CI [4.43, 5.08]), p = .032. However, there was no significant difference in 
perceived task engagement between participants with low and intermediate levels of 
prejudice (M = 5.12, SD = .85, 95% CI [4.80, 5.43]), p = .261 nor between participants 
with high and intermediate levels of prejudice (p = .569).   
3.4.2.3 Group identification following Karasawa (1991). A one-way between-
subjects ANOVA was conducted with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. 
high) as the between subjects factor and participants’ perceived influence from other group 
members’ ratings as the dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed that participants’ 
perceived influence from other group members’ ratings differed significantly across the 
three prejudice groups, F(2,121) = 4.191, p = .004, η2 = .086. Tukey post-hoc tests 
revealed that participants with low levels of pre-task prejudice indicated significantly less 
perceived influence from (an)other group member(s) (M = 1.81, SD = .13, 95% CI [1.54, 
2.07) compared to participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice (M= 2.37, SD 
= .13, 95% CI [2.11, 2.63]), p = .009. In addition, participants with intermediate levels of 
pre-task prejudice indicated significantly higher levels of perceived influence from 
(an)other group member(s) than participants with high levels of pre-task prejudice (M= 
1.85, SD = .14, 95% CI [1.58, 2.12]), p = .018. However, there was no significant 
difference in perceived influence ratings between participants with low and high levels of 
pre-task prejudice), p = .970.  
3.4.3.4 Group commitment following Ellemers et al. (1999). A one-way 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. 
intermediate vs. high) as the between subjects factor and the three group commitment item 
ratings as the dependent variables. The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
difference between participants’ perceived group commitment, in terms of them wanting to 
CHAPTER 3 
 84 
continue with the group, across the three prejudice groups, F(2, 121) = .053, p = .948, η2 = 
.001.  
In addition, it revealed that participants’ perceived group commitment, in terms of 
their dislike of other group members, differed across the three prejudice groups, F(2, 121) 
= 20.635, p < .001, η2 = .253. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that participants with low 
levels of pre-task prejudice indicated significantly less dislike for (a) member(s) of their 
group (M = 3.12, SD = .157, 95% CI [2.81, 3.43]) than participants with intermediate 
levels of pre-task prejudice (M = 3.65, SD = .153, 95% CI [3.35, 3.95]), p = .045, but 
indicated significantly more dislike for (a) member(s) of their group than participants with 
high levels of pre-task prejudice (M = 2.25, SD = .159, 95% CI [1.94, 2.56]), p < .001. 
Furthermore, participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice indicated 
significantly more dislike for (a) member(s) of the discussion group than participants with 
high levels of pre-task prejudice (p < .001).  
The ANOVA also revealed that participants’ group commitment, in terms of their 
desire to belong to a different group, differed across the three prejudice groups, F(2, 121) = 
24.794, p < .001, η2 = .291. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that participants with low levels 
of pre-task prejudice indicated significantly less desire to belong to a different group (M = 
3.05, SD = .147, 95% CI [2.76, 3.34]) than participants with intermediate levels of 
prejudice (M = 3.63, SD = .144, 95% CI [3.34, 3.91]), p = .016 but indicated significantly 
more desire to belong to a different group than participants with high levels of pre-task 
prejudice (M = 2.18, SD = .149, 95% CI [1.88, 2.47]), p < .001. Furthermore, participants 
with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice indicated significantly more desire to belong 
to a different discussion group than participants with high levels of pre-task prejudice (p < 
.001). Taken together, these results show that participants with intermediate levels of pre-
task prejudice reported the least group commitment, since they rated the highest levels of 
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dislike of (an)other group member(s) and the greatest desire to belong to a different 
discussion group. In contrast, participants with high levels of pre-task prejudice reported 
the most group commitment, since they rated the least dislike of (an)other group 
member(s) and the least desire to belong to a different discussion group. 
3.4.2.4 Post topic knowledge. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as the between 
subjects factor and participants’ post-task topic knowledge ratings as the dependent 
variable. The ANOVA revealed that participants’ perceived post-task knowledge ratings 
differed amongst the three prejudice groups, F(2,121) = 5.231, p = .007, η2 = .080. Tukey 
post-hoc tests revealed that participants with low levels of prejudice reported significantly 
less post-task topic knowledge (M = 4.00, SD = 1.16, 95% CI [3.63, 4.37]) compared to 
participants with high levels of prejudice (M = 4.65, SD = .98, 95% CI [4.34, 4.96]), p = 
.003. Participants with low levels of prejudice also reported significantly less post-task 
topic knowledge than participants with intermediate levels of prejudice (M = 4.53, SD = 
.74, 95% CI [4.31, 4.76]), p = .013. There were no significant differences in post-task topic 
knowledge ratings between participants with high and intermediate levels of prejudice (p = 
.590).  
3.4.2.5 Changes in topic knowledge. A 3 (level of prejudice: low, intermediate, 
high) x 2 (level of topic knowledge: pre-/post-task) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted, 
with level of prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as the between-subjects factor, level 
of topic knowledge (pre-/post-task topic knowledge) as the within-subjects factor, and 
changes in participants’ perceived topic knowledge ratings as the dependent variable. 
There was no significant main effect for the level of prejudice on participants’ perceived 
topic knowledge, F(2, 121) = 2.478, p = .088, η2 = .039. The main effect of level of topic 
knowledge was significant, Wilks λ = .418, F(1, 121) = 169.239b, p < .001, η2 = .582. 
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Results showed that participants’ perceived topic knowledge increased from pre- (M = 
2.58, SD = .135, 95% CI [2.31, 2.85] to post-task (M = 4.40, SD = .087, 95% CI [4.22, 
4.57]. Finally, there was no significant interaction effect between participants’ levels of 
prejudice and their levels of topic knowledge, Wilks λ = .975, F(2, 121) = 1.574b, p = .211, 
η2 = .025. Overall, these results suggest that although participants’ perceived topic 
knowledge increased after they participated in the task, these increases did not differ 
between the prejudice groups.   
3.4.2.6 Post-task understanding of the target group’s culture. A one-way 
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted with level of pre-task prejudice (low vs. 
intermediate vs. high) as the between subjects factor and participants’ understanding of the 
target group’s culture ratings as the dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed that 
participants’ understanding of the target group’s culture ratings differed between the three 
prejudice groups, F(2, 121) = 6.084, p = .003. Tukey post-hoc test showed that participants 
with low levels of prejudice reported significantly less post-task understanding of the 
target group’s culture (M = 3.59, SD = 1.40, 95% CI [3.14, 4.03]) than participants with 
high levels of prejudice (M = 4.50, SD = .96, 95% CI [4.19, 4.81], p = .001). There were 
no differences in post-task understanding of the target group’s culture between participants 
with low and intermediate levels of prejudice (M = 4.07, SD = 1.14, 95% CI [3.72, 4.42], p 
= .063) or those with intermediate and high levels of prejudice (p = 1.00).  
3.4.2.7 Changes in perceived understanding of the target group’s culture. A 3 
(level of prejudice: low, intermediate, high) x 2 (level of understanding of the target 
group’s culture: pre-/post-task) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with level of 
prejudice (low vs. intermediate vs. high) as the between-subjects factor, level of 
understanding of the target group’s culture (pre-/post-task) as the within-subjects factor, 
and changes in levels of participants’ understanding of the target group’s culture as the 
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dependent variable. There was a significant main effect for the level of prejudice on 
participants’ perceived understanding of the target group’s culture, F(2, 121) = 4.714, p = 
.011, η2 = .072. Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that participants with low levels of prejudice 
rated their understanding of the target group’s culture after participating in the task 
significantly lower (M = 3.45, SD = .169, 95% CI [3.15, 3.82]) compared to participants 
with high levels of prejudice (M = 4.23, SD = .171, 95% CI [3.89, 4.56]), p =.008. In 
addition, there was no significant difference in changes of perceived understanding of the 
target group’s culture between participants with low and intermediate levels of prejudice 
(M = 3.81, SD = .165, 95% CI [3.49, 4.14]), p = .510 after participating in the task. 
Furthermore, it showed that participants with intermediate levels of prejudice were not 
significantly different in their understanding of the target group’s culture ratings compared 
to participants with high levels of prejudice (p = .259) after they participated in the task. 
The main effect for participants’ levels of understanding of the target group’s culture was 
statistically significant Wilks λ = .850, F(1, 121) = 21.373b, p < .001, η2 = .150, indicating 
that participants’ understanding for the target group’s culture scores increased from before 
(M = 3.63, SD = .108, 95% CI [3.42, 3.85] to after they participated in the discussion group 
(M = 4.05, SD = .106, 95% CI [3.84, 4.26]. Finally, there was no significant level of 
prejudice X level of understanding of the target groups’ culture interaction, Wilks λ = .975, 
F(2, 121) = 1.529b, p = .211, η2 = .025. These results suggest that although participants’ 
perceived understanding of the target group’s culture increased from pre- to post-task, the 
significant differences in these increases were only observed between participants with low 
and high levels of prejudice.  
3.4.3 Changes in Levels of Prejudice 
Three 2 (levels of prejudice: pre-/ post-task) x 2 (type of argument: pro-/anti 
Roma/Traveller) mixed-design ANCOVAs, one for each prejudice group (low, 
CHAPTER 3 
 88 
intermediate, high), were conducted with levels of prejudice (pre-/post-task) as the within-
subjects factor and type of argument (pro- vs. anti-Roma/Traveller) as the between-
subjects factor, and changes in participants’ prejudice ratings as the dependent variable. In 
addition, group identification, in terms of influence exerted by other group members (i.e. 
Karasawa, 1991), and group commitment (i.e. Ellemers et al., 1999) was controlled for as 
covariates. None of the covariates had an effect on the independent variables (see Table 
3.1), thereby not supporting Hypothesis 2. For clarity, the results of the three mixed-design 
ANCOVAs, presented next, are broken down into the three prejudice groups (i.e. low, 
intermediate and high levels of prejudice).
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Table 3.1 
  Karasawa (1991) Ellemers et al. (1999) 
Level of 
Prejudice 
Independent 
Variable 
Influence by other 
group members 
Want to continue 
with Group 
Dislike of members of 
the group 
Desire to belong to a 
different group 
F p ηp2 F p ηp2 F p ηp2 F p ηp2 
Low 
Level of Prejudice 
(pre-/post-task) 
.163 .689 .005 .903 .348 .025 .079 .781 .002 .044 .835 .001 
Type of Argument .009 .925 .000 3.491 .070 .091 .151 .700 .004 .795 .379 .022 
Intermediate 
Level of Prejudice 
(pre-/post-task) 
.012 .913 .000 .865 .358 .023 .083 .774 .002 .513 .478 .014 
Type of Argument .643 .428 .017 .009 .925 .000 .002 .969 .000 .496 .486 .013 
High 
Level of Prejudice 
(pre-/post-task) 
.036 .850 .000 .072 .791 .002 1.131 .295 .032 2.008 .166 .056 
Type of Argument .545 .465 .016 .048 .828 .001 .039 .845 .001 .413 .525 .012 
*p < .05 
Summary table illustrating the F and p-values of social influence covariates for the independent variables ‘level of prejudice’ and 
‘type of argument’. 
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3.4.3.1 Participants with low levels of prejudice. As expected, there was no 
significant main effect for level of prejudice, F(1, 35) = 1.805, p = .188, ηp2 = .049, 
indicating that participants’ levels of prejudice did not change from pre- to post-task. Also, 
as expected, there was no significant main effect for the type of argument on participants’ 
prejudice ratings, F(1, 35) = 1.490, p = .230, ηp2 = .041, indicating that there was no 
difference in the persuasiveness of the two types of arguments and thus changes in 
participants’ levels of prejudice, which, in turn, supports Hypothesis 1. Finally, there was 
no significant interaction effect between level of prejudice and type of argument for 
participants with low levels of prejudice, F(1, 35) = .231, p = .634, ηp2  = .007. These 
results further suggest that participants with low levels of pre-task prejudice towards Roma 
and Travellers were overall resistant to online influence.  
3.4.3.2 Participants with intermediate levels of prejudice. There was no 
significant main effect for level of prejudice, F(1, 37) = 1.572, p = .218, ηp2 = .041, 
suggesting that participants’ levels of prejudice did not change from over the course of the 
study. Also, there was no significant main effect for the type of argument on participants’ 
prejudice ratings, F(1, 37) = 1.481, p = .231, ηp2 = .038, suggesting that the type of 
argument did not influence participants’ levels of prejudice. There was a significant level 
of prejudice X type of argument interaction, F(1, 37) = 7.197, p =  .011, ηp2 = .161. The 
means and standard deviations for this interaction are shown in Table 3.2. A simple main 
effects analysis demonstrated that participants with intermediate levels of pre-task 
prejudice were significantly more prejudiced after being exposed to the argument aimed at 
increasing their levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers, Wilks λ = .810, F(1, 39) 
= 9.173a, p = .004, ηp2 = .190. Yet, participants with intermediate levels of pre-task 
prejudice resisted online influence aimed at reducing their levels of prejudice towards 
Roma and Travellers, Wilks λ = .987, F(1, 39) = .510a, p = .480,  ηp2 = .013.  
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Table 3.2 
Time/Session Task Manipulation 
 Reinforcing Existing 
Stereotypes 
 
Refuting Existing 
Stereotypes 
 n M SD n M SD 
Pre-Task 21 41.19 5.03 22 41.55 5.29 
Post-Task 21 45.86 8.38 22 40.55 9.24 
 
3.4.3.3 Participants with high levels of prejudice. There was no significant main 
effect for level of prejudice on participants’ prejudice ratings, F(1, 34) = 2.546, p = .120, 
ηp2  = .070, indicating that participants’ levels of prejudice did not change in the course of 
the study. Also, as expected, there was no significant main effect for the type of argument 
on participants’ prejudice ratings, F(1, 34) = .021, p  = .886, ηp2  = .001, indicating that the 
type of argument (pro- or counter-attitudinal) did not determine changes in participants’ 
levels of prejudice. This further supports Hypotheses 1. No significant level of prejudice X 
type of argument interaction was found for participants with high levels of prejudice, F(1, 
34) = .003, p = .956, ηp2  = .000. Overall, these results suggest that participants with high 
levels of pre-task prejudice towards Roma and Travellers were resistant to online 
influence. 
3.4.4 Extreme Cases- Large Changes in Levels of Prejudice.  
 As previously pointed out, Sullivan (1999) suggested that the number of people 
who go on to commit acts of hatred tend to be a small minority. Therefore, it was decided 
to explore the number of extreme cases within the current sample (i.e. those who changed 
Summary table illustrating changes in prejudice scores for both arguments (reinforcing/ 
refuting existing stereotypes). 
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their levels of pre-task prejudice across entire categories, which is equivalent to 20 points 
or more). Four participants of the 124 (3.2%) were identified (see Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore whether online interactions, in the form of live 
discussions between groups of ‘like-minded’ participants (i.e. those holding low, 
intermediate, or high levels of prejudice towards specific target groups) would influence 
participants’ existing levels of prejudice towards this group. 
Overall, most participants indicated increased topic knowledge and understanding 
of the target group’s culture after their participation in the online discussion. In addition, 
online influence, in terms of changes in levels of prejudice, affected participants with 
intermediate levels of pre-task (i.e. existing) prejudice who were exposed to messages 
which were aimed at reinforcing stereotypes and thus increasing prejudice. Moreover, and 
as expected overall, participants in all other groups resisted attempts to influence them 
online. In particular, participants who resisted online influence attempts included those 
with low and high levels of pre-task prejudice who were exposed to messages which were 
Summary table of extreme changes in levels of prejudice. 
Level of 
Prejudice 
(pre-task) 
Level of Prejudice (post-
task) 
Number of 
Points 
Changed 
Exposure/Condition 
Low Intermediate (almost high) 21 Increasing Prejudice 
Intermediate High 21 Increasing Prejudice 
High Intermediate (almost low) 24 Reducing Prejudice 
High Low 27 Reducing Prejudice 
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aimed at either refuting or reinforcing stereotypes and thus decrease or increase prejudice. 
In addition, participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice who were exposed 
to messages that were aimed at refuting stereotypes and thus decrease prejudice also 
resisted attempts to influence them online.  
 3.5.1 Pro- and Counter-Attitudinal Messages 
The finding that participants with either low or high levels of prejudice resisted 
influence attempts supports Hypothesis 1. In particular, participants with low levels of pre-
task prejudice are likely to have perceived the messages which were aimed at decreasing 
prejudice towards the target group as pro-attitudinal and thus supportive of their existing 
views. Likewise, participants with high levels of pre-task prejudice would have perceived 
messages that aimed at increasing prejudice as pro-attitudinal and thus supportive of their 
existing views. As such, participants with either low or high levels of prejudice who were 
exposed to pro-attitudinal messages should have had no reason to change their attitudes 
towards the target group. This finding is also in line with previous research (e.g. Moscovici 
& Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sunstein, 2001; 
Wojcieszak, 2010). 
Additionally, counter-attitudinal messages which were aimed at increasing prejudice 
towards the target for participants with low pre-task prejudice, and discussions which 
aimed at decreasing prejudice for participants with high levels of pre-task prejudice are 
most likely to have been perceived negatively as they opposed participants’ existing views. 
As such, participants with either low or high levels of pre-task prejudice should have 
resisted counter-attitudinal positions. This finding is supported by existing research (e.g. 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1990; Wojcieszak, 2010).  
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3.5.2 Attitude Strength 
One could argue that participants’ low and high levels of pre-task prejudice scores 
indicate that they hold strong attitudes towards the target groups, whereas participants with 
intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice do not. In line with existing attitude strength 
research (i.e. Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Fazio, 1990; O’Keefe, 2004; Petty & Krosnick, 
2014), strong attitudes were therefore predicted to be resistant to change whereas weak 
attitudes were not (i.e. supportive of Hypothesis 1). In particular, participants with weaker 
attitudes towards the target group (i.e. intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice) were 
persuaded by online influence which aimed at increasing their levels of pre-task prejudice. 
Yet, participants with intermediate levels of prejudice (i.e. those with weaker attitudes) 
resisted online influence which was aimed at reducing prejudice. These findings therefore 
only partially support Hypothesis 1. In addition, these findings support Lee and Leet’s 
(2002) argument that online hate groups would benefit from neutral audiences as the 
persuasive effect tends to be strongest for such audiences.   
3.5.3 Social Influence 
With regard to perceived influence by other group members and group 
commitment, here too participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice indicated 
the biggest differences compared to participants with low and high levels of pre-task 
prejudice. In particular, participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice indicated 
the highest levels of perceived influence by other group members. In addition, participants 
in this group indicated the highest levels of dislike of other members and the greatest desire 
to belong to a different discussion group compared to participants with low and high levels 
of pre-task prejudice. As such, although participants with intermediate levels of prejudice 
indicated the highest levels of influence by other group members, they also identified the 
least with the group. In line with this, the results of this study suggest that social influence, 
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in terms of influence exerted by other group members and participants’ group commitment, 
did not facilitate online influence regardless of the type of argument (i.e. pro- counter-
attitudinal), thereby not supporting Hypothesis 2.  
One could argue that these findings, concerning participants with intermediate 
levels of prejudice, hint at a level of uncertainty about their perceived identity as group 
members. In fact, the concept of categorising participants as holding intermediate levels of 
prejudice towards the target groups, suggests less defined group norms and values in 
comparison to groups holding low or high levels of prejudice. In particular, for participants 
with intermediate levels of prejudice towards the target groups, the views expressed by the 
confederate during the discussion were neither fully in agreement nor disagreement with 
their existing attitudes compared to participants with low or high levels of prejudice 
towards the target group. As a result, the confederate’s views could have resulted in 
increased uncertainty about, and thus decreased identification with, the group for 
participants with intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice (Abrams et al., 1990, Hogg, 
2000; Turner, 1985).  
 3.5.4 Expectations of Message Content  
The finding that participants with intermediate levels of prejudice towards the 
target group resisted online influence aimed at reducing prejudice suggests that the existing 
(negative) stereotypes about this culture might be relatively resistant to influence. One 
reason for this resistance might lie in participants’ expectations about this culture. In 
particular, Parrott (1995) argued that unexpected message content, including discrepant 
cultural messages, can capture individuals’ attention to a message’s position (e.g. central 
processing) and thus result in their resistance to it. Here, the presentation of Roma and 
Travellers (i.e. the target group) in a way that aimed to refute the usual stereotypes might 
have resulted in greater scrutiny of the message content (i.e. central processing) and 
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consequently led participants to resist social influence, which ran contrary to their existing 
views. 
3.5.5 Personal Relevance  
Alternatively, overall resistance to online influence might be rooted in specific 
aspects of the discussion. In particular, one aspect of all discussions concerned the large 
amount of money the eviction of the Traveller site (i.e. a financial issue related to the 
target group) had cost the council. Here, it was observed that participants with all levels of 
prejudice (i.e. low, intermediate and high) discussed this aspect at great length compared to 
other aspects of the discussion. Given the financial recession during the time of data 
collection, it is possible that participants might have identified with the situational financial 
strain, making the cost of the eviction personally relevant to them, which, in turn, might 
have served as a particularly persuasive cue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b; Petty, Cacioppo & 
Goldman, 1981).  
3.5.6 Experiences  
Moreover, it was observed during several discussion groups that personal 
experiences, regardless of participants’ levels of pre-task prejudice or type of argument 
they were exposed to, seemed to relate to their resistance or acceptance of influence. In 
particular, participants who had negative or positive experiences with the target group, 
prior to their participation, tended to oppose counter-experiential views expressed by other 
group members during the discussion. This supports the ELM, suggesting that personal 
experiences in counter-attitudinal conditions result in central processing and therefore 
resistance to influence (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b).  
3.5.7 Task Engagement  
Finally, in terms of task engagement, this appeared to be related to participants’ 
pre-task levels of prejudice towards the target groups. In particular, despite holding the 
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least socially acceptable attitudes, participants with high levels of prejudice towards the 
target groups indicated the highest levels of perceived task engagement compared to both 
participants with low or intermediate levels of pre-task prejudice. One explanation for this 
finding might be that those with high levels of prejudice were able to express their socially 
unacceptable views freely and without feeling the risk of being judged or socially rejected 
(DeKoster & Houtman, 2008). As a result, the ability to disclose and compare similar 
views, which are usually deemed socially unacceptable (DeKoster & Houtman, 2008) 
could thus have increased participants’ perceived level of engagement in the task.  
3.5.8 Limitations 
3.5.8.1 Ecological validity and realism. As with experimental research in general, 
one of the limitations of this study relates to its lack of ecological validity. In particular, 
although the design attempted to mimic a naturalistic set-up, participants still knew that 
they were participating in a psychology study and might otherwise never have chosen to 
participate in these specific online discussions. Additionally, this study failed to obtain 
participants’ demographic details. The decision to omit personal information from the data 
collection was made given the sensitive nature of this study and thus to increase 
participants’ sense of anonymity.  
Moreover, participants were not specifically asked about their perceived realism of 
the discussion or whether they guessed that there was a confederate. Yet, a number of 
participants emailed the researcher immediately after their participation to express their 
enjoyment of the task. On several occasions, this also resulted in them indicating that they 
did not guess that there was a confederate during the discussion until they read the debrief 
information. Consequently, these responses are encouraging indicators that (at least) a 
number of participants perceived the discussion as realistic.  
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3.5.8.2 Time restrictions. The findings obtained in this study are limited to the 
immediate time after the discussion and thus do not allow for inferences about any long-
term effects. In particular, although participants with intermediate levels of prejudice 
indicated higher levels of prejudice immediately after taking part in the online discussions, 
it remains unclear whether this effect would persist over time. Specifically, previous 
research investigating the endurance of online influence through narrative and explicit 
messages on hate web pages has already demonstrated that persuasive effects can either 
increase or decay over time (e.g. Lee & Leets, 2002). Moreover, Lee and Leets (2002) 
found that both implicit and explicit low narrative content elicited persistent persuasive 
effects which even increased over time. They also found that explicit high narrative 
content (i.e. stories with plots and main characters) elicited persistent persuasive effects. 
Furthermore, Lee and Leets (2002) found that persuasive effects elicited by implicit high 
narrative content decayed over time. It would therefore be interesting for future research to 
explore whether the persuasive effects of online discussions (i.e. explicit, linked content) 
would persist over time. 
3.5.8.3 Information processing. Despite indications of participants processing the 
information centrally or peripherally, it is not possible to make definitive inferences about 
participants’ processing routes from this study, as this was not specifically measured. 
Previous research investigating persuasive strategies in the context of online hate (e.g. Lee 
& Leets, 2002) used a thought-generation task to explain findings relating to participants’ 
processing routes regarding their acceptance or resistance to racist online content (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986a). A thought-generation task measures cognitive responses (i.e. central 
processing), in the form of expressions of favourable or unfavourable thoughts, following 
exposure to pro- or and counter-argumentative message content. In this study, participants 
also displayed some pro- and counter-arguments during the discussion task, thus 
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suggesting that some central processing took place. This is supported by the ELM which 
suggests that counter-attitudinal arguments are likely to result in participants paying close 
attention to the information they are presented with (i.e. central processing), given that it 
runs contrary to their existing views (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986b). Yet, in order to make 
more definitive claims about participants’ processing strategies, future research should 
implement such measures as a thought-generation task. 
3.5.8.4 Target group’s ‘specificness’. Finally, this study explored changes in 
peoples’ prejudice towards a specific ethnic group, following ‘like-minded’ online 
discussions. As a result, the findings cannot explain online influence in general.  
3.5.9 Future Directions 
3.5.9.1 Inoculation treatments. Given that participants with intermediate levels of 
prejudice were the only ones influenced by online interactivity, this group presents an 
interesting avenue for future research investigating the influence and/or prevention of 
online hate. In particular, future research should investigate the effectiveness of inoculation 
treatments delivered via institutions, such as schools and universities, to counteract online 
influence. Inoculation treatments involve exposing people to pre-emptive messages about a 
target in order to strengthen existing attitudes/views and thus prevent persuasion (McGuire, 
1961a; 1961b). Inoculation treatments have already been found to prevent persuasive 
attempts in a range of contexts, including politics (e.g. Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, 
Kenski, Nitz & Sorenson, 1990), health campaigns (e.g. Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Parker, 
Ivanov & Compton, 2011; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994), marketing (e.g. Compton & Pfau, 
2004), public relations (Pfau, Haigh, Sims & Wigley, 2007; Wan & Pfau, 2004) and social 
networking (Compton & Pfau, 2009).  
3.5.9.1.1 Education. Inoculation treatments, coupled with education about some of 
the consequences of online hate, delivered to students in schools and universities might 
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therefore present a valuable method in preventing the spread of online hate. In particular, 
strategies to reduce prejudice against alternative subcultures and other ethnic minorities 
(e.g. Roma and Travellers), by educating children, teenagers, and young adults about the 
possible consequences of prejudice, are already being applied in schools and universities 
(e.g. The Sophie Lancaster Foundation, Holocaust Educational Trust).  
3.5.9.1.2 Attitude strength. In line with the findings of this study, inoculation 
treatments might become especially relevant for online interactions, including persuasive 
attempts exerted by hate groups with an audience holding weak attitudes towards the issue 
at hand. In particular, this study not only observed that online influence was strongest for 
those with weak attitudes (i.e. intermediate levels of prejudice towards the target group), 
but also that most recruited participants (i.e. 50%) indicated intermediate levels of 
prejudice (i.e. weak attitudes) towards the target group. This finding not only supports 
James’ (2014) argument that many people hold prejudices towards Roma and Travellers, it 
also suggests that many people could potentially be at risk of online influence, if this 
number also reflects the number of people with weak attitudes towards other target groups.  
3.5.9.2 Online anonymity. Future research could also investigate whether online 
influence in the present set-up is affected by reduced anonymity (e.g. interacting in groups 
over web-cams with and without sound/speech). In particular, whilst the present study did 
not manipulate anonymity per se (i.e. all participants were anonymous to each other), it 
would be interesting to see if online influence is increased/decreased through reduced 
anonymity. Existing research has suggested that online anonymity can lead to increased 
negative online behaviour (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Hardaker, 2010; Suler, 2004) 
compared to being identifiable (i.e. face-to-face interactions; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004). 
It is therefore likely that reduced online anonymity would lead to reduced online influence.   
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3.5.9.2.1 Pre-task relationships. Finally, and as pointed above, it seems 
unsurprising that participants who indicated little influence by other group members and 
felt little commitment to the group resisted online influence (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; 
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hewstone & Martin, 2012; Kelman, 1958). Participants’ low 
levels of group identification and commitment could be attributed to two particular factors 
of the design (i.e. participants’ anonymity to each other and the limited time to get to know 
each other). Consequently, and although participants in the discussion groups held similar 
levels of prejudice and thus were categorised as ‘like-minded’, they might not have 
perceived other participants as ‘like-minded’ group members.  
Future research could thus not only explore the effects of reduced online anonymity 
on online influence, but also consider people’s pre-task relationship (i.e. knowing/liking 
each other). In particular, previous research has already demonstrated that online 
interactions between hate group members (i.e. people who belong and identify as members 
of these groups) can reinforce negative stereotypes about disliked out-groups (e.g. Angie et 
al., 2010; DeKoster & Houtman, 2009; Glaser, et al., 2002; Green, et al. 1999; Price et al., 
2006; Sunstein, 2001, 2009; Wojcieszak, 2010). It is therefore most likely that knowing 
and liking each other (i.e. stronger group identification and commitment; Reicher et al., 
2005; Turner, 1985, 1991; Turner et al., 1987) would result in increased online influence.  
As such, the general rejection that social influence does not facilitate online 
influence (i.e. Hypothesis 2) seems too simplistic. Instead, it seems more appropriate to 
argue that social influence may facilitate online influence if group identification and group 
commitment are strong, instead of dismissing the influential effects of social influence 
altogether. In addition, reduced online anonymity amongst people who like each other 
could also lead to increased online influence.  
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3.5.10 Conclusion 
This study builds on the small body of existing research investigating the 
persuasive power of online interactions, and in particular changes in prejudice leading to 
the development of online hate. Whilst the results of this study revealed that the majority 
of participants resisted online influence and thus did not change their levels of prejudice 
after interacting with ‘like-minded’ others, there was one group of participants who were 
influenced by it: participants with weak attitudes (i.e. intermediate levels of prejudice) 
increased their levels of prejudice towards a specific target group after they participated in 
an online discussion in which negative prejudice about these groups was induced.  
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4.1 Abstract 
This article aims to add to the relatively small body of literature on online hatred. In 
particular, it focuses on the role Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms 
(SMPs) may play in the development of polarisation, by exploring how online users respond 
to explicit online hate materials. Specifically, this article discusses the ways in which a self-
selected sample of YouTube users responded, via posting online comments, to a video clip 
in which a White female train passenger (called Emma) could be seen to racially abuse other 
passengers. Thematic analysis of the YouTube comments identified four main themes: (1) 
Making Sense of Emma, which encapsulated posters' attempts to find explanations for 
Emma’s behaviour; (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, which described posters’ attempts to 
oppose Emma’s racism by means of resorting to aggressive, hateful language; (3) Us versus 
Them, which encapsulated posters' tendencies to categorise themselves and other posters 
into in- and outgroups, based on their particular stance on racism; (4) Contesting Britishness, 
which expressed posters' attempts to articulate (and contest) what it means to be British. 
Whilst this analysis provides some evidence that hateful web content can fuel aggressive 
and hateful responses, many of the comments analysed here emphasised common group 
membership, alongside people’s right to claim membership in a particular social category 
(i.e. Britishness). The current evidence, therefore, suggests that, at least in the specific 
context of this study, hateful web content may not necessarily lead to an automatic 
endorsement or escalation of hatred. 
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4.2 Introduction 
On the 21st of March 2016, 3,3 billion people worldwide were online (Internet Live 
Stats). The relatively recent emergence of Social Networking Sites (SNSs) has contributed 
noticeably to the growing numbers of Internet users. For example, Facebook had 1.6 
billion users in March 2016 (Internet Live Stats), and YouTube claimed, that in 2015, one 
billion users visited its page per month (YouTube, n.d.).  
Despite their immense popularity, some SNSs have recently come under critical 
scrutiny. In Britain, for example, there is increasing governmental concern about the 
Internet’s role in the incitement of hatred, including racial hatred. There have also been 
claims by some researchers (e.g. Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Perry, 2000; Stern, 2012), 
advocacy groups, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and charities that websites promoting 
hatred may contribute to the development and exacerbation of radical attitudes and 
behaviours and, as such, foster terrorist sympathies. However, to date, claims regarding the 
persuasive power of the Internet remain largely based on anecdotal observations, common 
sense assumptions, and on government concerns regarding the protection of members of 
the public.  
The existence of hateful materials online seems indisputable (e.g. it can be 
evidenced by certain key word searches). In addition, online hate materials, including 
propaganda video clips on websites, such as YouTube, are regularly found on computers 
seized from terrorist suspects (e.g. the Boston Bombers, Robi, 2013; or the Lee Rigby 
murderers, Swinford, 2013). Consequently, lawmakers across the globe have begun to 
amend and develop legislation to account for the evolution of the Internet into a potential 
medium for stirring up and promoting hatred. In the United Kingdom alone, this legislation 
includes the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, the Public Order Act 1986, the 
Malicious Communications Act, 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the 
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Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Communications Act 2003, the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Consequently, in the United 
Kingdom, several arrests and convictions have been made in relation to the publication and 
distribution of online materials with the intent to incite racial hatred Colin White (BBC 
News, 2016); Ihjaz Ali, Kabir Ahmed & Tazwan Javed (BBC News 2012); Joshua 
Bonehill-Paine (Jewish News Online, 2015); Matthew Doyle (Burrows, 2016); Teenager 
(Crown Prosecution Services, 2010). Arrests have also been made in Australia, China, 
Dubai, Russia and Kazakhstan where several people have been convicted of inciting hate 
via social media, including ethnic hatred (e.g. Ai Takagi, see: Mail Online, 2016; 
Alkhanashvili, see: Kazakhstan Newsline, 2015; Mukhtar, see: Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty, 2015; Pu Zhiquaing, see: Phillips, 2015; Tatyana Shevtsova-Valova, see: Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2015), religious hatred (e.g. Yklas Kabduakasov, see: Spencer, 
2015; UAE national, see: Agarib, 2016) and extremism (e.g. Vadim Tyumentsev, see: 
Reuters, 2015).  
Academic research exploring online hatred has begun to emerge in several social 
sciences (mainly sociology and criminology). So far, this research has tended to have two 
main analytic foci, namely on providing (1) detailed descriptions of online hate materials 
or (2) characterisations of polarised individuals/groups. For example, research on online 
hate materials has focused on outlining the specific contents of hate-promoting websites 
and has provided insights into the use of propaganda to polarise and recruit new members 
to common ideological causes (e.g. Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Blazak, 2001; 
Bostdorff, 2004; Douglas, 2007; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc & Lala, 2005, Gerstenfeld, 
Grant & Chiang, 2003; Levin, 2002; McNamee, Peterson & Peña, 2010; Perry, 2000; 
Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Zhou, Reid, Qin, Chen & Lai, 2005). Research focusing on 
understanding the type of individual or group who produces hateful materials or hate 
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speech online has tended to concentrate specifically on people who are already polarised, 
thus identifying not only some personality traits associated with hate speech but also some 
of the ways in which polarised individuals or groups share their ideology and deliberately 
use prejudice to create conflict between groups (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Cammaerts, 2009; 
De Koster & Houtman, 2008, Doane, 2006, Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Ezekiel, 2002; 
Glaser, Dixit & Green, 2002; Green, Abelson & Garnett, 1999; Wojcieszak, 2010).  
However, thus far, research tapping into the broader processes underlying the 
development of online hatred remains limited – despite the reported increase in ‘hate 
blogging’, especially on SNSs and Social Media Platforms (SMPs), over time (e.g. Chau & 
Xu, 2007; Citron & Norton, 2011) and the recent surge in arrests and convictions for 
SNS/SMP-related hate offences. In particular, there is limited empirical evidence 
investigating how Internet users might respond to hateful online web content displayed on 
ordinary SNSs and SMPs (i.e. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter).1 In particular, whilst one 
might expect to come across hateful/polarising content on certain websites (i.e. Stormfront, 
English Defence League), one might not expect to see such content during their visit to 
their familiar SNSs/SMPs. As a result, we know little about how Internet users might 
respond to or be influenced by hateful online materials displayed on SNSs/SPMs.  
Many SNSs/SMPs and online news web sites now allow, and even encourage, 
online users to express their views or responses to different web contents (including 
                                                
1 As noted in Chapter 1, SNSs and SMPs are conceptually not the same. Yet, as 
YouTube’s commenting feature allows users to socially interact (i.e. 
communicate/network) with other chosen or random users, it shares some of the 
attributions of SNSs and SMPs. As a result, references made in this thesis, assigning 
YouTube as a SNS, are to be understood based on this overlap in attributed features.  
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specific statements, pictures, video clips or TV programmes) via posting/commenting. 
These posts or comments are usually displayed publicly and, in turn, often seem to elicit 
further comments/posts from other users – who might agree or disagree with either the 
initial poster or with the web content in question. It seems therefore plausible that certain 
web content could lead SNS/SMP users to respond to such content in a polarised manner. 
These polarised responses could, in turn, lead to (virtual) conflicts amongst SNS/SMP 
users.  
In fact, such virtual conflicts can be observed in so-called online ‘trolling’, where 
certain individuals (i.e. ‘trolls’) intentionally aim to stir responses amongst users. Trolling 
has been attributed to online anonymity (Hardaker, 2010; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler & 
Barab, 2002), which, in turn, links to the so called online disinhibition effect (ODE; Suler, 
2004). In particular, the ODE is thought to be the result of a lack of social constraints 
mediated, predominantly, by online anonymity (Joinson, 1998; Suler, 2004). Whilst not all 
behaviour associated with online disinhibition has to be negative (i.e. increased self-
disclosure), as noted above, online disinhibition can encompass negative communication, 
such as offensive language, harsh criticisms, anger, hatred and threats (Suler, 2004). Suler 
(2004) referred to this form of the ODE as ‘toxic’ online disinhibition.  
Accordingly, Coffey and Woolworth (2004) found that whilst people’s responses to 
an alleged racially motivated murder reported in an anonymous online newspaper 
discussion board resulted in expressions of insults, racism, abuse and hatred (i.e. 
polarisation), no such responses were observed when the incident was discussed in a face-
to-face meeting. They consequently attributed these polarised responses expressed online 
to online anonymity. In addition, Peddinti, Ross and Cappos (2014) found that compared to 
identifiable Twitter users, anonymous users were less inhibited in relation to their Twitter 
activity. They also found that there are more anonymous Twitter users following sensitive 
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topics, such as pornography, than identifiable ones.    
Further, Doughty, Lawson, Linehan, Rowland and Bennett (2014) found that 
controversial television broadcasts elicited many polarised (i.e. anti-social, abusive, 
negative, aggressive and hostile) tweets - a phenomenon frequently referred to as ‘flaming’ 
(O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003; Suler, 2004; Turnage, 2008). In Doughty et al.’s (2014) 
study ‘flaming’, which is described as a negative aspect of the ODE, tended to be directed 
at the individuals or specific communities depicted in these broadcasts. In addition, Lange 
(2007) and Moor, Heuvelman and Verleur (2010) investigated possible causes of ‘flaming’ 
behaviour on YouTube and found that people predominantly ‘flamed’ to express their 
disagreement with certain video or comment content. They also found that a small number 
of users ‘flamed’ for mere entertainment (Moor et al., 2010) and enjoyment (Lange, 2007). 
Lange (2007) and Moor et al.’s (2010) findings also indicate that, although ‘flaming’ 
seems prevalent on YouTube, it is not always perceived to be harmful, even by the 
recipients or ‘targets’ of ‘flames’. 
Moreover, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) explored discursive strategies of racist and 
anti-racist supporters expressed on online news web sites. They found that moral 
disengagement is a very common strategy used by those supporting racism in order to 
justify or ‘feel okay’ about their views. They also found that those who opposed racist 
views/acts rarely used this strategy when expressing their views online. Given that 
expressions of racial attitudes are no longer socially acceptable (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; 
Furnham, 1986; Gawronski et al., 2007; Joinson, 1999; Steinfeldt et al., 2010), it does not 
seem surprising that moral disengagement is predominantly observed in those supporting 
racist attitudes.   
Current evidence therefore presents some strategies through which the expression 
of certain attitudes (i.e. racial) can be justified. In addition, it suggests that SNS/SMP 
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content may not only facilitate discussions amongst online users but can also lead to 
attitude polarisation. However, to what extent does controversial web content succeed in 
influencing or changing people’s actual attitudes or views?  
Steinfeldt et al. (2010) found that online newspaper forums often provide 
misinformation about specific groups (i.e. American Indians, in their case) which, in turn, 
can reinforce existing negative stereotypes and thus facilitate the expression of racist 
attitudes. More specifically, Lee and Leets (2002) argued that White supremacist web 
content can influence attitudes and views of polarised as well as ‘neutral’ adolescent online 
users. Furthermore, Rauch and Schanz (2013) found that, in the context of White 
supremacist online content, frequency of Facebook use influenced users in one of two 
ways. In particular, compared to infrequent Facebook users, frequent users were both more 
likely to agree with or reject racist messages (e.g. about White superiority), thus suggesting 
that those who frequently use Facebook are at higher risk of responding in a polarised 
manner to its content compared to those who infrequently use it.  
In sum, the evidence outlined above suggests that the content of materials posted on 
online forums or SNSs/SMPs can influence and polarise the expression of people’s views 
as well as lead to online abuse– even in cases where the initial web content is not 
specifically problematic or hateful. Yet, the extent to which explicit online hate materials 
might elicit hateful responses in online users more generally remains unexplored. For 
example, given recent media coverage (e.g. Castle, 2013; McNab, 2015; Nirvana News, 
2016; Poch, 2015; Risen, 2014) focusing on the use of YouTube and other social 
networking sites (e.g. for promoting domestic violence or for terrorist propaganda and 
recruitment), it seems increasingly likely that people come across hateful content without 
necessarily seeking to do so. This then, raises the question of how SNS/SMP users in 
general might respond to explicit hate materials.  
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This study therefore aims to explore the following research question: How do 
YouTube users respond to online materials that can be described as explicitly inciting 
hatred?  
The research question here is deliberately broad in order to allow for a qualitative, 
bottom-up and inductively-driven analytic approach – which has been deemed the most 
appropriate research strategy for under-researched areas (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is 
therefore important to stress that this study aims to offer an in-depth understanding of 
people’s responses to a very specific type of online hate material (i.e. a video clip with 
racist content) within a particular social networking context (i.e. YouTube). In other words, 
this study seeks to provide a detailed description of the qualitative nature of people’s 
online responses in a specific context – and does not set out to make any claims about 
online responses to hateful materials in general. However, the author hopes that the 
qualitative findings outlined below will provide a springboard for further quantitative 
research in this field to evaluate the extent to which the key findings can be generalised.  
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Materials 
4.3.1.1 Data source. This analysis was based on comments made by users of the 
Social Networking Site (SNS) YouTube in response to a particular video clip uploaded on 
its website. The video clip depicted a White woman who racially abused other passengers. 
The woman, later identified as Emma West, was travelling with her toddler son on the 
London underground in October 2011. The scene, which lasted approximately five 
minutes, was filmed by a passenger on his/her mobile phone, who subsequently uploaded it 
on 28th November 2011 as video clip onto YouTube (for a detailed description of the 
clip’s content, please see below). The clip prompted an unprecedented number of viewers 
to respond to its content via YouTube’s commenting feature – and these responses 
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provided the raw data for this study. It should be noted that some of these comments 
contain offensive, racist and potentially upsetting content. 
The nature of our choice of analytic materials was therefore opportunistic. In 
particular, when the video clip in question went viral online, the author became aware of 
the analytic potential the accompanying comments presented for addressing the current 
research question. To the author’s knowledge, the video clip was the first of its kind (in the 
UK) to have elicited such large numbers of views and comments. Using this data source, 
therefore, had several methodological advantages. First, the voluntary exposure of 
YouTubers to the clip’s content circumvented any ethical concerns an experimental design 
(i.e. the experimental use of hateful stimuli) would have posed. Second, users’ voluntary 
choice to comment on the clip’s content was likely to render responses more ecological 
valid than responses elicited in experimental settings. Third, unlike in many laboratory 
experiments, there was no researcher engagement with ‘respondents’, thus circumventing 
experimenter bias or social desirability effects.  
The time-frame for data collection, in turn, was determined by the sheer volume of 
online comments made in response to the YouTube clip. Forty-eight hours after the clip’s 
upload, the author decided that the volume of comments was more than sufficient whilst 
still presenting a manageable analytic task. Also, the original video clip was removed at 
approximately the same time because the police started a criminal investigation of the 
woman depicted in the clip. 
Consequently, the original raw data consisted of 71,295 comments. The actual 
content of the video clip is described below, followed by an outline of the different types of 
YouTubers’ responses the clip elicited after its upload, as well as the legal consequences 
Emma West (i.e. the woman depicted in the video clip) faced for her behaviour. 
4.3.1.2 Ethical considerations. This study adheres to the British Psychology 
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Society’s (BPS) Ethics Guidelines on Internet-Mediated Research (IMR, 2013). 
Specifically, the online comments that constituted the data source for this study were 
available within the public domain on a large SNS/SMP. As such, the responses were 
visible and freely accessible to anyone using YouTube. In addition, YouTube’s terms of 
service explicitly state that, by uploading/posting content (including comments) onto the 
site, users automatically consent to this content being used (i.e. reproduced, distributed, 
prepared in derivative works) by third parties. Whilst YouTubers’ right to withdraw their 
responses was restricted in this study (i.e. users did not specifically know that their 
comments would be used in this study) all user names were anonymised, ensuring their 
anonymity. Moreover, the benefit of the observational (i.e. naturalistic) and unobtrusive 
approach avoided potentially feelings of unwelcome intrusions amongst YouTubers.  
4.3.1.3 The YouTube video clip. At the start of the video clip Emma West can be 
heard posing the rhetorical question “...what has the UK come to...” - which she then 
proceeds to answer herself by stating “...a load of black people and a load of fucking 
Polish”. Emma then verbally attacks several fellow passengers for “not being English”, as 
well as telling them to “go back to their own country”. Next, a Black woman asks Emma to 
refrain from swearing for the sake of the children present on the train. In response, Emma 
demands the Black woman state which country she is from, to which the Black women 
responds that she, too, is English. Emma appears not to believe her. The clip continues by 
depicting Emma telling the same woman to “go back” to her “own country”. Emma then 
attempts to specify which country the Black woman should “go back” to; she is, however, 
unable to articulate this correctly. In particular, she refers to an awkward combination of 
the two countries Nicaragua and Siberia, which in this specific combination sounds to 
other passengers like the racially offensive term NIGGER. This, in turn, can be seen to 
upset a young Black man behind Emma so much that he stands up, visibly agitated, in 
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response to which two fellow passengers immediately get up and quickly calm him down; 
he then returns to his seat. Shortly after, a young White woman can be seen to rush towards 
the upset young Black man and embrace him. During this, Emma can be seen to argue with 
other female passengers calling out “You ain’t fucking British! You are Black!” Then a 
baby’s cries can be heard, to which a seemingly angry White woman steps forward and 
shouts at Emma to “shut up” for waking up her baby. The woman can then be heard stating 
that she is English and asking Emma what she has to say to her. Whilst the argument 
between the two women continues, the video clip finishes. 
4.3.1.4 Online YouTube responses. The video clip went viral after its upload and 
was viewed on YouTube more than 3 million times within the first 48 hours of its upload. 
Viewers’ responses included comments making death threats towards Emma, her child, 
and other YouTubers, general threats of violence, as well as offensive and racist 
comments, which resulted in YouTube’s removal of the clip from their website after 
approximately 48 hours. Since then, Emma West was arrested and charged with a racially 
aggravated public order offence. Emma pleaded guilty to racially aggravated harassment, 
alarm or distress. Additionally, several copies of the video clip have re-emerged on 
YouTube, resulting in an estimated 11 million views to date, including repeat viewings. 
4.3.2 Analytic Strategy 
4.3.2.1 Data preparation. YouTube comments to the video clip were first 
imported into Microsoft Word and then formatted uniformly (Arial, size 12 with single line 
and one paragraph spacing between posts) to provide visual ease during the analytic 
process. This also aided initial familiarisation with the content. Next, comments that solely 
consisted of Computer-Mediated-Communication (CMC) abbreviation acronyms (Baron, 
2004) such as LOL, and response tokens such as yeah, were deleted if the connection or 
relevance to other comments could not be easily established. Additionally, repeat 
CHAPTER 4 
 126 
comments made by the same users (i.e. displaying the same verbatim content) and 
comments made in a foreign language (30 in total) were deleted, leaving approximately 
71.000 comments for analysis. 
4.3.2.2 Preliminary analysis. Initially, the comments seemed to be too short and too 
many in number to allow for any meaningful in-depth qualitative analysis. The data were 
therefore initially approached from a content analytic perspective. Based on the nature of 
the video clip’s content, the research interest in responses to online hatred, and some 
previous findings (Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et al., 2014), the researcher 
expected to find different levels of escalation (i.e. aggression, abuse, racism). In particular, 
the data was approached by manually colour-coding any responses relating to levels of 
escalation in an attempt to aid visual identification and management within the large data 
set. 
However, the results of this initial content-based coding revealed no consistent 
evidence of levels of escalation as such. Instead, and despite the brevity of individual 
responses, the comments seemed richer than first anticipated, which was evidenced by the 
emergence of more and more content based codes. In particular, the expanded colour-
coding process resulted in a total of 28 codes, including general expression of aggression, 
hostility, threats, violence, blame and justification for the rant, as well as generally tapping 
into different stereotypes, and general descriptions of Emma West (see Appendix XIII).  
Based on the initial coding scheme, the researcher manually coded the entire data 
corpus, whilst three research assistants each manually coded approximately one third of it. 
The coding was then compared and discussed, which revealed high inter-rater reliability. 
Nevertheless, the large number of emergent content codes, suggestive of an 
unanticipated richness of the data, led to the decision to expand the analytic approach from 
a content analytic to a thematic one. Therefore, the analysis presented below is based on the 
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latter thematic analytic approach. 
4.3.2.3 Data analysis. Based on the relative lack of existing research in this area, as 
well as the absence of an overall theoretical framework with which to account for how 
online users respond to online hate materials on SNSs/SMPs, a bottom up, inductive 
approach to the data was taken. Overall, the thematic analytic process followed Allen, 
Bromely, Kuyken and Sonnenberg’s (2009) procedure. Generally, Thematic Analysis (TA) 
permits for a degree of epistemological and theoretical flexibility and is therefore not 
bound or limited to any specific pre-existing theoretical framework - yet, it does allow for 
the consideration of relevant theories during the analytic process (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
This flexibility thus allows for the identification of themes at both the semantic (i.e. 
‘micro’) and the latent (i.e. ‘macro’) level of analysis (Allen et al., 2009, Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Given the broad inductive scope of the research question, both levels of analysis are 
drawn on here.  
The thematic analytic process involved reading and re-reading the entire data set 
several times to become more familiar with the data and to identify themes related to the 
overall research question. A theme was deemed as such if, first, it tapped into relevant 
aspects concerning the overall research question and, second, if it represented a response-
trend across the entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Reading and re-reading the data set 
continued throughout the formulation of themes, ensuring that the final themes remained 
data driven and that the chosen YouTube extracts (i.e. comments) accurately illustrated the 
corresponding theme/sub-theme. Themes were compared and were either separated further 
to show different nuances in meaning, or grouped together according to their overlap with 
one another (Allen et al., 2009). This process allowed for the development of an analytic 
hierarchy, by ordering the data into overarching themes and corresponding sub-themes 
(Allen et al., 2009). An overarching theme was defined as such if it appeared to be more 
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inclusive (i.e. higher in the thematic hierarchy) and possessed greater analytic scope and 
explanatory strength than a sub-theme (Gleibs, Sonnenberg & Haslam, 2014). Overall, the 
aim of the thematic coding process was to identify and organise emerging themes that were 
internally homogenous, externally heterogeneous and had explanatory power (Allen et al., 
2009). Attention was also paid to prevalence which was determined by the frequency of 
responses that illustrated each theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
4.4 Results 
Overall, the majority of responses condemned the content of the video clip. 
Analysis of YouTube users’ responses to the video identified four overarching themes: (1) 
Making Sense of Emma, (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, (3) Us versus Them, and (4) 
Contesting Britishness (see Table 4.1 for an overview). These main themes are examined in 
detail below under separate section headings. Each section includes a broad definition and a 
narrative description of the respective theme content as well as evidence from the actual 
online comments. Corresponding sub-themes will be presented as sub-headings. It should 
be noted that here, as in other qualitative analyses (see Gleibs et al., 2014), is a degree of 
overlap between themes. For example, all themes reflect how posters, to some extent, 
attempted to position themselves (and other posters) in relation to racism. It should also be 
noted that many of the extracts below contain grammatical and spelling errors – which 
were corrected by putting the corrections in square brackets only in some cases to help 
clarify the meaning of these extracts.
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Table 4.1  
 
Main Theme Sub-Theme Example Extract(s) Frequency* 
Making Sense 
of Emma** 
 “She’s on drugs. Nobody can rationally act like that. (…)”; She must be high or drunk? 
(…)”; “cocaine is a hell of a drug”; “gurning her face off….cunt”. 
14% 
Meeting Hatred 
with Hatred**  
 “Im British through and through and all I can say is, this rat-faced ugly chav cunt needs to 
be dragged off by her skanky greasy hair and fucking shot.” 
10% 
Us Versus 
Them** 
 “Stupid Bitch! should know if it wasn't for us Non- brits, then maybe Britain wouldnt be as 
successful as they are. They STEAL our resources, they STEAL our oils, they STEAL our 
country's. And YET this British Bitch is complaining, it shouldnt be her complaining it 
should be the non brits complaining!” 
23% 
 Sense of 
injustice** 
“Why is it that blacks can get away with everything like murder, rape and taking over the 
country... and when british try we all get banged up....i think we should all go to africa and 
make their country ours and make them all slaves again.... BACK TO THE GOOD OLD 
DAYS OF SLAVE TRADE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” 
2% 
Distribution of overarching theme and sub-theme frequencies including examples obtained from the thematic analysis.  
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 Sense of 
deprivation 
“(…) white population lose out on housing jobs and benefits because of foreigners… how is 
that fair???” 
9% 
Contesting 
Britishness** 
 “how can people not understand that you can be British and black if you are born in Britain 
then you are British you can get a British passport i want to literally stab her she is a 
disgrace to not only Britain but human kind.” 
12% 
 Britishness 
under threat 
“This chick is badass! And she's right, 80% of that tram is not british.. Britain is dying, and 
she is has at least the courage to stand up for her nation.” 
3% 
 We are all 
immigrants 
“Throughout history, Britain was invaded by Germans, Danes, the French, the Italians, 
with migrations of gypsies from Eastern Europe. Her ancestors are probably ethnic.” 
4% 
 *The frequency of the main themes is calculated from the combined amount of comments of the main- and sub-themes. 
**These extracts contain some aspects which are also encapsulated in the other themes (i.e. meeting hatred with hatred and the notion of 
Britishness). 
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4.4.1 Making Sense of Emma 
Posters were obviously stirred by the content of the video clip and their responses 
often took a stance on racism. The video content seemed to evoke a range of negative 
emotions (i.e. expressions of distress) in several respondents. These emotions included 
shame (“Such a rude, ignorant women makes me ashamed to be British”), disgust and 
embarrassment (“You disgust me. You are the reason I am sometimes embarrassed to admit 
that I'm British.”), upset (“This video sickens me. She needs a reality check. I'm deeply 
upset by this footage.”), and shock (“I'm actually shocked! I can't believe what I have just 
watched?!"; “I am so shocked and appalled by this woman...”). 
Notably, respondents who expressed negative emotions condemned what they saw 
as Emma’s overt, racist behaviour. Many posters seemed to deal with what they had seen in 
the video clip by attempting to make sense of Emma and her behaviour. This sense-making 
focused on Emma’s personal characteristics, and particularly on attempting to attribute 
Emma's behaviour to internal, intra-psychic processes (i.e. alcohol and/or drug 
consumption): 
OMG that woman is vile. And obviously either drunk or on drugs (judging from 
facial expressions and slurring). Luckily we don't all feel like her and she is one 
of a minority of people.. (Poster A)  
This extract demonstrates how many respondents who disagreed with Emma’s 
racist behaviour, tended to attribute her behaviour to negative personal characteristics, 
which, in turn, enabled them to distance themselves from Emma. This distancing is 
evidenced by “we don’t all feel like her and she is one of a minority” which, not only 
rejects racism but also positions the poster in opposition to Emma and other perceived 
racists and thus removes any basis for socially identifying with her. As will become clear 
later, the process of distancing also relates to another theme, namely Us versus Them. 
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The link between disapproval of Emma’s behaviour and attempts to make sense of 
it by focusing on Emma’s perceived negative personal and socio-economic characteristics 
becomes even clearer in the extract below. Specifically, here the poster attempts to make 
sense of Emma’s behaviour by explicitly referring to her perceived low intelligence, low 
education, and low socio-economic status. Moreover, here these personal characteristics 
(i.e. negative stereotypes) are seen to be associated directly with racist attitudes: 
The fact she can't string her opinions without saying FUCK says a lot more 
about her intelligence. would she happen to be on benefits and live in a council 
home by any chance? Its usually those people that moan about others but are 
happy to scrounge benefits and freebies of others who work in Britain and pay 
taxes like the people she insults (Poster B) 
Here, there is an allusion to Emma’s racism as a direct consequence of her 
perceived low intelligence and low socio-economic status. In particular, these attributions 
seem to serve primarily to label Emma as a racist – in other words, as one of “those people” 
(i.e. an out-group member). Here, this strategy to position Emma as a racist (i.e. an out-
group member) further seems to serve as a means of making sense of Emma’s behaviour. 
 In addition to explaining Emma’s behaviour on the basis of a perceived lack of 
education, the following extract invokes a comparison between Emma and immigrants (i.e. 
immigrants "have more skills" and better work ethics than Emma). This comparison further 
serves as a way of discrediting Emma. The poster also tries to makes sense of Emma’s 
behaviour by linking it to a particular lifestyle (i.e. sexual transgression and work 
avoidance), which has been linked with poverty (Parisi, 1998): 
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This is what happens when u don't get an education that informs you of the 
realities of immigration. immigrants of all races have to work twice as hard to 
get jobs here and often have many more skills, in speaking several languages. 
I wonder what this ignorant fuck's skills are? probably shagging around and 
talking about how 'blacks' have ruined the country when she probably has never 
held down a job in her life! (Poster C) 
Making sense of Emma’s behaviour was also often associated with reference to 
Emma’s role as an unfit mother (i.e. "a bad mother" and "a bad role model"). In particular, 
responses frequently expressed concern for Emma's child, such as “I feel sorry for her little 
boy”, “she (i.e. Emma) used the child as a shield”, “I hope social services will take her 
child away", or “poor child”. This, then, corresponds to broader strategies that have been 
observed in the media (Thomas, 1998) which aim to discredit single mothers through 
negative stereotyping and their portrayal as immoral and neglectful.  
By referring to Emma and/or other perceived racist posters in hateful terms, 
comments frequently went beyond simply trying to make sense of Emma’s behaviour, 
attempting to take a stance on racism:  
Most of, if not all of the people backing this horrible cunt are unemployed dole 
spongers who use foreigners as an excuse for not getting a job. Waists of space 
racist pricks. most of the English football team are black. Show some respect 
(Poster D) 
This, then, goes beyond trying to make sense of Emma: here, insulting and 
negatively stereotyping Emma and other racists serves to demonstrate the poster’s 
opposition to their views. As will be seen, this use of hostile and aggressive language also 
links to the next theme (i.e. Meeting Hatred with Hatred). Also, the poster’s reference here 
to the ethnic diversity of the English football team – a symbol of national pride – 
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foreshadows the final theme Contesting Britishness. 
Overall, Making Sense of Emma encapsulated respondents’ attempts to understand 
and explain Emma. Specifically, respondents drew on a range of negative stereotypes both 
on a personal level (i.e. invoking alcohol/drug abuse, low intelligence, low education, ‘bad 
mother/role model’) and a social level (i.e. invoking a low socio-economic status) in order 
to account for Emma’s behaviour and to distance themselves from (Emma’s) racist views 
by positioning her as ‘other’ (i.e. an out-group member).  This process frequently involved 
the use of strong, hateful language as the following extract illustrates:  
Its funny how this silly lady thinks its 'the blacks' that are ruining her country 
when she is sitting on a tram with her son clearly on drugs and carrying on and 
the only person decent enough to tell her not to swear in front of kids is black..... 
I know who I would rather live next door two, the black lady and not the coked 
up whore. (Poster E)  
4.4.2 Meeting Hatred with Hatred 
This thick bitch would have got kicked the fuk out of by me the dik head in the 
back that takes his bag off why didnt he do anything.. Faggot bitch would get 
killed lil tart if i was there i would kill the bitch !!!! FUK YU DIE BITCH 
(Poster F) 
This extract epitomises the essence of Meeting Hatred with Hatred as another 
overarching theme in this analysis. In particular, comments encapsulated by this theme 
depicted posters’ tendency to strongly object to Emma's behaviour by means of demeaning 
and dehumanising her. Specifically, many posters responded to Emma’s behaviour by 
using hateful (including racist/abusive) and aggressive language, such as “she has a 
mentality like Hitler”, “she shouldn’t be allowed to breed”, “ugly ass throwback gobshite 
of a tredless bucketpussy usless eater oxygen thieving minus 80 I.Q”, “lazy”, "whore", 
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"cunt", "chav", “slag”, “anti-social, scum-sucking retard”, "pikey", “albino monkey”, or 
“honkey”. This use of hateful language in response to Emma's behaviour seems 
paradoxical, in so far, as it reflects an attempt to counter Emma’s apparent racism and 
hatred with further expressions of hatred (hence Meeting Hatred with Hatred).  
Along similar lines, posters frequently dehumanised Emma by referring to her as “a 
piece of filth”, "gutter trash", “White trash”, “mosh mault”, “monstrosity”, “plankton”, 
“a thing” or a "scum (bag)". These terms invoke a perceived lack of humanity on Emma’s 
part, thus placing her outside ‘normal’ human society and calling for her social exclusion 
(e.g. into "the sewer/gutter/trash", a place where society discards its unwanted waste). The 
dehumanisation of Emma thus represents another way in which posters attempted to 
distance themselves from her and the video’s content.  
In addition, posters who condemned Emma’s behaviour called for her punishment, 
albeit on a symbolical level rather than a literal one. For example, posters referred to “this 
lazy sponging cunt should be put down by a vet. Although animals are better looking that 
that scum.I sugest she goes back to where she came from the sewer”. As these examples 
illustrate, Emma’s dehumanisation and calls for her punishment frequently went hand in 
hand – indeed, the latter seemed predicated on the former. These calls for punishment 
seemed to underscore further posters’ apparent opposition to racism. Further calls for 
Emma’s punishment included “hitting her”, “knocking her out", “beating her”, “stabbing 
her”, “slashing her throat”, "deporting her", "locking her up in the sewer with the rats", or 
to "rot in hell" – which, again, highlight posters’ opposition to Emma's views and 
behaviour.  
Overall, Meeting Hatred with Hatred encapsulated one particular method posters 
used to express their disagreement with the video clip’s content. In other words, in their use 
of aggressive, abusive, threatening, and hateful language, posters attempted to distance 
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themselves from Emma’s expressions of racism. These attempts at distancing are also 
evident in the following theme.  
4.4.3 Us versus Them 
This prevalent theme describes how posters attempted to either distance themselves 
from or affiliate with Emma and her views by invoking a sense of “us” versus “them”. 
This, in turn, echoes previous work focussing social identity processes (e.g. Blackwood, 
Hopkins, Reicher, 2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher, Haslam & Rath, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). For example, posters condemning 
Emma tended to position themselves alongside other posters who shared their own 
seemingly anti-racist position – whilst, at the same time, distancing themselves from those 
who advocated or supported Emma's views (and vice versa). In particular, those posters 
who did not share Emma's views tended to refer to her and those who shared her views, as 
‘them’ - in other words, as out-group members. Posters opposing racism also tended to 
refer to other like-minded YouTube users as us, that is, as in-group members. Us versus 
Them consisted of two sub-themes that were labelled Sense of Injustice and Sense of 
Deprivation. 
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As already indicated, many posters condemned racist views and consequently 
distanced themselves from Emma: 
@Participant X1: […] All racism is wrong. This woman is an embarassment to 
where I come from. Hate engenders hate. Even the biggest, most intolerant 
racists must recognise exceptions to their misplaced and ignorant rules. Why 
not try giving everyone the benefit of the doubt? I don't want to be mistaken 
for someone like you, or this stupid woman on the video, so why should I 
assume anything about anyone else? (Poster G) 
This poster distances him/herself from racism in two ways: first, on a social level, 
by calling “all racism wrong” and by labelling racists, as a group, as “intolerant” and 
“ignorant” and second, on a personal level, by describing Emma in negative terms, calling 
her an “embarrassment”, “stupid”, and “I don’t want to be mistaken for (i.e. associated 
with) someone like you” (i.e. someone with racist views). Conversely, posters supporting 
Emma’s views attempted to distance themselves from immigrants and immigration 
supporters: 
@Participant X2: True, that was adorable how she stood up for her race and the 
bravery to say what everyone was thinking in front of adversity and to all the 
immigrant invaders who came to enforce their foreign oppressive laws and 
genocide [on] the land of the indigenous Whites. (Poster H) 
This comment displays categorical thinking through its use of distancing pronouns, 
                                                
1 This comment was made in response to another comment, expressing opposition to 
the poster’s views. 
2 Please note that this comment was also made in response to another comment. In this 
instance, the comment was aimed at a poster who shared the views of this particular poster. 
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such as “their” foreign oppressive laws, implying that laws were not voted for or made by 
us (i.e. here, White people). Consequently, the poster here distinguishes between the in-
group self (i.e. the ‘us’ supporting Emma’s views) and ‘the other’ or out-group (i.e. those 
opposing Emma). Specifically, the above terminology depicts ‘us’ as good, while ‘they’ are 
bad. Here, the contrast between negative terms, such as “invaders”, “oppressive”, 
“genocide”, “indigenous White", and positive terms, such as “adorable”, “stood up” and 
“bravery” emphasises the distinction between the in-group and out-group (i.e. perceived 
racial differences). The term ‘genocide’ here also links to a perceived threat, ostensibly 
posed by immigrants, to posters’ social identity (i.e., social identity threat; Branscombe, 
Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Reicher et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2013) which will be 
discussed in more detail under Contesting Britishness.  
Some comments in support of Emma not only created a sense of Us versus Them 
through use of in-/out-group defining pronouns, but also by displaying high levels of 
hostility towards out-group members, as illustrated in the following quote: 
GOOD FOR HER! THEY CAN ALL FUCK OFF BACK TO WHERE THEY 
BELONG, AND THE TRAITORS WHO BROUGHT THEM TO THE U.K. 
MUST BE ARRESTED AND FUCKNG EXECUTED FOR TREASON!!! 
FUCK OFF! FUCK OFF! FUCK OFF!!! (Poster I) 
This comment clearly demonstrates the poster’s positive self-representation and 
negative other-representation, through out-group defining pronouns (i.e. they/them) and, in 
doing so, distances him/herself not only from ‘foreigners’ (i.e. ‘they’ do not ‘belong’ in the 
UK), but also from those people in the UK who support immigration (i.e. "traitors", who 
should be "executed for treason").  
This hostility towards immigration supporters indicates a certain degree of conflict 
as the recipients of this hostility also belong to a potential us (i.e. the British). Here, British 
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nationals supporting immigration are categorised as out-group members by those opposing 
immigration which suggests that hostility expressed towards ostensible out-group members 
serves as a strategy to create inter-group conflict and justify action against them.   
Overall then, Us versus Them tapped into broad social identity processes. That is, 
the theme and its two subordinate themes (see below) encapsulated posters' attempts to 
position themselves and other posters in line with the construction of in- and out-groups. 
As such, respondents' positioning frequently drew on the issue of immigration – which is 
exemplified by the following sub-themes, Sense of Injustice and Sense of Deprivation. 
4.4.3.1 Sense of injustice. This sub-theme illustrates the way in which posters 
constructed a sense of Us versus Them by invoking immigration. In particular, those who 
voiced racist views tended to express their perceived sense of injustice by claiming that 
immigrants receive preferential treatment. Respondents who opposed racist views tended to 
argue that everyone “born in Britain” should be considered "just as British as we (i.e. 
White British) are" and therefore "have the same rights to live in Britain" (i.e. here, a sense 
of injustice consisted of denying immigrants their right to claim to be born in Britain as 
Britishness). These types of responses also related to notions of ‘Britishness’ and link to the 
final theme Contesting Britishness. There were also many posters who argued that 
immigration was an inevitable consequence of Britain's colonial history: 
Hey lady - you don't like people from other countries or ethnic backgrounds in 
your country or calling them British or English - you guys started it! invading 
and looting all those other countries, staying in India, Pakistan, parts of Africa 
etc - now it's our turn!! PS. - rest of Britain who aren't racist like this stupid 
cow - we love you, we love your pubs, your beer & stouts, your football and 
your culture. Peace! (Poster J) 
Again, here, a sense of Us versus Them is created through use of specific out-
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group-defining pronouns (i.e. you and your to address Emma and other British people), and 
in-group defining pronouns (i.e. our and we in relation to members of other countries and 
ethnic minorities). The poster also proclaims immigration an inevitable and direct 
consequence of British colonialism. In particular, his/her references to invading and looting 
express a sense of unfairness and injustice towards people from Britain's former colonies. 
Whilst this also suggests that s/he identifies as non-British, the poster also distinguishes 
between two different versions of British identity, namely a non-racist and racist British 
one, thereby differentiating between different types of British national group membership.  
There were, however, also posters who endorsed Emma's stance on immigration:  
[…] Islamic extremests do run round screaming "kill the infidel" and the police 
stand by and do absilutely nothing!. One law for black and another for white 
isn't working, any more than a housing or education policy that discriminates 
against established nationals, and merely fosters disharmony. (Poster K) 
Although this poster does not directly categorise him/herself as a member of a 
specific in-group, this comment creates a sense of Us versus Them (i.e. Islamists extremists 
and Black people versus White people) through ethnic stereotyping. In particular, this post 
implies that all Muslims are Islamic extremists and not White – a misleading fusion which 
is likely to reinforce existing negative stereotypes. More specifically, the comment 
expresses discontent concerning the British establishment (i.e. laws and government 
policy), whereby the British criminal justice system is accused of unjustly differentiating 
between groups by "discriminating against established nationals”.  
Whilst the poster in the above extract implicitly suggests that current laws/policies 
are unfair and contribute towards social division, other posters accused the British 
government and criminal justice system explicitly of committing injustices against those 
who are ‘really British’. Specifically, their sense of injustice referred to accusations of 
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perceived persecution of ‘real Brits’ for ‘minor crimes’, such as "expressing politically 
incorrect views", whilst maintaining that ‘severe’ crimes, such as "murder", "rape", or 
"burning poppies in the street", committed by those ‘non-British’ (i.e. immigrants) "remain 
unpunished".  
Thus, some responses to the video clip accused the British government of applying 
different rules to different people (i.e. favouring immigrants and discriminating against ‘the 
British’) - which directly related to posters’ own attempts to differentiate between groups 
(i.e. Us versus Them). This sense of injustice (i.e. the claim that the establishment unjustly 
differentiates between groups) here also relates to the next sub-theme.  
4.4.3.2. Sense of deprivation. The comments falling under this sub-theme 
conveyed posters’ sense of feeling deprived. In particular, those holding racist and anti-
immigration views tended to express a sense of deprivation via creating a sense of Us 
versus Them (i.e. here ‘us’ versus ‘foreigners’). Some posters blamed ‘foreigners’ for their 
own financial insecurity and unemployment, including familiar phrases, such as “they take 
our jobs”, “they are prioritised for housing” and “they receive special benefits and free 
health care”, whilst "we lose out to them”. Consequently, and as illustrated in the 
following extract, posters also expressed their sense of deprivation by drawing explicit 
group distinctions (i.e. racial out-grouping): 
I wish more people would stand up for what they believe in we have a freedom 
of speech but somehow this has been withdrawn with this and why??? she has 
an opinion and is expressing it..... if people are offended then sorry they 
shouldn't watch it or be here to be offended against it..... we have got too many 
immigrants due to legislation..... and what a load of shit it is..... white 
population lose out on housing jobs and benefits because of foreigners..... how 
is that fair??? (Poster L) 
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The above reference to "the white population losing out on housing, jobs, and 
benefits because of foreigners..." not only suggests a sense of deprivation in general but, 
particularly, a sense of ‘us’ being deprived compared to ‘them’ (i.e. see fraternal relative 
deprivation, Runciman, 1966). For instance, ‘our’ (i.e. White British) socio-economic 
insecurity is here, blamed on ‘them’ (i.e. immigrants).  
Overall, the theme Us versus Them reflected social identity processes as posters 
attempted to distinguish between different in- and out-groups (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2012, 
2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). In particular, 
posters attempted to align themselves with other posters whose views they shared (Us) and 
to differentiate themselves from those whose views they opposed (versus Them). In doing 
so, comments frequently touched on notions of ‘Britishness’ – and thus specifically on the 
issue of who should be included in this social category and who constitutes Us. This then, 
relates to Contesting Britishness, the final theme, which will be discussed next. 
4.4.4 Contesting Britishness 
In the majority of posts, attempts were made to define what it means to be British 
by constructing and contesting different versions of a British national identity. Here, 
posters did not simply try to position themselves in relation to Emma - instead, this theme 
indicates the extent to which respondents attempt to go beyond taking a specific stance on 
racism. In particular, this prevalent theme describes posters’ ambivalence about the notion 
of ‘Britishness’ or national identity content, by capturing the ways in which comments 
contested the criteria by which ‘Britishness’ should appropriately be defined. This is 
perhaps unsurprising especially as the video clip showed Emma challenging the British 
identity of a Black fellow passenger (i.e. referring to her as non-British). Also, given the 
diversity of YouTube users, one might expect variations in posters’ references to national 
identity and sense of Britishness. 
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Whilst endorsement of racist views and an anti-immigration stance need not 
necessarily go hand in hand, there frequently appeared to be a degree of overlap between 
the two. For example, here, respondents who positively embraced immigration did not 
always seem to differentiate between racism on the one hand and anti-immigration on the 
other. They therefore frequently referred to those who rejected immigration as racists.  
Overall, respondents’ accounts of the criteria defining ‘Britishness’ ranged from 
being “multi-cultural", "tolerant", "accepting of others", "patriotic", "born in Britain", 
"White", to "holding a British passport", or rejecting the existence of ‘true Britishness’ 
altogether: 
She doesn't have respect. No one is PURE english no more, not even the queen 
and the royal family is and I bet she isn't either. I'm mixed my father is english 
and my mum's thai, I was born here in the UK and I am a BRITISH. I follow 
every thing she does. .. I do the same as she, what just because My mum's from 
a different country? Just because these people are different colour means there 
not British.. HOW SHE WAS SAYING THIS IS MY BRITAIN.. NO BITCH 
THIS IS OUR BRITAIN. LIVE WITH IT! (Poster M) 
Here, the poster clearly rejects Emma's version of ‘Britishness’ and, particularly, 
the view that anyone can be considered ‘purely’ British – including the ultimate symbol of 
‘Britishness’, namely the Royal Family (ETHNOS, 2005). In particular, s/he rejects the 
idea that ‘Britishness’ can be determined by one's skin colour. In doing so, this poster not 
only distances him/herself from Emma's views, s/he also implicitly affirms immigrants’ 
and non-White people’s right to claim a British identity. 
The following two sub-themes relate to the degree to which the boundaries of 
‘Britishness’ are understood as inclusive of ‘others’. These were Britishness Under Threat, 
in which multiculturalism was claimed to be either the ‘undoing’ of ‘Britishness’ or, 
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conversely, as its very essence, and “We are all Immigrants”, in which notions of 
'Britishness’ were explicitly linked to Britain’s history.  
4.4.4.1 Britishness under threat. The content of a number of posts seemed to 
express fears that Britain might be ‘losing’ its ‘Britishness’ due to immigration. In 
particular, these fears tended to relate to posters’ perceived inability/restriction to express 
their ‘Britishness’ (i.e. not being allowed to “fly the George Cross on St. George's Day”, or 
to “refer to Christmas”). In other words, here, Christian ‘Britishness’ is seen to be under 
threat. Along the same lines, some posters expressed a sense of identity threat by references 
to “cultural genocide” or “cultural cleansing” in relation to immigration. Here, such 
references create a sense of social identity threat (Branscombe et al., 1999; Reicher et al., 
2008; Verkuyten, 2013) amongst those supporting Emma whilst simultaneously invoking 
conflict with the perceived out-group (i.e. foreigners).  
Interestingly, most posters who self-identified as English appeared to endorse a 
British national identity (rather than an English one). In particular, respondents who 
explicitly referred to their English heritage rarely voiced concerns about losing their 
Englishness – instead, when national identity was seen to be under threat this tended to be 
expressed in terms of the British losing their ‘Britishness’. In addition, posters frequently 
differentiated between a British we/this country from a non-British them/other countries 
(Condor, 2000):  
She has a valid point, albeit her language is really strong. The white, working 
classes in this country are becoming increasingly marginalised by the flood of 
immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. She's frustrated and angry. 
The present and preceding governments have failed her for years, and all she 
sees on public transport are ugly, threatening black and brown faces. Welcome 
to Tony 'War Criminal' Blair's vision of Britain for the 21st century. (Poster N) 
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Here, the British government is reproached for allowing “the flood of immigrants” 
into Britain – the poster thus distances him/herself from the government’s vision of Britain. 
This distancing is further emphasised by stating that the government “have failed” the 
“White working classes” which, together with references to “ugly, threatening black and 
brown faces”, underscore the poster’s sense of threat to his/her national identity.  Also, the 
poster’s use of the term "marginalisation" is interesting here. First, the term conveys a 
sense of (relative) deprivation for which s/he holds immigrants responsible (see also 
above). Second, the use of this particular term here expresses a sense of identity threat by 
implying that White people have become a minority in Britain.  
However, many other posters rejected this notion of Britishness Under Threat 
altogether. These posters argued in favour of immigration, suggesting that it enhances and 
enriches ‘Britishness’. This, in turn, was linked to calls for greater equal rights in terms of 
who should be allowed to call themselves British:  
I'm British (white) and know I have no greater right to call myself British than 
those who became citizens today. I hope the ignorant minority of white 
nationalists will flow into our cultural past, but I doubt it. No society ever lives 
without ignorance, prejudice or racism completely. I would say I'm ashamed of 
this woman but I see no connection between myself an her just because of our 
race. Don't get frustrated by her ignorance, Britain's a multicultural society, an 
I'm proud of that. (Poster O) 
Here, then, multiculturalism becomes the very essence of what it means to be 
British – which is in direct opposition to the views and behaviour depicted in the YouTube 
video. The poster clearly dis-identifies with Emma (i.e. "see no connection with her") and 
distances him/herself from White nationalists in general (i.e. by referring to them as 
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"ignorant"). Rather than threatening British national identity, here multiculturalism is 
construed as defining ‘Britishness’.  
Other posters argued that throughout British history different cultural groups came 
to Britain and therefore shaped ‘Britishness’. This not only gives people the right to call 
themselves British, it also undermines ‘Britishness’ as a fixed category. Some posters even 
suggested that “We (i.e. the British) are all Immigrants” – a claim which will be considered 
next. 
4.4.4.2 “We are all immigrants”. Many YouTube comments explicitly and 
positively embraced immigration, especially given Britain’s colonial history. For example, 
some posters responded to those who rejected immigration by suggesting that, under 
British Empire rule, people from British colonies had not only been encouraged but, at 
times, forced to live in Britain: 
Did anybody force the British to buy African slaves? By buying Africans, they 
made them British. The same history told me that the British used extreme force 
to capture several African settlements. They even sent the leaders of some of 
these settlements into exile. An example is King JaJa of Opobo. The British 
traveled for Months to look for Africa. They found Africa and raped her. They 
have to bear the consequences of their actions. No complaints is entertained 
from any British about Africans (Poster P) 
This then raises the issue of who has the right to call him/herself British and bestow 
this identity on others. The specific argument here is that African descendants have the 
same right to call themselves British based on their ancestral history. Here, people who 
reject immigration are being reminded, that, although Britain’s colonial history might 
appear glorious to some, British history is rooted in the (bleak) past of those living in the 
colonies – which, in turn, here justifies immigration. 
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The YouTube comments also challenged Emma’s concept of ‘Britishness’ by 
referring to Britain’s pre-colonial history. For example, some posters undermined Emma’s 
notion of ‘Britishness’ by suggesting that:  
(…) if you look at the history of britian [we] are pretty much all immigrants… 
a mix of roman and saxon and norman and viking… further back you have the 
celts and the picts… who came from somewhere else in europe… (Poster Q) 
Again, the argument here is that ‘Britishness’ is, in fact, a function of the nation’s 
cultural diversity – and as this diversity is evident in ancient British history, no one should 
thus be considered more or less British. The implication here is that there is no inherent or 
fixed essence to ‘Britishness’; instead, as Britain’s history and present continue to be 
shaped by cultural diversity and multiculturalism, what it means to be British evolves and 
expands. This position, then, lead to an advocacy of tolerance and diversity, which is 
reflected in the following extract: 
There are good and bad in every race. Every one has a right to there own 
opinion but no one has the right to disrespect and abuse people based on there 
race and religion this is not freedom of speech. White people are not the only 
ones who contribute to this country every where you go you will see black and 
brown doctors, teachers, politicians, police officers and soldier’s many have 
died for this country. Do you know why? Because this is our country! We are 
different but equal! Peace (Poster R)  
Overall, as a prevalent theme, Contesting Britishness encapsulated attempts to 
define ‘Britishness’– in other words, it captured efforts to define ‘us’. Specifically, 
respondents contested the criteria that determine who should and should not qualify as 
British, which often related to immigration. This contestation sometimes included 
perceived threats to posters’ sense of Britishness (i.e. social identity threat; Branscombe et 
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al., 1999; Reicher et al., 2008). However, for many others, Britishness constituted a broad, 
flexible and evolving social category with immigration/multiculturalism at its very heart. 
In sum, the current analysis indicates that YouTubers responded to explicit hate 
materials by attempting to define or contest the meaning of posters’ national (i.e. here, 
predominantly British) identity. Responses also frequently served to position users 
according to their stance on racism. As such, whilst some YouTubers responded in a racist, 
aggressive and abusive manner, the majority of posters did not automatically endorse, or 
raise their responses beyond, the level of hatred displayed in the video clip.  
4.5 Discussion 
The objective of this study was to explore how general users of a particular SNS (i.e. 
YouTube) responded to online materials which could be construed as explicitly inciting 
hatred. To address this objective, comments in response to a YouTube video clip which 
depicted ‘Emma’, a White female train passenger racially abusing other passengers, were 
analysed. 
Thematic Analysis (TA, Braun & Clarke, 2006) identified four superordinate themes: 
(1) Making Sense of Emma, (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, (3) Us versus Them, and (4) 
Contesting Britishness. Making Sense of Emma depicted attempts to explain Emma and her 
behaviour by invoking both intra-personal and social level explanations (i.e. alcohol/drug 
abuse, lack of intelligence, lack of educational and/or low socio-economic status) which 
also served to distance posters from Emma. Meeting Hatred with Hatred captured 
‘enflamed’ responses to the video clip’s content where hateful language was used, 
including calls for symbolic punishment, to express opposition to Emma and the views 
embodied by her. Us versus Them captured posters’ attempts to construct in- and out-
groups in order to position themselves according to their own stance on racism. This 
positioning frequently occurred with reference to immigration and related to expressions of 
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a sense of injustice and perceived relative deprivation. The final theme, Contesting 
Britishness, depicted attempts to define (or contest) the British national identity, especially 
in relation to Britain’s colonial history and immigration. Whilst some YouTube posters 
expressed a sense of their national identity being under threat, others suggested that there is 
no such thing as ‘Britishness’ – and, for some, immigration/ multiculturalism constituted 
the very essence of ‘Britishness’. These themes link to existing theories as well as previous 
empirical findings which will be discussed below. 
Posters frequently attempted to distance themselves from Emma’s behaviour by 
positioning her as an out-group member (i.e. a racist). This, in turn, was achieved through 
invoking negative stereotypes (i.e. low intelligence, low socio-economic and single mother 
status) and the use of hateful, dehumanising language. Similar distancing strategies have 
been observed in previous work (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; 
Douglas et al., 2005; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; Moghaddam, 
2005; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Steinfeldt et al., 2010) where the use of (hateful) language has 
been described as a means of creating negative social comparisons and reinforcing existing 
stereotypes – or ‘othering’. Here, this ‘othering’ strategy served not only as a means of 
Making sense of Emma but, paradoxically, also led to Meeting hatred with hatred, as 
expressed in Emma’s dehumanisation.  
The dehumanisation of perceived out-group members has been observed previously 
as a common linguistic ‘othering’ strategy (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 
2004; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; Moghaddam, 2005). Dehumanisation of perceived out-
group members has also been associated with attempts to foster a sense of moral 
righteousness or moral disengagement (Cammaerts, 2009; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016) and the 
creation of a sense of in-group superiority (Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley & Muntele Hendres, 
2012; Mumford et al., 2008). For instance, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) found that racists 
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used moral disengagement strategies such as dehumanisation to justify expressions of their 
views. Interestingly, in this study, dehumanisation was used by both those who supported 
or opposed racist attitudes to justify expressing their views. In line with this, some sub-
themes (i.e. Sense of deprivation, Sense of injustice and Britishness under threat) echo 
some of Faulkner and Bliuc’s (2016) moral disengagement themes.  
Furthermore, one of the functions of dehumanisation may be to enable in-group 
members to justify punitive treatments of individual out-group members and out-groups 
(Moghaddam, 2005) – which, in this study, was reflected in posters’ demands for Emma’s 
symbolic punishment. Similar calls for symbolic punishment have also been observed in 
other online hate contexts (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et 
al., 2014; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012). Some posters’ attempts to counter Emma’s apparent 
racism with further expressions of hatred (i.e. Meeting hatred with hatred) seem to be in 
line with existing ‘flaming’ research (Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et al., 2014, 
Lange, 2007; Moor et al., 2010). In particular, there was some evidence of ‘flaming’ (i.e. 
use of aggressive/abusive/racist language to oppose certain web content) in the online 
comments examined here. Specifically, posters appeared to use hateful language, or 
‘flames’, not only to express their disagreement with the video clip, but also in order to 
mirror the norms conveyed in the video clip (i.e. as evidenced by Emma’s own aggressive, 
racist, insulting and hostile language and behaviour). This corresponds to previous research 
on online aggression which suggests that aggressive expressions on the Internet are often a 
reaction to perceived aggression from others (Law, Shapka, Domene & Gagne, 2012).  
The most prominent themes identified in the current analysis – namely, Us versus 
Them and Contesting Britishness – explicitly tapped into social identity processes and, as 
such, not only correspond to previous findings but also fit within a broader social identity 
approach (Blackwood et al., 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
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Turner et al., 1987; Verkuyten, 2013). For example, Angie et al. (2011) related the use of 
negative stereotyping and categorical thinking – as evidenced by ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – to 
social identity formation. In particular, Angie et al. (2011) found the use of categorical 
thinking more prominent in non-violent ideological groups than in violent ones. 
Categorical ‘us-versus-them’ thinking was also observed by Blackwood et al. (2012), Bliuc 
et al. (2012) and Reicher et al. (2008). In line with previous work, in order to confirm their 
identification with like-minded respondents, or their group identity (i.e. here, non-racists), 
many posters in this study adopted similar categorical thinking strategies to those identified 
in previous work (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Charteris-Black, 2006).  
Posters who supported Emma’s behaviour also distinguished between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
– specifically by using terminology that depicted ‘us’ as good and ‘them’ as bad. This, too, 
corresponds to previous observations that positive self-representation is often pitched 
against negative other-presentation (Douglas et al., 2005; Verkuyten, 2013) in order to 
create negative social comparisons which, in turn, aims to establish a sense of legitimacy 
and to persuade like-minded others (Charteris-Black, 2006). Here, negative other-
presentations was frequently linked to expressions of a sense of injustice or relative 
deprivation. For example, posters who endorsed Emma’s views tended to claim that 
immigrants and ethnic minorities were in receipt of preferential treatment by the State or by 
the police - which, in turn, mirrors previous findings (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; 
Douglas et al., 2005; Mols & Jetten, 2014). These posters also invoked the notion of socio-
economic insecurity as a consequence of immigration; attributing blame to immigrants has 
previously been linked to scapegoating, disgruntled sentiments, prejudice and hate crimes 
towards minority groups (Bowling & Phillips, 2003; Sibbitt, 1997; Young, 1999; for a 
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detailed review see Walters, 2010).3  
 Taken together, these findings closely relate to the concept of social identity threat 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Reicher et al., 2008, Verkuyten, 2013) which derives from the 
social identity perspective (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; 
Tajfel &Turner’s, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Whilst there 
are different types of social identity threat, the current findings relate most closely to what 
Branscombe et al. (1999) have termed ‘distinctiveness threat’ (i.e. the fear that one’s group 
distinctiveness is prevented or undermined). This suggests that perceived threats to one’s 
group’s identity may lead to discrimination including expressions of overt racism and 
hostility (Perreira, Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Reicher et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2013).  
In line with previous findings (e.g. Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016), posters in this study, 
who supported racist views, attempted to justify their opinions by expressing a perceived 
sense of threat to the distinctiveness of their social (i.e. national) identity (Branscombe et 
al., 1999) on the basis of immigration. It has been shown previously that one of the 
responses to multiculturalism can be the expression of a perceived (national) identity threat 
(Mols & Jetten, 2014; Sindic; 2008). Issues relating to perceived social identity threat were 
also evident in the final theme – namely, Contesting Britishness. In particular, posters who 
supported racist views invoked a sense of socio-economic threat to the White British 
working class.  
Another way in which the themes Us versus Them and Contesting Britishness 
tapped into social identity processes relates to YouTubers’ contestation of their national 
                                                
3 At the time of the video clip's upload (e.g. October 2011), Britain was in an economic 
recession and characterised by socio-economic insecurity. This may therefore have 
exacerbated posters’ sense of relative material and financial deprivation. 
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identity as British. In particular, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) previously observed how 
Australians disputed in online newspaper comments the perceived values and 
characteristics considered representative of their national identity. In addition, differences 
in people’s versions of ‘Britishness’ have been identified previously (e.g. Condor, 1997). 
In particular, differing accounts of ‘Britishness’ are frequently found in political discourse 
where they serve as rhetorical tools to influence people’s interests and behaviours 
according to political agendas (Sindic, 2008). Therefore, as political agendas change, so 
might the boundaries/definitions of ‘Britishness’.  
Along similar lines, national identities are not fixed and, as Cohen (1994) has 
argued, their boundaries are generally ‘fuzzy’. Thus, national identities are continuously 
re-defined through interactions with different 'others' (Condor, 2000; Hopkins & Murdoch, 
1999).  
4.5.1 Exposure to Online Hate Materials and Escalation 
Coffey and Woolworth (2004) observed that some online discussions can be 
characterised by escalation (i.e. in terms of racism, aggression, abuse). However, in the 
context of the present study, the author did not find any straightforward evidence of 
escalation; instead, posters’ responses seemed more complex and, as discussed above, 
often contested relevant social categories (i.e. ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘Britishness’). One 
reason for the lack of evidence of escalation here is likely to be found in the relative short 
time-span (i.e. 48 hours) posters had available to respond to the video clip (i.e. before the 
clips’ removal from YouTube).  
Another likely reason is the asynchronous nature of the responses under 
investigation here and the corresponding non-sequential way in which posts were displayed 
on YouTube: unlike in Coffey and Woolworth’s study (2004), given the volume of 
simultaneous responses to the YouTube video, posters were rarely able to respond 
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sequentially (i.e. directly) to specific others. Some respondents attempted to overcome this 
issue by creating a response sequence addressing other posters directly (i.e. starting their 
responses with an '@' and indicating the recipient’s username). Yet, by the time their posts 
were displayed, given the sheer number and speed of postings, these attempts at creating 
response sequences would have been hard to identify visually (i.e. they would have 
appeared ‘lost’ amongst hundreds of other comments).  
The potential differences between synchronous versus asynchronous 
communication and user density in online spaces have been highlighted previously 
(Wojcieszak, 2010). In particular, Wojcieszak (2010) questioned whether online response 
synchrony and user density would facilitate or prevent people from responding in a more 
polarised (i.e. escalated) manner over time. Thus, the relative short time, asynchrony and 
density of the comments analysed here might, in part, have prevented further polarisation 
and escalation of hateful responses. The specific relationship between response time, 
asynchrony, density and escalation of hateful responses therefore warrants further 
investigation in order to clarify the possible factors contributing to polarised responses.  
Finally, whilst collating the online comments, it was observed that several 
respondents were removing their comments from the website. This removal seemed 
prompted by other respondents’ appeals to the service providers (i.e. YouTube) or the 
police to delete or investigate certain comments for their perceived offensive and illegal 
nature (i.e. hate speech and/or incitement to racial hatred). Therefore, the removal of posts 
seemed related to posters’ concerns about potential legal consequences and a decreased 
sense of online anonymity. More importantly, the observed removal of posts suggests that 
a certain degree of self-policing is practiced online.  
It was also observed that some posters blocked or spammed others who expressed 
racist views, as well as advised others to do the same (via commenting). Consequently, 
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responses by blocked or spammed posters became no longer visible to anyone on 
YouTube, suggesting that online hate materials can, in fact, elicit self-censorship. This 
self-censorship, in turn, seems to further support the finding that social networking users 
do not always automatically endorse online hate materials. 
4.5.2 Limitations 
First, as with qualitative work in general, one of the limitations of this study lies in 
the fact that the current findings cannot be generalised (e.g. across all online hate materials 
or different SNSs/SMPs). Here, responses to a certain, racially motivated hate incident on 
one specific SNS/SMP (i.e. YouTube) were explored. The author therefore cannot claim to 
explain hatred across all SNSs/SMPs or all hate-motivated incidents, such as those based 
on disability, faith, gender, transgender or subculture. Instead, the broad focus of the 
current research question aimed to provide a starting point for research by exploring the 
nature of online replies to explicit hate materials. In particular, the present study aimed to 
shift the currently dominant ‘end-product approach’ (i.e. already polarised 
individuals/groups and their content/interactions) to a focus on the potential processes 
underlying the development of polarisation in the context of online hatred. It was found 
that whilst online racism can lead to some degree of polarisation, the majority of responses 
did not suggest polarisation per se, but instead indicated social identity processes at play 
(i.e. reflecting the construction of in- and out-groups, illustrating respondents’ group 
affiliations).  
Second, whilst one of the study’s strengths lies in the realistic nature of the data, 
this observational approach prevents the author from making inferences about the 
representativeness of the responses (e.g. the sample might not represent users across other 
SNSs/SMPs). The author neither had access to respondents’ demographics, nor could she 
determine whether respondents posted with multiple or different user names (i.e. 
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identities). Yet, given the substantial number of comments in response to the video clip (i.e. 
over 71,000 posts), it is unlikely that these were exclusive to a specific (demographic) 
group – instead, there was evidence of some diversity in backgrounds (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, geographic location). 
Finally, as in previous studies (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004), the findings do 
not allow the author to draw inferences about the effects that the relatively short period of 
time in which people were able to respond to the video clip might have had on the content 
of their posts. In particular, it remains unclear whether longer-term online interactions 
result in repeated and/or increased expressions of hatred or whether long-term 
interactions/discussions change direction and automatically lose focus, therefore reducing 
or diverting expressions of hatred.  
4.5.3 Conclusion 
Expressions of hatred (e.g. racism) are more and more becoming a feature of life 
online, especially on Social Networking Sites and Social Media Platforms (e.g. YouTube). 
It is therefore becoming increasingly important to understand how ‘everyday’ online users 
respond to and engage with such hateful materials. Many YouTubers who responded to the 
hateful online material analysed here condemned its content. As such, the findings 
obtained in the current context indicate that online hatred may not always be automatically 
endorsed by online users; instead, a degree of contestations in online users’ responses was 
observed. Whilst the current findings cannot be readily generalised to all other forms of 
social networking and/or forms of hatred, they nevertheless show how YouTubers engaged 
with racial hatred and each other, how quickly they engaged and how willing they were to 
engage. In addition, the sheer weight of the number of responses shows that this racial 
incident resonates within a section of society. The author therefore hopes that these 
findings can also provide a springboard for future research which should take into account 
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not only a wider variety of hate materials but also different Social Networking Sites/Social 
Media Platforms.  
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5.1 Abstract 
Although it has been argued that hate on the Internet is increasing, there is still a lack of 
clarity regarding people’s attitudes towards the permissibility of expressions of online 
hatred. In this study, 164 participants completed an online survey, which explored three areas 
of interest concerning online hatred: (1) what constitutes online hatred? (2) the relationship 
between online and offline hatred (3) the role of online anonymity in expressing online 
hatred. The results revealed that the evidence concerning the permissibility of online hatred 
is mixed. In particular, on the one hand, participants did not associate online with offline 
hatred, objected to legal consequences for inciting online hatred, and blamed the victims for 
their online abuse rather than the posters of hateful web content. On the other hand, 
participants largely agreed on which content classified as hateful and which content should 
be considered criminal and admitted that online anonymity aids their own anti-normative 
behaviour, despite most of them not actually feeling anonymous online. Moreover, results 
revealed that there is no consensus on whether the consequences of online or offline hatred 
are worse for its victims. Overall, the mixed results concerning the permissibility of online 
hatred highlight the complexities that online hatred presents for those at the brunt of it.    
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5.2 Introduction 
5.2.1 Background 
Hateful online content has increased in recent years (European Commission, 2016; 
Heller, as cited by North, 2016; Jacks & Adler, 2015), with some reports claiming that, in 
2015, online hate speech spiralled out of control (Wolfram, 2016). For example, according 
to Facebook, the number of general user violations amounts to one million a day, 
compared to Twitter’s 480,000 racist tweets per month (Wolfram, 2016). There has been a 
marked increase over time in the frequency of news headlines on hateful online content, 
expressions of online hatred and their consequences (i.e. hate offences) as well as in the 
number of people witnessing online hate crimes (BBC News, 2016; Graham, 2016).  
Consequently, Jourová, the European Commissioner for Justice, Consumer and 
Gender Equality (cited by the European Commission, 2015) and others (e.g. ACPO, 2014; 
Angie et al., 2010; Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Home Office, 2009; OSCE, 2010) have 
expressed concern that “there is growing evidence that online incitement to hatred leads to 
violence offline”. Jourová (as cited by the European Commission, 2016) argued that online 
hate speech not only distresses the people it targets, but the fear of being targeted by online 
hate speech can also keep people away from Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social 
Media Platforms (SMPs), and thus it limits the digital space for freedom of expression. 
Supporting this, the continuous growth of online hate speech has led to the decision by 
some news websites (e.g. Bloomberg, Chicago Sun Times, Recode, Reuters) to remove 
(temporarily) their online commenting features (Wolfram, 2016).  
According to police chiefs in the UK, online hate materials, and particularly online 
anonymity, play an increasing role in individuals and communities being targeted online 
on the grounds of their race, religion, disability, gender or transgender (Oryszczuk, 2016). 
In addition, Sukhni (as cited by Laubner, 2016) argued that Social Networking Sites/Social 
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Media Platforms (SNSs/SMPs; e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube) play an 
essential role in people’s self-radicalisation. Sukhni based his argument on the fact that 
hateful online content (e.g. emotionally charged films, ideological content, instructions to 
build bombs/commit acts of terror) is professionally tailored and displayed to its intended 
target groups. Such concerns contribute towards the overall perception by governments, 
academics and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that hate on the Internet can be 
dangerous.  
Governments across the world have, in turn, begun to amend and toughen existing 
legislation, introducing new laws to govern the online incitement to hatred. One such 
strategy includes the new European Union Internet Forum, a voluntary partnership 
between Government, Europol and major Internet companies, which was founded in 
December 2015. The forum aims to detect and address harmful online materials (European 
Commission, 2015). For example, the forum introduced the so called ‘Code of Conduct’ to 
tackle online hate across the European Union, to which Facebook, Google, Microsoft, 
Twitter and YouTube, signed up in May 2016 (Burlecu, 2016). Since then, some Internet 
companies have already started to set aside resources to introduce new tools to tackle 
online hate speech (Burlacu, 2016). For example, Microsoft updated their terms and 
services, introducing web forms enabling people to report hateful online content (Pradeep, 
2016). In addition, Google Chrome recently introduced a new plugin called ‘Hate Free’ 
which detects and flags up hateful language to all online users accessing content which is 
considered hateful (Tech City News, 2016). 
In addition, changes in legislation governing the incitement of online hatred have 
led to global increases in the number of legal cases against individuals conducting such 
behaviour (e.g. Creighton, see: Taylor, 2016; Choudary & Rahman, see: Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2016; Jumaa, see Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2016; Takagi & 
CHAPTER 5 
 175 
Kaiheng, see: Mail Online, 2016; Wilders, see: Mail Online, 2016; Alkhanashvili, 
Kazakhstan Newsline, 2015; Berlin woman, see: Berliner Zeitung, 2015; Bonehill-Paine, 
see: Jewish News Online, 2015; Yklas Kabduakasov, see: Spencer, 2015; Mukhtar, see: 
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2015; Pu Zhiquaing, see: Phillips, 2015; Shevtsova-
Valova, see: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2015; Topham, see: CBC News, 2015; 
Tyumentsev, see: Reuters, 2015). For instance, in the last five years, arrests in London for 
expressions of hatred on SNSs have risen by 37% (Corfield, 2016). Yet, despite evidence 
of the prevalence and dangers of online hate (e.g. victimisation, recruitment to online hate 
groups resulting in radicalisation, social division, mobilisation towards acts of hatred), it 
remains largely unknown how permissible expressions of online hate are perceived to be 
by those who frequently come in contact with it (i.e. ‘everyday’ online/SNS/SMP users). 
For example, despite existing legislation, it remains largely unknown if SNS/SMP users 
agree on what web content constitutes online hatred, whether such content should be 
criminalised or not, whether online users accept the consequences of online victimisation 
and whether online anonymity still (i.e. despite technical and legal advancements) plays a 
role in negative online behaviour. These specific aspects of the permissibility of online 
hatred will therefore be considered in more detail next. 
5.2.2 What Constitutes Online Hate?  
As already indicated, so far, there is little evidence regarding people’s views on 
what, exactly, constitutes online hate and to what extent expressions of online hatred are 
regarded as permissible. Specifically, there seems to be a lack of what (kind of content) 
constitutes online hate and to what extent it is endorsed or rejected (Rohlfing & 
Sonnenberg, 2016). In addition, the results of a recent survey carried out by Avon and 
Somerset constabulary exploring how Twitter users would respond to witnessing online 
hate crimes, indicate that 70% regarded online hate crimes as banter (Churchill, 2016). 
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Moreover, only 11% of Twitter users indicated that they would report online hate crimes to 
the police (Churchill, 2016). Along similar lines, Moor, Heuvelman and Verleur (2010) 
found that YouTubers perceived flaming – i.e. “displays of hostility by insulting, swearing 
or through use of otherwise offensive language” (Moor, 2007) – as a ‘side-effect’ of 
respecting freedom of speech and not as a real or potential offline problem for themselves. 
However, Moor et al. (2010) also found that most YouTubers acknowledged that flaming 
is a problem for a minority of other YouTubers.  
Finally, the extent to which people’s perceptions concerning expressions of online 
hate match legal definitions of online hate crimes also remains unknown. For example, 
Rohlfing and Sonnenberg (2016) noted that whilst some YouTubers identified expressions 
against other people’s national identity as hateful, racist and criminal, others branded them 
as patriotic and called upon their right to freedom of expression. Therefore, people’s 
perceptions of what constitutes hatefulness, and what is regarded as criminal, seem to 
differ amongst online users.  
5.2.3 Online versus Offline Hatred 
As already mentioned, it has been argued that expressions of online hate can lead to 
hateful acts offline (e.g. Jourová, 2015; 2016). Yet, as with the lack of consensus about 
what constitutes online hate and about the relationship between hatefulness and 
criminality, the extent to which offline hateful acts are regarded as a consequence of online 
expressions of hate remains unclear. For example, and although not representing the 
specific focus or the main findings of their study, Rohlfing and Sonnenberg (2016) 
observed that YouTubers’ attitudes towards the consequences of online hate varied (i.e. 
some responses implied that they believed that online hate can lead to offline hate, whereas 
others implied that online hatred is harmless online communication).  
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If online users disregard the consequences of online victimisation through 
expressions of hatred, they might consider such expressions to be acceptable and risk-free 
– which, in turn, would counteract some of the aims governments and other organisations 
have tried to achieve with the new strategies mentioned above. In addition, strategies to 
prevent online victimisation in the first place can only be effective if the consequences for 
its victims are understood and accepted. As such, it is vital to determine how online hate is 
perceived by online users before developing or adapting prevention strategies, such as 
educating users, accordingly. 
5.2.4 The Role of Online Anonymity in Expressing Online Hatred 
The role online anonymity plays in facilitating negative online behaviour has 
already been demonstrated in Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) research (e.g. 
Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty, Lawson, Linehan, Rowland & Bennett, 2014; 
Hardaker, 2010; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler & Barab, 2002; Joinson, 1998; Lange, 
2007; Moor et al., 2010; O’Sullivan & Flangin, 2003; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel & de Groot, 
2001; Roberts & Wasieleski, 2012, Sia, Tan, & Wei, 2002; Steinfeldt et al., 2010; Suler, 
2004; Turnage 2007). Negative online behaviours can include hateful expressions, such as 
flaming (outlined above) or trolling, which is defined as “deliberately posting provocative 
and insulting messages about sensitive subjects or inflicting racism or misogyny on an 
individual” (Internetmatters.org, n.d.). Negative online behaviour has been frequently 
attributed to online anonymity, which, not only removes social constraints (i.e. reduces 
inhibition; Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope & Liberman, 2006; Joinson, 1999; Suler, 2004), 
but it also provides users with the confidence to get away with such behaviour (Comas-
Forgas & Sureda-Negre, 2010; Sawer, 2016).  
Yet, it is unclear whether people’s perceptions of their anonymity online have 
changed as a result of recent increases in media reports about online hate offences and the 
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introduction of modern technology (e.g. smartphones). In particular, Rohlfing and 
Sonnenberg (2016) observed that YouTubers removed hateful online content they had 
posted following potential legal threats by other YouTubers. Yet, online anonymity was 
not the specific focus of their study and thus was not investigated further. Nevertheless, the 
removal of hateful online content could be indicative of decreases in levels of perceived 
online anonymity, though, the rising number of online hate offences would suggest 
otherwise.  
5.2.5 Research Questions.  
Given the points above, this study is an exploration into SNS/SMP users’ attitudes 
to the permissibility of online expressions of hate, providing an insight into the following 
research questions:  
(1) Constitution of online hatred: Is there an overall consensus on what constitutes 
online hatred? Does the perceived hatefulness of online content correlate with its perceived 
criminality? Do perceptions of criminality correspond with legal definitions of online hate 
crimes? In line with this, it should be noted that some of the content described below 
contains offensive, racist and potentially upsetting. 
(2) Online versus offline hatred: To what extent are online expressions of hate 
regarded to ‘translate’ into the offline world? Is online hate believed to be less bad/as 
bad/worse than offline hate? Should online hate be permitted as part of people’s right to 
freedom of expression? To what extent are victims of online hate, Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), the creator of hateful expressions, or the police thought to be 
responsible/accountable for and/or should deal with the consequences of online hate?  
(3) Online anonymity: Has the introduction of modern technology changed the way 
SNS/SMP users feel about anonymity? Has an increase in news headlines stating the 
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consequences for online hate offences influenced how anonymous SNS/SMP users feel 
online? Is online anonymity perceived to affect users’ online behaviour? 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1. Ethical Considerations 
Participant consent was sought prior to participation, informing them of the nature 
and format of the study (i.e. a survey, exploring attitudes concerning online anonymity and 
whether perceptions of online hatred are in line with legislation). Participants were 
informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point up until its completion and 
provided them with the relevant contact details in case of any arising ethical concerns. 
They were also pre-warned of provocative statements prior to participation (see Appendix 
XIV), and were informed that participation was anonymous insofar that they did not have 
to reveal their names. After participation, participants received detailed debrief information 
about the study (see Appendix XVI).  
5.3.2 Participants 
Initially, 262 participants were recruited to complete an online survey measuring 
their attitudes towards the permissibility of online hatred. A total of 98 participants (i.e. 
37%) were excluded because they did not complete all of the survey, leaving the data of 
164 participants (79 females, 82 males, one transgender, one genderless and one omission) 
aged between 17 and 80 (M = 33, SD = 16.44) for the analyses. Eighty-five percent of 
participants identified as White, 4% as Mixed Race, 4% omitted indicating their ethnicity, 
2% identified as Black, 2% as Asian, 2% as Middle Eastern, 1% as Indian. In addition, 
97% of participants resided in the UK, 2% were non-UK based, and 1% did not indicate 
their place of residence. Finally, 43% were students, 41% were employed, 6% were 
unemployed, 6% were retired, 2% were self-employed and 2% omitted their work status. 
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5.3.2.1 Social networking. Sixty percent of participants indicated that they used 
their smartphones to connect to SNSs/SMPs. For a summary of participants’ SNS/SMP 
activity see Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 
Type of SNS Access 
Frequencies  
Account activity Activity 
Frequencies 
Facebook 87% Check account at least once a day 68% 
Twitter 50% Log into account at least once a day 23% 
  Tweets per day 8% 
LinkedIn 34% Check account once a day 2% 
  Check account monthly 16% 
YouTube 76% Use at least once a day 38% 
5.3.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were recruited online from the university student and staff population, 
as well as the general public (through personal contacts) and completed an online survey 
(via Qualtrics) in one single session. There was no time restriction and participants were 
able to omit responses. The survey first aimed to gather an overview of participants’ 
demographic information and their social networking habits. It then focussed on three 
proposed attitude dimensions, namely, (1) hatefulness and criminality; (2) online versus 
offline hatred; (3) the role of anonymity in expressing online hatred; which were addressed 
across six attitude measures (outlined below). All measures were developed specifically 
for the purpose of this study. It should be noted that online users can perceive online hatred 
to be directed at different social categories (e.g. personally, peers, others). In this study, 
Summary table illustrating key findings concerning participants’ SNS/SMP activity.  
CHAPTER 5 
 181 
most of the measures assessing participants’ perceptions towards online hatred did not 
address a particular social category (apart from the last, namely, the Online Anonymity, 
measure, which addressed the participant directly; see Appendix XV). Therefore, the 
majority of results should be interpreted to predominantly address ‘others’. 
5.3.3.1 Hatefulness and criminality. This measure aimed to assess (i) what type of 
content constitutes online hatred; (ii) what content should be classified as criminal; (iii) 
whether a statement which is perceived as hateful is indicative of its perceived criminality; 
(iv) whether perceptions of the criminality of content are in line with its actual legislative 
status. The measure consisted of 18 attitude statements reflecting hateful/criminal and non-
hateful/non-criminal online content (see below).  
The attitude statements for this measure were selected from actual online content. 
Specifically, it was chosen from Rohlfing and Sonnenberg’s (2016) data corpus (i.e. 
YouTube comments made in response to a video clip depicting racist behaviour exerted by 
a woman on a public train). To ensure representativeness, statements were selected by 
applying several search terms (including Nigger, British, superior, ape, kill, death, 
Muslims, scum, Pikeys, bitch) across the entire data corpus. In addition, in conjunction 
with an academic hate crime expert, particular attention was paid to the potential criminal 
implications of some of the statements during the selection process. This allowed the 
exploration of whether participants’ perceptions of (il)legal web content matched current 
legislation, by comparing the actual legal status of statements with their perceived legal 
status. The selected statements were of similar word length (i.e. equally comprehensive). 
The 18 statements were clustered as follows: (1) criminal - three statements met the 
legal threshold as inciting racial hatred (e.g. Don’t speak but kill all the non-Whites on 
tram fucking invaders, Cronbach coefficient .89); (2) borderline criminal - four statements 
almost classified as meeting the legal threshold for the incitement to racial hatred (e.g. So 
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what if whites are descended from Africans? We're smarter, less prone to violence, and in 
every way superior. Black people are lesser evolved apemen, Cronbach coefficient, .90.); 
(3) offensive - nine statements were offensive but not legally defined as constituting a 
crime (e.g. I’m okay with everyone.... except Muslims.. they do not know how to integrate 
and they always make a mess anywhere they go. and their fucking religion of Allahdin, 
Cronbach coefficient, .90); (4) neutral - two statements were considered neutral (e.g. Why 
can’t we just stick together?! When will you people realise it is a colour and colour is not 
synonymous with being British.). For a full list of statements from this attitude measure as 
well as the other five discussed below, see Appendix XV. 
For each of the 18 statements, participants indicated the extent to which they 
considered the statement to be hateful, as well as the degree to which they considered the 
same statement as criminal (i.e. one response for each statement’s level of hatefulness and 
one for its level of perceived criminality). Responses were given on seven-point Likert 
scales, ranging from 1-strongly disagree to 7- strongly agree with a neutral point (i.e. 
neither agree or disagree) of 4 in the middle. For example, two strongly disagree responses 
to the statement ‘Trouble is… Blacks and Muslims in the 3rd world are lazy’, indicated that 
the statement was perceived to be not at all hateful and that it should definitely not be 
regarded as criminal. In addition, two strongly agree responses indicated that the statement 
was perceived to be very hateful and that it should definitely be regarded as criminal).  
5.3.3.2 Effects of online hate on the offline world. This measure aimed to explore 
the overall relationship between online and offline hatred and specifically whether online 
hatred leads to offline hatred. This measure consisted of six attitude statements concerning 
online hatred in offline contexts (e.g. Online posts, regardless of their content, are no more 
than words and can’t hurt anyone in the real world; Social divisions are not related to 
anything said online). Participants indicated their (dis)agreement to each statement on 
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seven-point Likert scales, ranging from 1- strongly disagree to 7- strongly agree with a 
neutral point (i.e. 4- neither agree or disagree) in the middle. Low scores here indicated 
that participants did not link online to offline hatred and high scores indicated that 
participants linked online to offline hatred. The remaining measures tapping the overall 
relationship between online and offline hatred used similar seven-point response scales. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) revealed that five of the six statements 
showed an overall clear factor structure (i.e. factor loadings above .50 onto one factor, 
‘Online hatred does not transpire into offline hatred’, accounting for 52% of the total 
variance). One statement (i.e. Racist online posts can lead to social divisions in real life) 
loaded negatively onto the factor and was reverse scored. The resulting measure showed 
good reliability (Cronbach’s coefficient, .81). 
5.3.3.3 Severity of online versus offline hate. This measure further aimed to 
assess the overall relationship between online and offline hatred and specifically explored 
whether the consequences of either online or offline hatred are perceived to be worse for 
its victims. The measure consisted of nine statements, which reflected the consequences of 
online and offline victimisation (e.g. Offline hate is worse than online hate because it can 
involve physical confrontation; online hatred is worse than offline hatred because the 
revictimisation is ongoing).  
PCA revealed that eight of the nine statements showed a clear factor structure 
across two factors (i.e. factor loadings above .50; accounting for 54% of the total 
variance). Specifically, four statements loaded onto the first factor 'Offline hatred is worse 
than online hatred’ accounting for 31% of the total variance with good reliability (i.e. 
Cronbach coefficient, .83). In addition, four statements loaded onto the second factor 
‘Online hatred is worse than offline hatred’ accounting for 23% of the total variance with 
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an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach coefficient, .68). The ninth statement was 
subsequently excluded from further analyses.  
As a consequence, low scores on the seven-point response scales relating to 
statements concerning offline hatred to be worse than online hatred, indicated participants’ 
agreement that the consequences of offline hatred are worse than those of online hatred 
and vice versa. In addition, low scores on the seven-point response scales relating to 
statements concerning online hatred to be worse than offline hatred, indicated participants’ 
agreement that the consequences of online hatred are worse than those of offline hatred 
and vice versa. 
5.3.3.4 Freedom of expression. This measure tapped the relationship between 
online and offline hatred by assessing whether expressions of online hatred would be 
acceptable as part of one’s freedom of expression. The measure comprised seven attitude 
statements which addressed participants’ stance on legislation governing expressions of 
online hatred (e.g. Legislation should not dictate what people can or cannot say online, or 
People posting offensive things about others should be arrested). Low scores to the seven-
point response scales (i.e. here, strong agreement to the measures’ statements) indicated 
that online hatred should be restricted by legislation and vice versa.  
PCA showed a clear one-factor structure with factor loadings above .50 accounting 
for 46% of the total variance. Two statements (People should be allowed to say whatever 
they want regardless of whether this is online or offline and Legislation should not dictate 
what people can or cannot say) loaded negatively onto this factor and were subsequently 
reverse scored, resulting in good reliability (Cronbach coefficient, .80). 
5.3.3.5 Responsibility-accountability. This measure also tapped the relationship 
between online and offline hatred. It specifically aimed to assess who participants hold 
responsible for the incitement of online hatred and who should deal with it. Specifically, 
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four statements attributed responsibility for online abuse to the victim (e.g. It is your own 
responsibility to stop being bullied online by simply turning off the machine; Cronbach 
coefficient, .79) and three to Internet Service Providers (It is the Internet Service 
Providers’ responsibility to remove hateful content that has been posted on their websites; 
Cronbach coefficient, .84). In addition, one statement held the poster/creator of hateful 
content accountable (i.e. It is not the poster’s responsibility to consider how others might 
perceive their posts) and one the police (i.e. It’s not up to the police to investigate people 
posting hateful things about others online). Low scores to the seven-point response scales 
(i.e. here, strong agreement to the statements) placed the blame/responsibility for online 
hatred on the relevant party, whereas high scores removed the blame/responsibility from 
them. Please note that the wording of the statements blaming the police and the poster 
made it necessary to reverse the scores to keep in line with the remaining response scales.  
5.3.3.6 Online anonymity. This measure aimed to assess the role of online 
anonymity in expressing online hatred by exploring (i) if participants feel anonymous 
online; (ii) whether perceptions of online anonymity have decreased over time; (iii) 
whether negative online behaviour is determined by perceived anonymity. The measure 
consisted of 26 attitude statements (e.g. On the Internet, I feel completely anonymous; I’d 
remove some things I previously posted online if I thought they could be traced back to me; 
I felt more anonymous online before Facebook.) Participants indicated their (dis)agreement 
to each statement on seven-point Likert scales, ranging from 1- strongly disagree to 7- 
strongly agree with a neutral point (i.e. 4 - neither agree or disagree) in the middle. Low 
scores (i.e. here, agreement with the statements) indicated (i) low levels of perceived 
online anonymity; (ii) reduced online anonymity over time due to technical advancements 
and recent media reports of online hatred (iii) anonymity determining (negative) online 
behaviour.  
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PCA revealed that twelve statements highly loaded onto one factor (i.e. above .50) 
accounting for 28% of the total variance. These statements referred to 
anonymity/identifiability affecting online behaviour and perceptions of reduced 
anonymity. One statement (i.e. Anonymity doesn’t determine what I say towards others 
online) loaded negatively onto this factor and was subsequently reverse scored. This 
measure showed good reliability (i.e. Cronbach coefficient of .85). In addition, twelve of 
the 14 statements which did not load onto this factor were subsequently removed from 
further analyses. However, the two statements concerning participants’ perceptions of 
online anonymity (i.e. one of the aims to be assessed with this measure) had to be retained.  
5.3.4 Data Preparation and Transformation 
First, the data were checked for missing and anomalous values, revealing that 13 
participants had omitted responding to the online anonymity measure. These 13 were 
excluded from the analyses of this particular measure. In addition, inspection revealed that 
the highest percentage of missing values per statement across all attitude measures was 
8%, which is lower than the common missing data rate of 15-20% observed in 
psychological studies (Enders, 2003). It is also lower than the rate of missing values which 
is likely to result in a biased statistical analysis (i.e. more than 10%, Bennett, 2001). 
Missing values were replaced via mean substitution. Next, participants’ mean scores for all 
of the proposed measures were calculated, and these mean scores could range from 1 to 7.  
For the hatefulness and criminality measure, this meant that the mean scores for each level 
of legal status (i.e. offensive, borderline, criminal) was calculated. For the severity of 
online hatred measure, this involved the calculation of one mean score for each factor (i.e. 
offline hatred is worse than online hatred and online hatred is worse than offline hatred. 
For the responsibility-accountability measure, a mean score per relevant party (i.e. one for 
the victim, one for the poster, one for Internet Service Providers one for the police) were 
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calculated. For the online anonymity measure, a mean score for each area of exploration 
(i.e. perceptions of online anonymity/identifiability, whether online anonymity has 
decreased over time, or, whether online anonymity determines negative behaviour) was 
calculated. For the other measures (i.e. effects of online hatred and freedom of expression) 
this meant calculating one overall mean score per measure.  
5.4 Results 
The Results section is divided by research aims, namely ‘what content constitutes 
online hatred’, ‘online versus offline hatred’ and ‘online anonymity’ (see section 5.2.5), 
and so each will be examined in turn. Please note that all statistical analyses, means and 
frequencies in this Results section are based on participants’ overall mean scores in 
relation to the relevant variables/measures (see section 5.3.3). Means and frequencies will 
be reported in addition to any inferential statistics to illustrate participants’ overall 
perceptions of the different aspects of online hatred investigated in this study.  
Frequencies in this Results section will be illustrated as ‘agreement’, 
‘disagreement’ or ‘indifference’ to variables’/measures’ content. For the individual 
statements (e.g. responsibility of the poster or the police towards online hatred), the score 
classification was calculated so that scores between ‘1’ and ‘3’ represented ‘agreement’ 
(i.e. here, attributed responsibility to the relevant party), scores of ‘4’ ‘undecidedness’, and 
scores between ‘5’ and ‘7’ ‘disagreement’ (here, removed responsibility of the relevant 
party). To determine these categories across the measures (i.e. clusters of statements) 
scores were split and added together so that scores ranging from ‘1” to ‘3.49’ represented 
‘agreement’, ‘3.50‘ to ‘4.49’ represented ‘indifference’, and scores between ‘4.50’ and ‘7’ 
represented ‘disagreement’. Moreover, differences within measures/variables (i.e. from 
neutral) will be determined with one-sample t-tests (i.e. by comparing the 
measures’/variables’ overall mean scores against their neutral scores). 
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5.4.1 What Content Constitutes Online Hatred? 
5.4.1.1 Hatefulness. Frequency analysis of participants’ agreement to statements’ 
hatefulness ratings (i.e. here, scores between ‘4.50’ and ‘7’) indicated that the large 
majority of participants (i.e. more than 80%) rated all of the statements (offensive, 
borderline criminal, criminal) to be hateful. In addition, a one-way within subjects 
ANOVA was conducted to compare the differences in participants’ mean perceived 
hatefulness ratings across three legal statuses (offensive, borderline criminal, criminal). 
There was a significant difference between participants’ perceived hatefulness ratings and 
the statements’ legal status, Wilks’ λ = .608, F(2, 162) = 52.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .392. 
Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that participants rated the offensive statements 
significantly less hateful compared to the borderline criminal (t = 5.291, df = 163, p < .001, 
CI [.16, .36], d = .21) or the criminal statements (t = 10.064, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.52, 
.78], d= .58). In addition, participants rated the borderline criminal statements as 
significantly less hateful than the criminal statements (t = 5.883, df = 163, p < .001, CI 
[.25, .52], d = .33). A summary of the mean scores and frequencies (including those of the 
criminality section, discussed next) can be found in Table 5.2 below.  
Three one-sample t-tests (offensive, borderline criminal, criminal) showed that all 
three mean scores differed significantly from the neutral score of ‘4’ (offensive: t = 
20.937, df = 163, p < .001 CI [1.72, 2.08]; borderline criminal: t = 21.846, df = 163, p < 
.001 CI [1.97, 2.36]; criminal: t = 29.823, df = 163, p < .001 CI [2.38, 2.72]). These 
findings therefore suggest that although participants rated all statements, regardless of their 
legal status, to be hateful (i.e. above the neutral score of ‘4’), they nevertheless associated 
the statements in the rank order of their levels of criminality with current legislation.  
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5.4.1.2 Criminality. Frequency analysis of participants’ agreement to statements’ 
criminality ratings1 (i.e. here, scores between ‘4.50’ and ‘7’) indicated that participants’ 
perceptions of hateful content could match current legislation. In particular, although 38% 
of participants rated the offensive but legal statements to be criminal (i.e. not in line with 
legislation), 51% of participants rated the borderline criminal statements to be criminal and 
83% of participants rated the criminal statements to be criminal. To test this further, a one-
way within subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the differences in participants’ 
mean perceived criminality ratings across three legal statuses (i.e. offensive, borderline 
criminal, criminal). There was a significant difference between participants’ perceived 
criminality ratings of the statements and their legal status, Wilks’ λ = .412, F(2, 162) = 
115.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .588. Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that participants rated the 
offensive statements as significantly less severe compared to the borderline criminal (t = 
6.922, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.28, .50], d = .22) or the criminal statements (t= 15.106, df = 
163, p < .001, CI [1.34, 1.74], d = .96). In addition, it showed that participants rated the 
borderline criminal statements as significantly less severe than the criminal statements (t = 
11.688, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.96, 1.35], d = .68). These findings therefore illustrate that 
participants’ perceptions of what content should or should not be classified as criminal do 
indeed mirror current legislation.  
                                                
1 Please note that the term criminality here encapsulates two concepts. First 
participants’ perceptions of whether the content in question should be considered criminal 
or not to allow for the comparison between participants’ perceptions of legality and 
content’s actual legal status. Second, it referred to content’s severity, as content can only 
be criminal or not. This is relevant to participants’ criminality ratings across the three types 
of statements (offensive, borderline criminal, criminal). 
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Table 5.2 
 Offensive (legal) Borderline Criminal Criminal 
 M SD Frequency M SD Frequency M SD Freque
ncy 
Hateful 5.90 1.16 83% 6.16 1.27 88% 6.55 1.10 95% 
Criminal 4.25 1.64 38% 4.63 1.82 51% 5.78 1.56 83% 
*Frequencies refer to participants’ agreement that the statement content is hateful and 
should be criminal (here, scores above ‘4.49’). 
5.4.1.3 The relationship between hatefulness and criminality. Correlations 
indicated that attitudes towards online hatred are a weak indication of their perceived 
criminality. In particular, there were weak positive correlations between participants’ 
attitudes towards whether content was hateful and whether such content should be 
regarded as criminal for i) the offensive statements (r = .419, N = 163, p< .001), ii) the 
borderline criminal statements (r = .388, N = 162, p <.001), and iii) the legally criminal 
statements (r = .348, N = 161, p <.001). As such, these results suggest that although online 
content might be considered hateful and criminal, it tends to be considered more hateful 
than criminal. 
5.4.2 Online versus Offline Hatred  
5.4.2.1 Effects of online hate. Low mean scores and frequency analysis suggested 
that overall participants did not link online with offline hatred (M = 2.25, SD = .97, 89% of 
participants disagreed and only 2% agreed that online hatred has consequences for its 
recipients offline). A one-sample t-test comparing this mean score (M = 2.25) with the 
Summary table illustrating means, standard deviations and frequencies of participants’ 
hatefulness and criminality ratings in relation to their legal statuses. 
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neutral score ‘4’ confirmed that participants perceived online hatred to have no effects on 
anyone in the offline world (t = 22.99, df = 163, p < .001, CI [1.90, 1.60]). These findings 
indicate that online users may view online hatred as acceptable, given that its 
consequences are perceived to only affect people online. For a summary of the findings 
concerning all perceptions of the relationship between online and offline hatred, see Table 
5.3 below). 
5.4.2.2. Severity of online versus offline hatred. Here, mean scores and frequency 
analysis around the neutral score of ‘4’ showed that there was no overall agreement on 
whether the consequences of online or offline hatred are worse for its victims (offline 
worse: M = 3.92, SD = 1.39, 34% agreed and 35% disagreed that offline hatred is worse; 
online worse: M = 3.96, SD = 1.08, 30% agreed and 35% disagreed that online hatred is 
worse). Two one-sample t-tests (i.e. offline hatred is worse, online hatred is worse) showed 
non-significant differences between these scores and the neutral ‘4’ score (offline: t = .-
701, df = 163, p = .484, CI [.-29, .14]; online: t = -.523, df =  163, p = .602, CI [-.21, .12]), 
which confirms that overall participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statements 
that offline hatred is worse than online hatred or that online hatred is worse than offline 
hatred. This was further supported when testing for a statistical difference between the two 
mean scores. That paired-sample t-test revealed a non-significant effect (t = .233, df = 163, 
p = .816, CI [.24, .30]).  
5.4.2.3 Freedom of expression. High mean scores and frequency analysis revealed 
that most participants objected to legislation censoring online hate speech (M = 4.64, SD = 
1.10, 60% of participants disagreed and 13% agreed that online hatred should be governed 
by legislation/ have legal consequences). A one-sample t-test confirmed that overall 
participants saw hate speech as part of freedom of expression (i.e. opposed its illegality; t = 
7.410, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.47, .81]). These findings suggest that participants might 
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reject the concept of online victimisation constituting a criminal offence, which, in turn, 
further indicates that online hatred, directed at others, is perceived to be largely normative. 
5.4.2.4 Responsibility/accountability. Mean scores and frequency analyses for the 
variables regarding to whom participants attributed the blame for and/or duty to 
intervene/remove hateful online content (thus ‘agreement’ here referred to this attribution) 
revealed that, by and large, participants blamed and attributed the responsibility to act upon 
online abuse to the victims (61%, M = 3.05 SD = 1.31). It also revealed that participants 
did not hold the poster responsible for how their posts are perceived by others (82%, M = 
5.71, SD = 1.52). Moreover, it showed that most participants (57%) did not attribute the 
duty to remove and investigate hateful online content to Internet Service Providers (ISPs; 
M = 4.5, SD = 1.5) or the police (61% disagreed that it is up to the police to investigate 
people posting hateful things online; M = 4.75, SD = 1.73). Four one sample t-tests (i.e. 
victim, poster, ISPs, police) confirmed that all four mean scores differed significantly from 
the neutral score of ‘4’, thus confirming the findings of the descriptive analyses (victim: t 
= 9.245, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.74, 1.15]; poster: t = 14.418, df = 163, p < .001, CI [1.48, 
1.95]; ISPs: t = 4.262, df = 163, p < .001, CI [.27, .73]; police: t = 5.558, df = 163, p < 
.001, CI [.48, 1.02]). 
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Table 5.3  
Measure   Frequencies 
 M SD Agreement Undecided Disagreement 
Effects of Online Hate (Link Between Online and Offline Hatred) 2.25 .97 2% 9% 89% 
Severity of Online versus Offline Hatred (Offline Hatred is Worse Than Online 
Hatred) 
3.92 1.39 34% 31% 35% 
Severity of Online versus Offline Hatred (Online Hatred is worse than Offline 
Hatred) 
3.96 1.08 30% 35% 35% 
Freedom of Expression (Legislation Should Restrict Online Hatred) 4.64 1.10 13% 27% 60% 
Responsibility-Accountability (Victim Blame) 3.05 1.31 61% 24% 15% 
Responsibility-Accountability (Poster Blame) 5.71 1.52 10% 8% 82% 
Responsibility-Accountability (ISPs Blame) 4.50 1.50 24% 19% 57% 
Responsibility-Accountability (Police Blame) 4.75 1.73 26% 13% 61% 
 
Summary table of overall means, standard deviations and frequencies of participants’ (dis)agreement to the proposed attitude measures.  
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5.4.3 The Role of Online Anonymity in Expressing Hatred 
5.4.3.1 Perceptions of online anonymity. Descriptive statistics (i.e. low mean 
scores and frequency analysis) revealed that most participants (86%) did not feel 
anonymous online (M = 2.09, SD = .95). These findings were supported by a one-sample t-
test, which showed that participants’ overall mean scores concerning their perceived online 
anonymity differed significantly from the neutral score of ‘4’ (t = 24.641, df = 150, p < 
.001, CI [1.75, 2.06]). For a summary of all of the results referring to the role of anonymity 
in expressing hatred see Table 5.4 below.  
5.4.3.2 Reductions in online anonymity over time. Here, descriptive statistics 
(means and frequencies) indicated that there was no clear direction (29% agreed, 40% 
were indifferent, 31% disagreed) concerning changes in perceived online anonymity over 
time (i.e. since the introduction of smartphones and/or increased publications of legal 
consequences for online hate offences; M = 3.97, SD = 1.18). A one sample t-test also 
confirmed that participants’ overall mean scores relating to reduced anonymity due to 
modern technology and/or news headlines, did not differ from the neutral score of ‘4’ (t = 
.303, df = 150, p = .763, CI [.16, .21]). 
5.4.3.3 Online anonymity and subsequent behaviour. Descriptive statistics (i.e. 
low mean scores and frequencies) revealed that the majority of participants (57%) 
indicated that they would feel more inhibited online if they were identifiable (M = 3.35, SD 
= 1.00). These findings were supported by a one-sample t-test, which indicated that 
participants’ mean scores, in relation to online anonymity determining their subsequent 
behaviour, differed significantly from the neutral score of ‘4’ (t = 7.893, df = 150, p <.001, 
CI [.48; .81]). 
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Table 5.4  
Area of exploration     Frequencies 
 M SD t p Agreement Indifference Disagreement 
Perceptions of online anonymity 2.09 .95 24.641 < .001 3% 11% 86% 
Reduced anonymity over time 3.97 1.18 .303    .763 29% 40% 31% 
Anonymity determining subsequent behaviour 3.35 1.00 7.893 < .001 57% 30% 13% 
Summary table showing overall mean scores, standard deviations, frequencies, t- and p-values of participants’ perceptions 
concerning three aspects of online anonymity. 
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5.5 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine people’s attitudes towards the permissibility 
of online hatred. In particular, the three-overall research aims of this study were to explore 
(i) what constitutes hateful online content; (ii) the relationship between online and offline 
hatred, and; (iii) the role of online anonymity in expressing online hatred, each of which 
will be discussed in turn. 
5.5.1 What Online Content Constitutes Hatred? 
The first research aim explored if there is an overall consensus on what online 
content is perceived to be hateful. It also tested the relationship between whether perceived 
hatefulness is indicative of perceived criminality (i.e. whether hatefulness correlates with 
criminality). Finally, it determined whether participants’ perceptions of criminal web 
content correspond or not with existing online hate legislation. 
Results revealed an overall agreement on which online content should, or should 
not be classified as hateful and/or criminal. In addition, although the legal but offensive, 
borderline criminal and criminal statements were all rated to be hateful, the level of 
perceived hatefulness corresponded with the statements’ actual legal grading (i.e. offensive 
statements were rated the least hateful and criminal statements the most hateful). Similar 
results were obtained from the criminality ratings whereby offensive statements were rated 
to be the least severe and the illegal statements the most severe. Moreover, although 
participants perceived statements to be hateful and/or severely criminal the association 
between perceived hatefulness and perceived criminal severity was weak. In other words, 
although participants might consider content to be hateful, they do not necessarily consider 
it as criminal. 
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Taken together, these results imply that current legislation reflects which online 
content users perceive to be hateful and criminal. As such, these findings also suggest that 
online hatred is not seen to be normative or acceptable.  
5.5.2 Online versus Offline Hatred 
The second research aim was to explore the potential link between online and 
offline hatred. The measures used aimed to tap specifically (i) whether online hatred is 
perceived to be linked to offline hatred; (ii) whether the consequences of online or offline 
hatred are worse for its victims; (iii) whether online hatred is part of one’s freedom of 
expression; (iv) who is responsible for the prevalence of online hatred. 
Results showed that the majority of participants do not associate online with offline 
hatred, thus suggesting that participants distinguish between these two types of offending. 
Yet, participants’ attitudes towards the severity of online versus offline abuse revealed that 
there is no real consensus on whether the consequences of either online or offline hatred 
are perceived to be worse. One reason for this ambiguity might stem from the specific 
online and offline hate-consequence examples used in this study. In particular, before 
completing the survey, participants might only have been aware of the obvious 
consequences of offline hate (e.g. physical confrontation), whereas some of the statements 
in the survey specifically pointed out the consequences of online hatred (e.g. ongoing 
victimisation, not knowing who the perpetrator is). Consequently, pointing out the negative 
consequences of both online and offline hatred may have led participants to rate the 
consequences of online and offline hatred as almost equally bad.  
In addition, results showed that most participants objected to legal consequences 
for online hate speech. These findings suggest that online hate speech is indeed perceived 
to be permissible because it is seen to be part of one’s right to freedom of expression 
(Moor et al., 2010). 
CHAPTER 5 
 198 
Moreover, and interestingly, participants largely blamed the victims of online 
hatred for their abuse, thus mirroring existing research into victim-blame of other crimes 
(e.g. rape; Bieneck & Krahé, 2011; Suarez & Gadalla, 2010). These findings also suggest 
that participants might not have identified the statement-content as being aimed at 
themselves or their peers. In particular, previous research has identified that people are 
usually less empathetic towards out-group members (i.e. here, victims of online hatred), 
compared to in-group members (i.e. peers; Tarrant, Dazeley & Cottom, 2009).  
Along similar lines and in line with previous findings (e.g. Avon and Somerset 
constabulary, Churchill, 2016), most participants did not hold the police or Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) responsible for dealing with online hatred. Perhaps participants view 
online hatred to be acceptable and therefore consider that neither the police, nor ISPs 
should have to be responsible for dealing with it. Moreover, participants’ overall indication 
that online hatred does not transpire into the ‘offline’ world could stem from a potential 
lack of experience with online victimisation (i.e. personal or peers).  
Overall, these results suggest that online hatred is perceived to be somewhat 
acceptable and/or normative. In particular, and although there was no consensus on 
whether online or offline hatred is worse for its victims, the finding that most participants 
(i) did not link online to offline hatred; (ii) objected to legal consequences for inciting 
hateful web content; and (iii) blamed the victim but not the poster of hatful online content 
for online victimisation, all imply its perceived acceptability.     
5.5.3 The Role of Online Anonymity in Expressing Hatred 
The third research aim was to examine participants’ attitudes towards online 
anonymity. In particular, it explored whether or not being anonymous affects online 
behaviour and whether the introduction of modern technology and publicised 
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consequences of online hate offences have changed participants’ perceptions of their own 
level of online anonymity.  
The results illustrate that few Social Networking Site (SNS) and Social Media 
Platform (SMP) users feel anonymous online. They also highlight that anonymity aids 
negative online behaviour and vice versa and thus support the large body of existing online 
anonymity research (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty, Lawson, Linehan, 
Rowland & Bennett, 2014; Hardaker, 2010; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler & Barab, 
2002; Joinson, 1998; Lange, 2007; Moor et al., 2010; O’Sullivan & Flangin, 2003; 
Postmes, Spears, Sakhel & de Groot, 2001; Roberts & Wasieleski, 2012; Steinfeldt et al., 
2010; Suler, 2004; Turnage 2007). They also reflect Comas-Forgas and Sureda-Negre’s 
(2010) and Sawer’s (2016) findings that online anonymity grants those who express 
unacceptable (i.e. socially undesirable) views online the confidence to get away with it.  
In addition, there was no obvious trend concerning changes in participants’ levels 
of online anonymity over time. In particular, most participants were indifferent to whether 
modern technology, increases in online hate news headlines, or pressure on Internet 
Service Providers to reveal the identities of online hate offenders had changed their 
perceptions towards being anonymous online. One reason for these findings relates to the 
possibility that participants may never have felt anonymous online. Whilst the researcher 
was predominantly interested in changes in levels of online anonymity, this study did not 
specifically ask participants about their original levels of perceived online anonymity (i.e. 
when they started using the Internet).     
Taken together, these results suggest that although most participants do not feel 
anonymous online, anonymity still plays a role in the way they behave online. Results also 
highlight that modern technology and increased publicity of the consequences of online 
hatred does not change how anonymous people feel online. 
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Overall, the results concerning the permissibility of online hatred examined in this 
study are somewhat inconclusive. In particular, whilst participants’ ratings concerning the 
hatefulness and criminal gravity of specific content mirrored current legislation, the 
relationship between hatefulness and the criminal severity of such content was found to be 
weak. As such, whilst participants seem to agree on which content classifies as hateful and 
illegal, they still seem to distinguish between the hatefulness of such content and its 
criminal gravity, thus indicating a degree of permissibility towards such content. Another 
indicator towards the acceptability of hateful online content is reflected in participants’ 
objection to legal consequences for the incitement of online hatred, and them blaming the 
victims of online hatred for their abuse. In particular, and when considering the finding 
that participants did not link online with offline hatred it could be that participants have 
come to accept/expect to experience some hateful online content which they then view as 
harmless and inconsequential. After all, this study did not obtain data on participants’ 
history on online abuse and the pre-participation warning of the aims and the type of 
content would have made it highly likely that no victims of online abuse would have 
participated in this study. Another indication against the permissibility of online hatred and 
negative online behaviour relates to participants’ acknowledgement that they would only 
be inclined to behave ‘badly’ online if they were anonymous. Yet, it needs to be noted that 
although standing against the permissibility of online hatred in general, anonymity has 
been linked with other underlying concepts (e.g. no social constraints/reduced inhibition; 
Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope & Liberman, 2006; Joinson, 1999; Suler, 2004) and 
confidence to get away bad behaviour; Comas-Forgas & Sureda-Negre, 2010; Sawer, 
2016). As such, there is no straight forward link between anonymity and the permissibility 
of online hatred.   
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5.5.4 Limitations 
As with survey data in general, one of the limitations of this study concerns its high 
participant exclusion rate (i.e. 37%). In particular, this study’s exclusion rate was based on 
participants not completing the entire survey. Whilst one can anticipate that not every 
participant will complete the entire survey, the sensitive context of this survey (i.e. socially 
undesirable behaviour online) may have further contributed towards a relatively high non-
completion rate. Specifically, and despite prior warning, perhaps participants became 
offended by the hateful nature of the statements employed as measures here, or by 
disclosing information about their online behaviour. Evidence for this possibility comes 
from the large number of participants who did not respond to any of the questions (i.e. 
28%). As such, one could argue that the participant sample is not representative and thus 
the findings of this study are not readily generalisable. 
In addition, although this study used real-life examples of hateful online statements 
to explore whether there is an overall consensus on what constitutes online hatred, it still 
lacks ecological validity. Specifically, the survey used self-reports to assess participants’ 
attitudes towards a range of online hate-related variables. There are two issues with this 
method. First, the method of self-reporting has been criticised for its subjective nature 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Gawronski, Galdi & Arcuri, 2015). Second, the hypothetical 
nature of the statements to which participants responded does not allow us to draw any 
conclusions about ‘actual’ online hate offenders’ attitudes concerning online hatred. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, most of the statements did not specifically 
address participants themselves, or their peers. Instead, they addressed non-specified 
others, which not only prevents conclusions about who exactly participants had in mind 
when rating the statements, but may also have resulted in participants showing less 
empathy towards victims of online hatred (e.g. Tarrant et al., 2009). For ethical and legal 
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reasons this study did could not ask participants if they had either been victimised, 
witnessed or exerted hate online. As such, and as pointed out before, the sample cannot be 
considered as representative.  
Moreover, and as indicated above, the term permissibility used throughout this 
Chapter is somewhat problematic as some of the aspects explored seem to relate closer to 
the concept of acceptability of online hatred rather its permissibility. As such, some of the 
results (e.g. participants’ opposition to legislating hateful online content, and their 
attribution of blame/responsibility/accountability) need to be interpreted with some 
caution.   
Finally, this study did not obtain data on participants’ actual (posting) 
activity/frequency on SNSs/SMPs. Instead, the most frequent response option referred to 
several times a day. The interpretation of participants’ account activity (see Section 
5.3.2.1) is therefore somewhat problematic as it might not reflect their actual SNS/SMP 
activity. In particular, users might post things on SNSs/SMPs every hour or even more 
often, whereas others ‘only’ two times a day. As such, combining the posting frequencies 
would have automatically resulted in losing some of the depth and range of the data. 
5.5.6 Future Directions 
5.5.6.1 Changing attitudes. In line with online victimisation, future research 
should explore how to change online users’ attitudes towards the consequences of online 
victimisation. In particular, this study illustrates that although there was an overall 
consensus on what constitutes online hatred, the results of several measures indicated that 
participants perceived online hatred to be largely acceptable. It would be interesting to 
examine if hateful content which addresses participants personally or their peers would 
elicit similar levels of perceived permissibility of online hatred. Such research could also 
determine whether current perceptions of the consequences of online hatred (i.e. perceived 
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harmlessness and inconsequentiality) are based on unawareness/a lack of understanding of 
the magnitude for its victims, or on a lack of recognition/empathy.  
Along similar lines, future research should compare the attitudes of online hate 
offenders, victims of online hatred and ‘everyday’ online users towards the consequences 
of online hate offences. Such research would not only aid the understanding of the 
similarities and differences in how online hate is expressed and perceived by online users, 
but it could also be used to develop strategies to raise awareness of the consequences 
online hatred has for its victims. Therefore, when raising awareness of the consequences of 
online hatred, existing attitudes towards the effects of online hatred might also change and 
thus prevent people from inciting online hatred in the future. This would be particularly 
relevant for those who blame the targets of online hate for their own victimisation. As 
such, changing attitudes might not only help the victims’ recovery, in terms of recognition 
and the reduction of possible feelings of self-blame, but it could also help some of those 
who incite online hatred in the process of their rehabilitation (e.g. realise the gravity of 
their offence).  
However, such interventions also need to consider/alter the underlying motivations 
of hate offenders. Specifically, they need to consider if an offender offends to seek a thrill 
from it, to defend their territory (e.g. due to perceptions of threats to their resources), to 
retaliate in response to perceived degradation or assaults on their in-group, or because they 
want to rid the world of felt evil or inferior groups (McDevitt, Levin, Bennett, 2002). Such 
motivational distinctions are important, as offenders might be aware of the seriousness of 
their actions but might deem it necessary to achieve their goals. Moreover, the recognition 
of the magnitude of online hate offending might prevent those who have not yet incited 
online hatred from creating such content in the first place.  
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5.5.6.2 Online anonymity. Despite the findings that perceptions of online 
anonymity levels have decreased for almost half of the participants, the number of online 
hate offences are increasing. Future research should explore this association more closely. 
In particular, whilst this study was able to attribute decreases in perceived online 
anonymity to smartphones and media attention (i.e. fear of legal consequences), it is not 
possible to make inferences about the specific motivating factors in increases in online hate 
offending. Thus, future research should explore any additional motivating factors that can 
facilitate online hate offending.   
5.5.7 Conclusion 
We increasingly encounter hate on the Internet in our daily online business. In 
order to counter online hatred effectively, it is important that we know how it is perceived 
by ‘everyday’ users. The results of this study, concerning the permissibility and 
acceptability of online hatred, are somewhat inconclusive. Whilst participants did not 
connect online hatred to offline hatred, opposed its legislation, deemed it inconsequential 
to its victims and even held the victims responsible for it, hateful content is rated to be not 
only hateful but also criminal and participants admitted that they would only behave badly 
online if they were anonymous. Whilst the sample used in this study does not allow for the 
findings to be easily generalised they, nonetheless, suggest ideas for future research aimed 
at raising awareness of the consequences for victims of online hatred to try and change 
existing attitudes towards the incitement of online hatred.  
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6.1 General Discussion Outline 
This chapter first summarises the main findings of the thesis with regard to how 
Social Networking Sites (SNSs) and Social Media Platforms (SMPs) can facilitate the 
spread of online hatred, how online users respond to online hatred, how online hatred is 
viewed by ‘everyday’ online users and how these findings fit within existing research (see 
Section 6.2). Next, the learning gains of the research programme and researcher biases on 
the findings are reflected upon (see Section 6.3). Then the practice, policy and research 
implications of the findings are considered, taking a focus on how hatred might spread and 
conversely, how it might be prevented. Here, the particular foci are a) governmental and 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) strategies to counter online hatred, b) the role of social 
identification and online anonymity in accepting and expressing hatred and c) raise 
awareness to aid the prevention of online hatred and rehabilitate offenders (see Section 
6.4). Next, some methodological issues are considered (see Section 6.5). Finally, ideas for 
future research are discussed which draw together and build on those that are mentioned in 
previous chapters (see Section 6.6) before drawing an overall conclusion (see Section 6.7). 
6.2 Overview of Main Findings 
To date, online hate research has primarily focused on individuals and groups who 
have already expressed hate on the Internet. Hence there is limited empirical evidence 
investigating how online hatred might affect ‘everyday’ users who do not (perhaps yet) 
seem polarised in their views. Specifically, we know little about the extent to which hateful 
online content on SNSs may shape people’s attitudes towards others. Therefore, the main 
aim of this thesis was to examine if and how online hatred can influence SNS users’ 
attitudes (e.g. prejudice, expressions of hatred) towards others. The studies conducted here 
focused on different aspects of online hatred and explored: (a) the influence of online 
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discussions on participants’ levels of prejudice; (b) SNS users’ responses when exposed to 
hateful online content and (c) the permissibility of expressions of hatred online. 
Chapter 2 described two studies in which an explicit 10-item measure was 
developed to assess prejudice towards Roma and Travellers (the Anti-Roma and Traveller 
- ART scale). In doing so, an existing explicit prejudice measure (i.e. Levinson & 
Sanford’s 1944 Anti-Semitism Scale) was successfully adapted. The newly-developed 
prejudice measure was intended to provide a tool for tracking changes in participants’ 
levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers (see Chapter 3). 
Chapter 3 examined the influence of online group discussions (via instant 
messaging) on participants’ levels of prejudice towards a particular target group, namely 
Roma and Travellers. The experimental study protocol involved the measurement of 
participants’ pre-existing levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers via completion 
of the ART scale (developed in Chapter 2). Next, participants with similar levels of 
prejudice (e.g. low, intermediate, high), plus one confederate, were grouped together 
before discussing, via instant messaging (i.e. typing comments online simultaneously), the 
‘real-world’ Dale Farm case. The case concerned the eviction of Roma and Travellers from 
a particular plot of land (Dale Farm). During these discussions, the confederate responded 
with (typed) pre-determined statements which, depending on the experimental condition, 
aimed to either reduce or increase participants’ existing levels of prejudice towards Roma 
and Travellers. After the online discussion, participants completed the ART scale again to 
determine any changes in levels of prejudice (i.e. online influence).  
Overall, most participants resisted these attempts of online influence. However, 
participants with intermediate levels of pre-existing prejudice towards Roma and 
Travellers indicated significantly higher levels of prejudice following the discussion during 
which the confederate tried to increase their levels of prejudice. Yet, this influence was 
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one-directional, as those participants with intermediate levels of pre-existing prejudice 
towards Roma and Travellers who encountered the confederate who expressed views 
aimed at decreasing their levels of prejudice, resisted online influence. These findings are 
supported by previous research suggesting that those with strong attitudes (i.e. those with 
low or high levels of pre-existing prejudice towards the target group) will resist influential 
attempts which oppose their existing beliefs, as opposed to those with ‘weak’ attitudes (i.e. 
here, those with intermediate levels of pre-existing prejudice towards Roma and 
Travellers; e.g. Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Fazio, 1990; O’Keefe, 2004; Petty & Krosnick, 
2014). The findings are also in line with research that suggests that those who have strong 
attitudes and are exposed to attitudes which run in line with their existing position, have no 
reason to change their position (e.g. Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Sunstein, 2001; Wojcieszak, 2010).  
It was surprising to find that participants with intermediate initial levels of 
prejudice who were exposed to experimental messages aiming to reduce their existing 
levels of prejudice towards Roma and Travellers, would resist online influence. This 
finding seems to suggest that pre-existing negative stereotypes associated with Roma and 
Travellers may be easier to reinforce than to refute. Overall, this chapter provides evidence 
that online interactions may, indeed, shape negative attitudes in some individuals. 
Specifically, influence seems to be determined by initial attitude strength, the direction of 
social influence (i.e. towards an increase or decrease of prejudice) and, arguably, the 
strength and, therefore the resistance to change, of the original stereotype(s).  
The qualitative study described in Chapter 4 explored how YouTubers responded 
(via online comments) to specific online hate materials. In particular, YouTubers 
commented on a particular YouTube video clip, depicting racial abuse exerted by a White 
female woman called Emma. The analysis of the comments involved an inductive, data 
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driven approach using Thematic Analysis (TA; Braun & Clarke, 2006), which identified 
four main themes.  
The first theme, called Making Sense of Emma, captured YouTubers’ attempts to 
find explanations for Emma’s behaviour. This was repeatedly linked to her perceived role 
as an unfit mother and her bad mental state and thus not only attempted to ‘make sense’ of 
Emma’s behaviour, but also corresponds to Lloyds theory of double deviance 
(Heidensohn, 1989; Lloyd, 1995). In particular, Heidensohn (1989) and Lloyd (1995) 
found that women who offend (here, racially abuse others) are not only punished for their 
offence but also for their deviation from their gender expectations and social norms.  
The second theme was called Meeting Hatred with Hatred, and described 
YouTubers’ efforts to oppose racism whereby they resorted to aggressive and/or hateful 
language and thereby fits into existing flaming research (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; 
Doughty, Lawson, Linehan, Rowland, & Bennett, 2014, Lange, 2007; Moor, Heuvelman, 
& Verleur, 2010). Flaming involves people’s use of aggressive, abusive, and racist 
language to oppose certain views (here, racism). Such motivation is also closely linked to 
one of the typologies of hate offenders, namely, the retaliatory one, as identified by 
McDevitt, Levin and Bennett (2002). It also relates to another of these typologies, namely, 
the thrill seeing one (McDevitt et al., 2002), whereby some YouTubers may have 
responded in a hateful manner because they were seeking a thrill from their own and other 
responses (i.e. similar to the concept of trolling).  
The third theme, namely Us versus Them, encapsulated YouTubers' leanings to 
categorise themselves and other YouTubers into in- and outgroups, which depended on 
their particular stance on racism. Such categorical thinking (see also section 6.4.2 – The 
Role of (Social) Identification in Shaping Hatred below) mirrors existing research from the 
broader social identity perspective (e.g. Angie et al., 2010; Blackwood, Hopkins & 
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Reicher, 2013, 2015; Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley & Muntele Hendres, 2012; Reicher, Haslam 
& Rath, 2008). It also and links to so called dichotomous (Black and White) thinking, 
whereby others (here, other YouTubers) were either supporting or opposing racist views. 
Dichotomous thinking, by means of identifying and positioning certain others outside the 
law (here, expressed as in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination), has also been 
classified as the first stage of genocide (Arendt, 1951) and ‘the fourth floor of the staircase 
to terrorism’ (Moghaddam, 2005).  
The last theme was called Contesting Britishness. Here, YouTubers attempted to 
define (and challenge) what it means to be British. The contestation of one’s national 
identity (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Condor, 2000; Faulkner & Bliuc, 
2016; Reicher et al., 2008) also fits within existing research from the broader social 
identity perspective (see section 6.4.2 The Role of (social) identification in shaping hatred 
below). Moreover, for those supporting racist views, the notion of Britishness was 
frequently linked to perceptions of an unjust denial of ones’ Britishness by the government 
due to immigration, resulting in a sense of grievance. This sense of grievance also links to 
the so called ‘mission’ and ‘defensive’ types of hate crime offenders (McDevitt et al., 
2002), whose motivations to offend is based on them wanting to protect their home (here, 
the UK and their Britishness) from outsiders, including wanting to eliminate all evil (here, 
immigrants and immigrant supporters). 
Overall, the analysis therefore highlighted that, in part, hateful web content can 
indeed fuel aggressive and hateful responses and that motivations towards posting such 
responses link to those of hate offenders and other offending research (i.e. female 
offending). Yet, it also showed that the large majority of comments emphasised collective 
group memberships, as well as people’s right to claim membership in a particular social 
category (here, Britishness). These findings therefore suggest that responses to online 
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racial hatred might involve broader social psychological processes rather than those who 
are exposed to it automatically endorsing it. In other words, there is not always a 
straightforward or inevitable escalation of hatred.  
Chapter 5 explored the permissibility of online hatred across three areas of interest: 
(1) what constitutes online hatred; (2) the relationship between online and offline hatred; 
and (3) the role of online anonymity in expressing online hatred. Results revealed that most 
participants did not connect online with offline hatred, blamed the victim of online abuse 
but not the poster of hateful web content, rejected police involvement in cases of online 
hatred, and opposed legal consequences for the incitement of hatred- all pointing towards 
the permissibility of online hatred. Yet, results also showed that participants overall agreed 
on what content is perceived to be hateful and what content should be classified as 
criminal, whilst also acknowledging that online anonymity aids their own anti-normative 
behaviour- suggesting online hatred is not permissible. Therefore, the overall evidence 
concerning the permissibility of expressions of online hatred was not entirely clear. 
Overall, this study emphasises the complexities associated with the permissibility of online 
hatred.  
Taken together, the evidence provided by the studies in this thesis suggests that 
expressions of online hatred can influence the attitudes of some online users. In particular, 
the current evidence suggests that online group discussions can increase prejudice in 
people whose initial attitudes are ‘weak’. However, exposure to hateful online content does 
not automatically result in further hatred - instead, responses to online hate content can 
focus upon broader social psychological issues (i.e. social identification, including defining 
and contesting one’s national identity, as well as positioning oneself and others according 
to their perceived social categories). In terms of the permissibility of expressions of online 
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hatred, the evidence obtained in this thesis is mixed because some findings point towards 
its permissibility, whilst others imply the opposite.  
The diversity of the studies in this programme of research (e.g. explicit prejudice 
measure development, experimental and ‘observational’ approaches, qualitative and 
quantitative analytic methods) tapped a variety of questions concerning online hatred. As 
such, these findings further our particular understanding of how online hatred on SNSs 
may be used by polarised groups to fuel hatred and to effectively influence online users’ 
views. 
6.3 Reflexivity and Learning Gains 
In the beginning of this research programme, the complexity online hatred 
presents was rather overwhelming. It was particular challenging to find a way to limit, yet 
maximise, the scope of the research programme to a number of aspects exploring online 
hatred. It soon became clear that one PhD can assess only so much and that the topic of 
online hatred warrants enough scope for far more research studies than fit into one PhD. 
For example, and although the idea of the study discussed within Chapter 3 was developed 
at the very beginning of this research programme, the careful consideration for appropriate 
target groups resulting in the need for an additional tool to measure online influence (here, 
changes in levels of prejudice) highlights only one aspect of the complexities this research 
programme faced.  
However, this complexity offered me the opportunity to apply and gain 
experience in a range of different research methods. It also allowed for the critical 
evaluation of the methodologies, which were applied throughout this programme of 
research. As a result, it is now apparent that the development process of the explicit Anti-
Roma and Traveller (ART) prejudice scale based on Levinson and Sanford’s (1944) Anti-
Semitism (AS) scale did not require to make it generic/group non-specific (Study 1a) 
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before adapting it to the intended target groups. This is especially relevant, given that the 
AS scale was selected, in part, for the said overlap in stereotypes between Jewish people 
and Roma and Travellers (Barnett, 2013).  
In addition, the completion of the study described in Chapter 3 reinforced the 
importance of keeping study designs as simple as possible. In particular, the combination 
of a complex design (e.g. its completion in two sessions, the need for participants with 
similar levels of prejudice towards the target groups, the organisation of several 
participants and one confederate to complete the task remotely, yet at the same time) and 
the type of task (i.e. discussing an unknown topic with unfamiliar others) resulted in 
difficulties to recruit participants and thus a prolonged data collection process. These 
difficulties also resulted in a change of the original study design. In particular, the original 
design included an additional type of argument, termed ‘neutral’ (see Appendix X). This 
manipulation was subsequently dropped as, in addition to the difficulties in recruitment, no 
online influence was anticipated from it. Whilst this condition could have served as a 
control condition to the other two types of arguments (pro-, anti-target groups) its retention 
would probably have resulted in a still ongoing data collection process. Despite these 
difficulties, the unique and new set-up made it a very interesting and positive experience 
with some interesting observations (e.g. who was influenced/resisted online influence, the 
role of online anonymity in negative online behaviour and its relation to the 
permissibility/acceptability of online hatred). Some of these ideas were then incorporated 
in the study described in Chapter 5 and some ideas considered for future research (e.g. 
reduced anonymity). 
 Moreover, this research programme provided me with the chance to gain 
experience in qualitative research with large amounts of data (Chapter 4). The manual 
coding of the data was informative and helpful for my engagement with the vast range of 
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responses, the development of an initial coding scheme, and the appropriate analytic 
approach, yet, it was also very time consuming. Therefore, if I was to repeat the process or 
undertake a similar research project, I would consider using data mining software, such as 
NVIVO.  
Part of the qualitative research experience also included the acknowledgement of 
my own preconceptions which influenced my methodological and analytic decisions. For 
example, as a White German female, coming from a working-class background, I have 
long been interested and aware of the consequences of hate. Because of my lack of first-
hand experience with hatred (i.e. projected against me or others), I found some of the 
hateful materials and online content disturbing and startling, particularly at the beginning 
of this research programme. In order to get somewhat desensitised to the nastiness of some 
of the materials and maintain a positive psychological well-being, I maintained a degree of 
distance to the content, which I achieved mostly through my role as a researcher. However, 
certain content continued to be disturbing, which is when I had to remind myself of the 
somewhat ‘bleak’ nature of the research topic. I also adopted a legal stance to deal with 
particular nasty the content, whereby the categorisation into offensive and possibly illegal 
content helped to rationalise that, although content might be horrid, there might be no 
element of illegality per se. This process further helped me to keep any negative arising 
emotions at bay. As a result, and despite my attempts to keep an emotional balance 
between distancing myself from the nastiness of the content and trying to maintain my 
privately held views (e.g. an awareness of how such content might make those addressed 
by it feel and general wrongness), these preconceptions ultimately influenced how I 
approached the data.  
In addition, this emotional balance permitted me to support my confederates during 
and after their attempts to reinforce prejudice towards Roma and Travellers in the online 
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discussion task (Chapter 3), as well as my research assistants during the initial coding of 
the hateful online comments (Chapter 4). In particular, whilst the support of the 
confederates predominantly involved their ease to express (potentially) unpleasant 
statements during the discussions, the support of the research assistants involved several 
meetings questioning them about their well-being during the coding process.  
Furthermore, since the start of this research programme, online user dynamics 
have changed. For example, what was defined as frequent use of Social Networking Sites 
(SNSs) or Social Media Platforms (SMPs) in 2011 is no longer the same. Specifically, 
people are ever more connected through mobile devices and the like, which enables them 
to be constantly available and thus inevitably increases how often they use SNSs and 
SMPs. This is particularly relevant for the study discussed within Chapter 5, where 
frequent use of SNSs/SMPs covered ‘several times a day’ up to ‘constantly’. This is 
problematic insofar that there are big differences between these frequencies and what they 
represent. Future research should therefore investigate these frequencies more carefully. In 
line with this, advances in technology are growing ever faster, resulting in research forever 
trying to catch up with it. For example, whilst the set-up of the study described within 
Chapter 3 remains to be new to research (i.e. online influence exerted during live instant-
chat group discussions), many mobile applications now allow users to chat/communicate 
instantly with others without the need of sitting in front of a computer screen. As such, the 
realism of some of the aspects of the set-up might already be outdated.  
Finally, the nature of who is online and is at risk of being influenced has changed 
since the beginning of this research programme. In particular, according to the EU Kids 
online survey (2014), compared to 2010, children aged between 11 and 16 are now up to 
20% more at risk of being exposed to hate messages and up to 12% more likely to be 
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exposed to cyberbullying. As such, future research not only faces the challenge of trying to 
keep up with technology itself, but also with its resulting changes in user dynamics. 
6.4 Implications of Findings 
Below, the main policy, practice and research implications of the current findings 
are discussed. These are in the areas of spreading and preventing online hatred and online 
victimisation and offender rehabilitation.  
6.4.1 Spreading and Preventing Online Hatred 
Understanding online influence (e.g. in terms of spreading hatred) in order to 
reduce the increasing number of hateful online expressions and thus online victimisation is 
high on the global political agenda (European Commission, 2015, 2016), as each 
government has the responsibility to protect its citizens from harm. Despite this, there is 
currently neither a global definition of hate crimes or online hate crimes, nor is there an 
agreement on how to treat hateful online content. As a result, there is much variation in 
how Internet Service Providers (ISPs) police the problem, including an overall reluctance 
to remove hateful content (Nag, 2017). A global definition of (online) hate could therefore 
guide ISPs on what content is to be removed. In addition, it would aid law enforcement 
agencies around the world in their criminal investigations by providing clarity and equal 
treatment concerning the treatment of illegal online content.1  
Along the same lines, despite increasing political pressure on ISPs to take down 
hatful online content (BBC News, 2017; Clague, 2017; Kahn-Harris, 2017), to date, there 
                                                
1 Please note that such global definition is not to be understood as censorship of 
online content, as this could result in displacing the issue of hatred from public websites 
(Rohlfing, 2014) thus making us blind to ‘what is out there’ (Douglas, 2007) – which, in 
turn, may prevent the development of effective counter strategies. 
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is little legislation to help address the issue. Instead, while ISPs argue that it is not their 
responsibility to remove hateful content politicians in the UK have accused some ISPs to 
even make profit from such content (BBC News, 2017). It seems therefore unsurprising 
that (intended) new legislation aims at ISPs finances (e.g. fines up to €50 million, Clague, 
2017). The study described in Chapter 4 is also an example of ISP’s reluctance to remove 
hateful online content, as despite the video clip and many of the responses breaching 
YouTube’s (not legally binding) user agreement, the clip is still available on YouTube. 
However, ISPs have started to develop new strategies to counter online hate speech. 
For example, some ISPs have recently introduced mechanisms which flag up and allow 
users to report hateful content (e.g. Hate Free). However, there are some conceptual issues 
with these mechanisms, such as their reliance on a degree of user diversity, similar to the 
study described in Chapter 4. Specifically, the mechanisms are based on the principle that 
the power of the crowd will police itself, whereby the crowd is seen as one big community. 
Whilst this might be the case for some public forums as seen in Chapter 4, the way that the 
Internet and many forms of online engagement are constructed (e.g. through means of 
algorisms and filtering) points more towards multiple disparate communities, in which 
users chose their community based on them holding similar views. As a result, users will 
hear views which are evermore tailored towards (and thus reinforce) their own 
understandings (as intended by the study described in Chapter 3; Sunstein, 2001). In 
addition, what might be socially desirable in one group, might not be acceptable or even be 
offensive in another group. For example, it might be desirable to express right wing views 
in a related forum and thus it is unlikely that users of that community would feel the need 
to report certain (perhaps hateful) content. In fact, the results from the study described in 
Chapter 3 and other existing research demonstrates that hate groups already use the 
principles of  filtering to connect ‘like-minded’ individuals and groups and reinforce their 
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views (i.e. spread hatred; Angie et al., 2010; DeKoster & Houtman, 2009; Glaser, Dixit & 
Green, 2002; Green, Abelson & Garnett, 1999; Wojcieszak, 2010) and to recruit new 
members to their cause (Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Castle, 2013; Douglas, 2007; 
Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003; Nirvana News, 2016).  
In addition, these mechanisms do not take the aspect of preventing expressions of 
online hatred into account, as they do not address or explain the risks of hateful content to 
online users. Yet, the importance of prevention has already been acknowledged, both 
academically and politically. For example, Moghaddam (2005) argued that prevention is a 
long-term solution to terrorism.2 In addition, in 2015, the UK government introduced the 
so called Prevent duty to provide guidance on how to counteract people from being drawn 
into terrorism. This strategy is predominantly aimed at front line staff (e.g. teachers, 
lecturers, health workers, the police, the prison and probation services) and points out the 
risks of radicalisation and how to support those at risk. It is also in line with a relatively 
new trend describes SNSs as a means to individuals’ (self-) radicalisation (Sukhni, as cited 
by Laubner, 2016) which, in turn, is defined as “a phenomenon in which individuals 
become terrorists without joining an established radical group, although they may be 
influenced by its ideology and messages” (Citizendium, 2009, para 1). In particular, there 
has been a recent increase in so called ‘lone-wolf’ or ‘home-grown’ terrorist attacks, which 
has been attributed, at least in part, to the Internet (e.g. Anders Breivik, see: Mala, 2011; 
                                                
2 As mentioned previously, there is much overlap in the different hate, radicalism, 
terrorism and extremism concepts (e.g. they are all motivated by aspects of hatred). Yet, it 
is important to note that there are distinctions in their legal definitions and underlying 
motivations. As such, the examples given here are to be understood based on the overlap in 
hate-based motivation and not their legal definition and/or political motivation. 
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Michael Adebolajo & Michael Adebowale, see: Whitehead, 2014).  Prevent also aims to 
address the issue of individuals being recruited and radicalised online to then leave Europe 
to fight the ‘Jihad’ in Syria or Iraq (e.g. Amira Abase, Kadiza Sultana & Shamima Begum, 
see: Sky News, 2016; Ece B., & Merve S., see: Lauterbach, 2015; Kesinovic & Selimovic, 
see: Killalea, 2015; Yusra Hussein, see: Arkell, 2014). Here, the specific concern is that 
individuals can be hard to identify, which, in turn, hinders effective interventions and 
counter-terrorism strategies.  
In addition, the combination of Muslim terrorist groups and repeated terrorist 
attacks carried out by Muslims in recent years have led many to view Muslim communities 
as suspicious and even stir up hatred against them (Nelles, 2016). Unsurprisingly, there are 
Muslim communities who feel unfairly persecuted and view the governmental counter-
terrorism strategy (i.e. Prevent) to be aimed predominantly at them. Such feelings may 
then lead to increased community tension and feelings fostering division, grievance and 
even hatred. In line with this, the UK Home Office currently classifies international 
terrorist threats from Da’esh the most serious compared to other threats (e.g. far-right 
attacks; Boora, 2017). 
6.4.1.1 The Role of (Social) Identification in Shaping Hatred. As mentioned 
before, interactions between individuals and groups who hold similar views (i.e. are 
considered ‘like-minded’), can contribute to the spread of hatred (Angie et al., 2010; 
DeKoster & Houtman, 2009; Glaser et al., 2002; Green, et al., 1999, Moscovici & 
Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970; Sunstein, 2001, 2009; Wojcieszak, 2010). In 
particular, individuals who identify with views similar to those advocated by relevant in-
group members (e.g. hate groups), may subsequently internalise these views (i.e. are 
influenced by them) and adopt them as part of their own social identity (Turner, 1982).  
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For example, Chapters 3 and 4 provide some evidence to suggest that participants 
who identify with a message’s content readily accept such views whilst rejecting and 
opposing message content with which they do not identify. In particular, Chapter 3 
illustrates that (resistance to) online influence depends, at least in part, on how the 
proposed message content fits with people’s existing attitudes (i.e. whether it is supportive 
or unsupportive of them). These findings therefore sit within existing attitude research (e.g. 
Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) and fit the 
small body of research into the (social) influence of online hatred (e.g. Coffey & 
Woolworth, 2004; Lee & Leets, 2002; Steinfeldt et al., 2010; Sunstein, 2001; Wojcieszak, 
2010).  
In addition, Chapter 4 highlights the importance of social psychological processes 
(e.g. social identification) in accepting or rejecting hateful attitudes. Specifically, there 
were two types of strategies observed, which fit within existing online hate research. First, 
distancing oneself from others (here, racists), through invoking negative stereotypes and/or 
using hateful language, including dehumanisation, as a means to highlight and reinforce 
their status as an out-group (Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Steinfeldt et al., 2010). Second, creating negative 
social comparisons to out-groups (Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Douglas 
et al., 2005). In addition, the noted dehumanisation of out-group members mirrors previous 
findings (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et al., 2014; 
Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012) and is thought to create a sense of in-group superiority over the 
out-group (Bliuc et al., 2012; Mumford et al., 2008), as well as justifying punitive 
treatments of out-group members (Moghaddam, 2005). 
Moreover, as pointed out previously, observed categorical or dichotomous thinking 
(i.e. distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’) to illustrate one’s particular group 
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belongingness (here, racists or non-racists) with others sits within the broader social 
identity approach (e.g. social identity formation and confirmation; Blackwood et al., 2012, 
2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987). It also matches existing findings concerning online hatred (e.g. Angie et 
al., 2011; Bliuc et al., 2012; Charteris-Black, 2006; Verkuyten, 2013). In line with this, 
categorical thinking (e.g. here, positive self-representation and negative other-presentation 
and claims of preferential State treatments for others but not for ‘us’) further serve to 
create a sense of relative deprivation, socio-economic insecurity and social identity threat, 
including threats to one’s national identity. These findings therefore further correspond 
with existing hate related findings (e.g. Bowling & Phillips, 2003; Coffey & Woolworth, 
2004; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc & Lala, 2005; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; Mols & Jetten, 
2014; Verkuyten, 2013; Young, 1999) and the social identity perspective (e.g. Blackwood 
et al., 2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). 
Finally, the observed contestation of the national (here, British) identity also mirrors the 
social identity processes pointed out above. It also reflects previous work concerning 
online hatred, national identity and political discourse (e.g. Cohen, 1994; Condor, 1997, 
2000; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; Hopkins & Murdoch, 1999; Sindic, 2008).  
6.4.1.2 The Role of Anonymity in Expressions of Online Hatred. Online 
anonymity comprises two main features; namely visual anonymity (i.e. online users cannot 
physically see one another) and limited channel (i.e. communicating via text only; Joinson, 
1999). In addition, online users can anonymise or reveal their identities through the use of 
user names and avatars (i.e. “an icon or figure representing a particular person in a video 
game or Internet forum”, Oxford Dictionary, n.d.).  
It is widely accepted that anonymity plays an important role in people behaving 
anti-normatively online and that identifiability can prevent such behaviours (e.g. Coffey & 
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Woolworth, 2004; Joinson, 1999; Suler, 2004) and the findings of Chapter 5 fit within this 
existing research. As such, the recent media/legal emphasis on online hatred, including 
ISPs being pressured to reveal user IP addresses, publicised convictions for online hate 
offences and/or, governmental counter-hate strategies as well as revelations concerning 
global surveillance programmes in news headlines (e.g. National Security Agency) could 
result in online users no longer considering themselves as being completely anonymous 
online. In any case, the increase in online hate offences would suggest that reduced 
perceptions of online anonymity are not a sufficient deterrent to commit online hate 
offences.  
The results of the study described in Chapter 5 demonstrate that, indeed, 
perceptions of online anonymity are low but they also highlight that the media and 
publicised governmental anti-hate strategies do not affect these perceptions. Therefore, 
these findings provide some clarity and, in turn, allow to examine other factors which 
might affect perceptions concerning online anonymity. After all, the more we know about 
online users’ perceptions of online anonymity the more can be done to prevent online hate 
speech.  
Overall, it is clear then that an understanding of the factors influencing the 
expressions of online hatred can aid its prevention. Therefore, future research into the 
prevention of online hatred should always consider the role of identifiability versus 
anonymity. It should also take the relationship between the communicator of hateful 
content and its recipients into account, as online anonymity during group interactions (e.g. 
discussions) has been found to increase group identification, which in turn, increases social 
influence (e.g. can shape hate-based attitudes; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel & deGroot, 2001).   
Taken together, the findings from this thesis can be implemented to develop new 
and extent existing counter hate strategies (see below). For example, they highlight the 
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importance of attitude strengthening methods (e.g. inoculation treatments), context (e.g. 
whether the message is spread amongst the ‘like-minded’ or on an open forum where 
diverse opinions are expressed) and awareness (e.g. the consequences of online 
victimisation) to policy makers, practitioner and researchers. They further show how 
audiences with diverse opinions towards racism engaged with materials depicting racial 
hatred. Moreover, the evidence concerning the (resistance to the) spread of online hatred 
amongst a not exclusively hateful audience also provides some answers to the overall 
concern that the Internet generally facilitates the spread of hatred. In particular, the results 
of this thesis illustrate that many people resist online influence, thus indicating that the 
suggestion of SNSs generally facilitating the spread of online hatred might be too 
simplistic.  
The findings of this thesis, concerning the spread/prevention of online hatred, could 
also benefit (the UK) government(s) and a range of organisations (e.g. charities and ISPs) 
in their development and implementation of counter-hate/prevention strategies. For 
example, it could aid the government in the implementation of the Prevent duty. In 
particular, Prevent predominantly focusses on the identification of individuals at risk of 
being drawn to terrorism before providing support to counter such leanings. The findings 
of this thesis then suggest that attitude strengthening methods and inoculation treatments 
could prevent individuals from being influenced by hate groups at an earlier stage of 
developing such views. These methods also have the advantage that they do not single out 
individuals and/or specific groups of people as they a) only point out the risks, strategies 
and potential consequences of hate groups and b) can be delivered to groups (e.g. pupils, 
students). As such, extending Prevent with attitude strengthening methods and inoculation 
treatments has the potential to reduce the feelings of unfair persecution felt by Muslim 
communities and thus reduce might help to reduce a degree of community tension. 
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In addition, similar methods could be adopted by ISPs to make their counter hate 
strategies more effective. In particular, ISPs who operate open forums (i.e. are likely to be 
visited by a diverse audience) could extend their existing methods to flag up hateful 
content by also providing information about the risks and consequences of such content 
(e.g. online influence and victimisation). Such methods might therefore not only help in 
the removal of hateful content but might also prevent online influence and raise awareness 
and empathy towards the victims of online hatred, which, in turn, might increase the 
reporting hate-based incidents (online and offline) to the police.  
Moreover, the findings could be used by other organisations delivering intervention 
programmes to tackle hatred (e.g. Sophie Lancaster Foundation, True Vision). In 
particular, these organisations aim to raise awareness of prejudice and hate crimes and 
provide them with ways to challenge it. The results of this theses further enable them to 
raise awareness of the risks of online influence and means to challenge it. These results 
also permit these organisations to address and thus potentially prevent other related issues, 
such as online bullying.   
6.4.2 Online Victimisation and Rehabilitation 
In terms of the effects of online hatred, the findings of Chapter 4 highlighted some 
of the consequences that hate on the Internet can have for its victims. In particular, and 
although the study described in Chapter 4 did not specifically focus on online 
victimisation, there was some evidence of online victimisation, ranging from abusive, 
threatening and harassing comments to responses of distress, shock and upset. In addition, 
the findings of Chapter 5 indicate that many online users do not believe that online hatred 
can result in offline victimisation. Specifically, online users not only blamed the victims of 
online hatred for their abuse, they also did not hold the posters of hateful online content 
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responsible for victimising others online. In addition, Chapter 5 highlighted that online 
users opposed legal consequences for inciting online hatred.  
The results of this thesis could therefore also aid offender rehabilitation and thus 
the prison and probation services. In particular, rehabilitation programmes, could highlight 
the consequences of online victimisation to the relevant offenders. Specifically raising 
offenders’ awareness of the damaging effects of online victimisation on its victims may 
also raise their empathy towards their victims. Such increased empathy might, in turn, help 
them in their rehabilitation process and possibly prevent them from inciting online hatred 
in the future. However, it should be noted that such programmes also depend on offenders’ 
motivation towards the offence. For example, raising awareness of the victim impact might 
increase empathy in offenders who were motivated by thrill, yet, those who were 
motivated by retaliation or in response to a perceived threat might not feel empathetic 
towards their victim(s). 
6.3. Methodological Considerations 
6.3.1 Social Desirability 
As highlighted earlier (see Chapters 1, 2 & 3), online hate research, as well as 
research into prejudice, racism and explicit attitudes is often subject to social desirability 
effects. In particular, expressions of prejudice/racism are frequently perceived to be 
sensitive topics and societal norms tend to disallow expressions of particular attitudes 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Furnham, 1986; Gawronski, LeBel & Peters, 2007; Joinson, 
1999). As a consequence, responses concerning these areas of research are at risk of being 
untruthful.  
Therefore, in an attempt to generally reduce the risk of participants adhering to 
societal norms (i.e. social desirability), this thesis maintained anonymity for participants in 
all of the studies in which they were likely to have responded in line with such norms 
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(Chapters 2 & 3). This decision was strengthened particularly for the study discussed in 
Chapter 3, whereby participants admitted after they completed the study that they would 
have responded differently (i.e. with less prejudice) had they been identifiable during the 
study. Additionally, the analysis carried out in Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of 
online anonymity in expressing online hatred insofar as that when creators of hateful 
online content felt threatened with potential legal consequences, they removed such 
content, which suggests a reduced sense of online anonymity. 
In addition, researchers trying to explore explicit expressions of prejudice and/or 
racism (e.g. expressions of hatred) have to carefully consider their limited choice of target 
groups/topics. For example, the history of some groups, known to prejudice/racism 
research (e.g. Black and Jewish people), tends to disallow overt expressions of negative 
attitudes/prejudice/racism against them (Franco & Maass, 1999). Consequently, these 
groups are less suitable for online hate research, which relies on explicit communication. 
This is particularly relevant to the studies discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, which involved 
measuring prejudice against specific target groups, namely Roma and Travellers. In 
particular, these groups were precisely chosen in an attempt to try and overcome the social 
desirability aspects identified in previous work, as explicit expressions of negative 
attitudes against Roma and Travellers are said to be largely acceptable in Europe (Franco 
& Maass, 1999; James, 2014; Spears & Tausch, 2012).  
Moreover, people seem generally reluctant to participate in studies which address 
explicit hateful attitudes in the first place and often fail to complete such studies, resulting 
in either biased sampling or a non-response bias (Couper, 2000). These biases, in turn, can 
prevent the generalisability of findings, as observed in the study reported in Chapter 5. 
Consequently, the specific aims of studies investigating explicit attitudes, prejudice and/or 
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racism can often only be revealed after participants have completed the relevant 
experimental tasks (e.g. Chapter 3).  
6.3.2 Ecological Validity of Experimental Study Designs 
In the study described in Chapter 4, respondents did not know that their responses 
would be used to inform our understanding of online hatred. Yet, participants in the other 
studies discussed in this thesis (see Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5) knew that they were 
participating in psychological research, albeit they did not always know the specific aims 
of the relevant study. As such, there is only one study which can ‘truly’ claim ecological 
validity. However, as the findings obtained from the other studies are still largely in line 
with predictions and results from existing research, it can be suggested that these studies 
did not suffer from a lack of ecological validity.  
In addition, although the majority of participants used in the study described in 
Chapter 3 resisted online influence which may have ran contrary to their existing views, 
the study cannot account for how long these effects might last for. For example, it remains 
unknown if the repeated/prolonged exposure to such views would result in participants 
being persuaded by or become more resistant to them. Although ethically difficult, for 
reasons such as the danger of ‘creating’ prejudiced participants over a period of time, 
future research should consider ways in which the sustainability of participants’ resistance 
to online influence could be measured. Such results are also needed for the 
adaptation/development and administration of (long-term) effective intervention 
programmes.   
Moreover, neither of the studies in which hate/prejudice was expressed (i.e. 
Chapters 3 & 4) assessed how firmly participants believed in their stated views and thus 
how entrenched these views were. As mentioned before, it is possible that some 
participants who responded to the YouTube clip (Chapter 4), expressed certain (e.g. 
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offensive) views to stir responses to get a thrill out of other people’s responses. Such 
behaviour has been frequently observed in so called ‘trolling’. In addition, it is possible 
that some participants felt that it might be expected of them (i.e. requirement of the task) to 
express strong views during an online discussion (Chapter 3). Yet, it was methodologically 
difficult to assess how strong participants’ views reflected the actual strength of their 
opinions in these studies, given that one design was purely observational and the other was 
already complex and time consuming for participants. The assessment of such reflections 
should nevertheless be considered in future research. 
6.4. Directions for Future Research 
There are a number of ideas that could be examined in future studies to help 
contribute to the still relatively small body of literature on online hate. Most of these ideas 
have already been considered in the discussion sections of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. To 
summarise, this thesis suggests nine main directions for future research. First, future 
research should explore online influence for alternative (ethnic) groups and groups which 
might be targeted for other identifiable traits (e.g. disability, faith, gender, transgender, 
alternative sub-cultures). Second, future research should examine the longevity of online 
influence. Third, the effects of online hatred with reduced online anonymity (e.g. 
visibility/identifiability through means of webcams or actual names) should be explored. 
Fourth, future research should compare online influence between identifiable and 
anonymous groups. Fifth, online influence in relation to high group identification should 
be examined (e.g. exploring whether liking and/or prior relationships of participants 
increases online influence). Sixth, a comparison between one-to-one (i.e. minority) 
influence and group (majority) influence should be considered in future research. 
Moreover, the number of confederates exerting online influence should be varied and 
compared in future designs. Seventh, the effectiveness of inoculation treatments to counter 
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online influence should be tested in future work. Eighth, alternative communication 
contexts in which online hatred is expressed (e.g. message/discussion boards, popular 
Social Networking Sites, gaming) should be explored. Finally, future research should 
explore the perceived permissibility of online hatred when it is aimed directly at 
participants or their peers.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Existing research into online hatred has largely neglected to examine if and how 
social networking might shape the attitudes of ‘everyday’ online users towards others. 
Therefore, the central aims of this thesis were to examine whether online hatred could 
indeed shape online users’ attitudes by changing their levels of prejudice towards others, as 
well as to find out how online users would respond to online hatred and how permissible 
they perceive it to be. The findings of this thesis, which were obtained from a variety of 
related novel studies with methodological and analytical diversity, demonstrate that: (a) 
online hatred can shape (negative) attitudes of certain online users; (b) exposure to online 
hatred does not lead to its inevitable endorsement; (c) perceptions of the permissibility and 
acceptance of online hatred vary. Overall, these findings further imply that the best way to 
counter online hatred is through raising awareness amongst users of its associated dangers 
(i.e. influence) and consequences for its victims. 
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Appendix I 
Levinson and Sanford’s (1944) Anti-Semitism (A-S) Scale 
 
“This is an investigation of general public opinion concerning Jewish people. The following 
are statements with which some people agree and other disagree.” 
 
1. It would hurt the business of a large concern if it had too many Jewish employees. 
2. The Jews should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating 
faults, if they really want to stop being persecuted. 
3. In order to maintain a nice residential neighbourhood, it is best to prevent Jews from living in 
it. 
4. War shows up the fact that the Jews are not patriotic nor willing to make sacrifices for their 
country. 
5. The best way to eliminate the Communist menace in this country is to control the Jewish 
element which disguises it. 
6. Jews seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant and sensual way of living. 
7. Much resentment against Jews stems from their tendency to keep apart and to exclude 
Gentiles from Jewish social life. 
8. Colleges should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of Jews in fields which 
have too many Jews now. 
9. The Jews must be considered as a bad influence on Christian culture and civilization.  
10. In order to handle the Jewish problem, Gentiles must meet fire with fire and use the same 
ruthless tactics with the Jews that the Jews use with Gentiles. 
11. The Jewish districts in most cities are results of the clannishness and stick-togetherness of 
Jews. 
12. Jews may have moral standards that they apply in their dealing with each other, but with 
Christians they are unscrupulous, ruthless and undependable. 
13. On the whole, the Jews have probably contributed less to American life than any other group. 
14. One thing that hindered the Jews from establishing their own nation is the fact that they 
really have no culture of their own; instead they tend to copy the things that are important to 
the native citizens of whatever country they are in. 
15. A step toward solving the Jewish problem would be to prevent Jews from getting into 
superior, profitable positions in society, for a while at least. 
16. The true Christian can never forgive the Jews for their crucifixion of Christ. 
17. Jews go too far in hiding their Jewishness, especially such extremes as changing their names, 
straightening noses and imitating Christian manners and customs. 
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18. It is not wise for a Christian to be seen too much with Jews, as he might be taken for a Jew, 
or be looked down upon by his Christian friends. 
19. When Jews create large funds for educational or scientific research (Rosenwald, Heller, etc.) 
it is mainly a desire for fame and public notice rather than a sincere scientific interest. 
20. There is something different and strange about Jews; one never knows what they are thinking 
or planning, not what makes them tick. 
21. The Jewish problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods 
can ever solve it. 
22. A major fault of the Jews in their conceit, overbearing pride, and their idea that they are a 
chosen race. 
23. One of the first steps to be taken in cleaning up the movies and generally improving the 
situation in Hollywood is to put an end to Jewish domination there. 
24. There is little hope of correcting the racial defects on the Jews, since these defects are simply 
in their blood. 
25. One big trouble with Jews is that they are never contented, but always try for the best jobs 
and the most money. 
26. The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a 
typical Jewish atmosphere. 
27. It is wrong for Jews and Gentiles to intermarry. 
28. One trouble with Jewish business men is that they stick together and connive, so that a 
Gentile doesn’t have a fair chance in competition. 
29. No matter how Americanized a Jew may seem to be, there is always something basically 
Jewish underneath, a loyalty to Jewry and a manner that is never totally changed. 
30. Jewish millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their 
money goes into worthwhile American causes. 
31. Most hotels should deny admittance to Jews, as a general rule. 
32. The Jew’s first loyalty is to Jewry rather than to this country. 
33. It is best that Jews should have their own fraternities and sororities, since they have their own 
particular interests and activities which they can best engage in together, just as Christians 
get along best in all-Christian fraternities. 
34. Jewish power and control in money matters is far out of proportion to the number of Jews in 
the total population. 
35. Jewish leaders should encourage Jews to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of professions 
and activities already over-crowded with Jews, and keep out of the public notice. 
36. I can hardly imagine myself marrying a Jew. 
37. The Jews should give up their un-Christian religion with all its strange customs (kosher diet, 
special holidays, etc.) and participate actively and sincerely in the Christian religion. 
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38. There is little doubt that Jewish pressure is largely responsible for the U.S. getting into war 
with Germany. 
39. The Jews keep too much to themselves, instead of taking proper interest in community 
problems and good government. 
40. Jews seem to have an aversion to plain hard work; they tend to be a parasitic element in 
society by finding easy, non-productive jobs. 
41. It is sometimes all right to ban Jews from certain apartment houses. 
42. Jews tend to remain a foreign element in American society, to preserve their old social 
standards and to resist the American way of life. 
43. Districts containing many Jews always seem to be smelly, dirty, shabby and unattractive. 
44. It would be to the best interest of all of the Jews would for their own nation and keep more to 
themselves. 
45. There are too many Jews in the various Federal agencies and bureaus in Washington, and 
they have too much control over our national policies. 
46. Anyone who employs many people should be careful not to hire a large percentage of Jews. 
47. On general fault of Jews is their over-aggressiveness, a strong tendency always to display 
they Jewish looks, manners, and breeding. 
48. There are few exceptions, but in general Jews are pretty much alike. 
49. Jews should be more concerned with their personal appearance, and not be so dirty and 
smelly and unkempt. 
50. There seems to be some revolutionary streak in the Jewish make-up as shown by the fact that 
there are so many Jewish Communities and agitators. 
51. The Jews should not pry so much into Christian activities and organizations, not seek so 
much recognition and prestige from Christians. 
52. Jews tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most menial 
work and live under standards that are far below average. 
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Appendix II 
Participant Consent and Instructions (Chapter 2 - Study 1a)  
 
Consent 
 
The aim of my study is to develop a scale to measure people’s attitudes. In particular, I am 
interested in measuring negative attitudes towards specific groups of people. I do not mean to 
imply that you personally are prejudiced towards others or that being prejudiced against others is 
normal (or not normal). Instead, I want to establish whether all of the attitude items attached, which 
originally came from a longer scale published in 1944, are measuring the same thing. My aim is to 
shorten and improve the original scale for contemporary research investigating negative attitudes 
and prejudice. It is important that you are aware that this study is anonymous. The items attached 
contain a number of statements, each of which you might agree or disagree to varying amounts.  
 
I understand that the study is anonymous and the only identifiable information I am required to 
provide is my gender and my age. My data and are being collected as part of a PhD research 
project, supervised by Aldert Vrij. 
 
My data are to be held confidentially. This means that any hardcopies of my data will be kept in a 
locked cabinet for a period of at least five years after any resulting publication and my electronic 
responses will be kept on a password protected computer. To both, only the researcher and the 
supervisory team will have access to. 
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and I have the right to withdraw my participation any time and 
for any reason during the study, and immediately after participation, without penalty. However, 
because data is stored in a de-identified way, it will not be possible to withdraw my data after the 
date of participation. 
 
I will be able to obtain general information about the results of this study by contacting Sarah 
Rohlfing after 31 December 2013 (please note that as participation is anonymous it will not be 
possible to access feedback on individual performance). 
 
If you have any questions about the above, please ask the researcher, by emailing her under 
(Sarah.Rohlfing@port.ac.uk) or, if you are completing the survey on paper, by asking her 
personally before continuing with the study. 
 
If you agree to the above, which I sincerely hope you do, please click the next button below which 
indicates your consent to take part in the study. 
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Instructions - Positively Associated Group 
 
 
To complete this study, I need you to focus on group of people you have positive feelings for. So, 
for example these people could be linked together by ethnicity, or by religion, all by occupation, all 
by a pastime, or by a team they support! Or anything else that links them together that generally 
makes them people that you like or have positive associations with! Then with this group in mind, 
please rate each of the following statements. 
 
 Now, before we go any further, I like to start by clarifying a few important points: 
 
• Some of the statements express strong opinions which some participants may you feel sensitive 
about. But please answer as honestly as you can. 
• I am aware that not all of the statements are applicable to all groups of people.  I have therefore 
added not applicable option for you. However, please use this sparingly, and ONLY use this 
option when the statement truly does not apply to the group of people you have in mind. Using 
the not applicable option too often really does ruin my data so please using only when no other 
option makes sense. 
• Please also note that you were NOT have to reveal the group you are thinking of to anyone at 
any time! 
 
Once you know which group you have in mind, please rate each statement by ticking the box 
which indicates the amount you agree or disagree (using the scale below each statement). 
 
Please take a moment once you have completed the ratings and read through the debrief form. It’s 
important to me that you know why I have asked you to spend your time filling in my form. 
Finally, thank you so much for your help! 
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Instructions - Negatively Associated Group 
 
 
To complete this study, I need you to focus on a group of people you have negative 
feelings/connotations for. So, for example these people could be linked together by ethnicity, or by 
religion, or by occupation, all by a pastime, all by a team they support! Or anything else that links 
together that generally makes them people that you do not like or have negative associations with! 
Then with this within mind, please read each of the following statements. 
 
Now, before we go any further, I’d like to start by clarifying the a few important points: 
 
• I completely understand that this may be a difficult task to some, as I cannot and will not assume 
everyone how is negative attitudes towards others. However, most of us have been in situations 
where we have had negative experiences with others, which make us dislike them, even 
temporary and for a very short period. If you are struggling to think of the particular group, think 
of the situation where you dislike the behaviour of others and use the people from that situation to 
write the statements.  
• Some of the statements express strong opinions which some participants may feel sensitive about. 
But please answer as honestly as you can.  
• I am also aware that not all of the statements are applicable to all groups of people. I have 
therefore added and not applicable option for you. However, please use this sparingly, and 
ONLY use this option when this statement truly does not apply to the group of people you have 
in mind. Using a not applicable option too often really does ruin my data, so please use it only 
when no other option makes sense. 
• Please also note that you were NOT have to reveal the group you are thinking of to anyone at any 
time! 
 
Once you know which group you having mind, please rate each statement by ticking the box which 
indicates the amount you agree or disagree (using the scale below which statement). 
 
Please take a moment once you have completed the ratings and read through the debrief form, as 
this is an important part to finish the study informed and happy, and it’s important to me let you 
know why I have asked you to spend your time filling in my form. Finally, thank you so much for 
your help!
  
Appendix III 
List of 46 Adapted Attitude Statements (Chapter 2 – Study 1a) 
1. It would hurt in the business of a large concern if it had too many _______ employees. 
2. ________ should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating 
faults, if they really want to stop being persecuted. 
3. In order to maintain a nice residential neighbourhood, it is best to prevent _________ from 
living in it. 
4. War shows up the fact that the _______are not patriotic, nor willing to make sacrifices for 
their country. 
5. _________ seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant and sensual way of living. 
6. Much resentment against _________ stems from their tendency to keep apart and exclude 
people from their social life. 
7. Colleagues should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of _________ in 
fields which have too many of them now. 
8. _________ must be considered a bad influence in Christian culture and civilisation. 
9. In order to handle the ________ problem, people must meet fire with fire and use the same 
ruthless tactics with them that they used with other people. 
10. The _________ districts in most cities are the result of clannishness and stick-togetherness of 
them. 
11. __________ may have moral standards that they apply in dealing with each other, but with 
others they are unscrupulous, ruthless and undependable. 
12. On the whole, ________ have probably contributed less to the western life than any other 
group. 
13. A step forward solving the _________ problem would be to prevent _________ from getting 
into superior, profitable positions in society, for a while at least. 
14. __________ go too far in hiding their ways of living, especially imitating other manners and 
customs. 
15. It is not wise for people to be seen too much with _______, as they might be taken for a 
_______, or be looked down upon by their non-_________ friends. 
16. There is something different and strange about _________; one never knows what they are 
thinking or planning, nor what makes them tick. 
17. The _________ problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods 
can ever solve it. 
18. A major fault of the _________their conceit, overbearing pride, and their idea that they are 
special. 
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19. One of the first steps to be taken in cleaning up the movies and generally improving the 
situation in the media is to put an end to _________ domination there. 
20.  There is little hope of correcting the biological defects of the ___________ since these 
defects are simply in their blood. 
21.  One big trouble with ___________ is that they are never contented, but always try for the 
best jobs and the most money. 
22.  The trouble with letting _______ into a neighbourhood is that they gradually give it a typical 
_________ atmosphere. 
23.  It is wrong for _________ and non-________ to intermarry. 
24.  One trouble with _________ businessmen is that they stick together and connive so that a 
non-_________ doesn’t have a fair chance in competition. 
25. No matter how adapted a _________ may seem to be, there is always something basically 
________ underneath, a loyalty to their own beliefs and a manner that is never totally 
changed. 
26. __________ millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their 
money goes into worthwhile national causes. 
27. Most hotels should deny admittance to ________, as a general rule. 
28. The ___________ first loyalty is to themselves, rather than to their country. 
29.  It is best that _________ should have known societies and clubs since they have their own 
particular interests and activities which they can best engage in together, just as others get 
along best in their societies. 
30. _________ power and control in money matters is far out of proportion to the number of 
________ in the total population. 
31. _________ leaders should encourage ________to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of 
professions and activities already overcrowded with ________, and to keep out of the public 
notice. 
32. I can hardly imagine myself marrying a ________. 
33. The _________ keep too much to themselves, instead of taking the proper interest in 
community problems and good government. 
34. __________seem to have an aversion to plain hard work; they tend to be a parasitic element 
in society by finding easy, non-productive jobs. 
35. It is sometimes all right to ban ________ from certain types of housing. 
36. __________ tend to remain a foreign element in society, to preserve their own social 
standards and to resist the Western way of life. 
37. Districts containing many __________ always seem to be smelly, dirty, shabby and 
unattractive. 
38. It would be in the best interest of all if the ________ would keep more to themselves. 
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39. There are too many _________ in the various government agencies and offices in Whitehall, 
and they have too much control, over our national policies. 
40. Anyone who employs many people should be careful not to hire a large percentage of 
___________. 
41. One general fault of __________ is their over-aggressiveness, a strong tendency always to 
display their ________ looks, manners and breeding. 
42. There are few exceptions, but in general ________ are pretty much alike. 
43. __________ should be more concerned with their personal appearance, and not be so dirty 
and smelly and unkempt. 
44. There seems to be a revolutionary streak in the _________ make up as shown by the fact that 
there are so many __________ agitators. 
45. The __________ should not pry so much into Christian activities and organisations, nor seek 
so much recognition and prestige from Christians. 
46. __________ tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most 
menial work and to live under standards that are far below average. 
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Appendix IV 
Participant Debrief (Chapter 2 - Study 1a) 
Research on attitudes has a long history in psychology. Much of this research has focussed on 
positive or negative attitudes toward one particular group of people. Classic social psychology has 
suggested that attitudes towards others have been associated with stereotypes and prejudice which 
in turn and that the consequence of ordinary categorisation of others (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981). 
Ehrlich (1973) even went as far as arguing that no one can escape the existing attitudes and 
stereotypes which have been assigned to major ethnic groups. Stereotypes are also being used in 
propaganda by several websites (for example, the Ku Klux Klan), which can result in reinforcing 
existing negative perceptions, and may even lead to negative behaviour towards others (Chau & 
Xu, 2007). Many people have some degree of stereotypes towards others, but this does not always 
result in negative actions against them. Another difficulty with stereotypes is however, that 
stereotypes are automatically activated and people are often not aware of these negative thoughts 
processes and perceptions, which makes them very resistant to change (Devine, 1989).  
 
The aim of this study is to develop an attitude scale which allows us to measure attitudes towards 
several groups, instead of one particular group only. This study is based on an original attitude scale 
developed by Levinson and Sanford in 1944.   
 
As part of my PhD, I am developing an adapted version of the original scale addressing more than 
one group, and with fewer items. To be able to do this, I firstly have to find out if all items in this 
scale are reliable and equally important. This is the reason for the study you participated in today. 
The results from today will enable me to develop this new scale and allow me to use it to measure 
attitudes towards several other groups. The new scale also has the advantage that, whilst gathering 
information about several groups, it will be less time consuming (for both, participants and 
researchers) than the original. 
 
If you would like to know more about this research and the findings, please contact Sarah Rohlfing 
at sarah.rohlfing@port.ac.uk after the 31st December 2013 by which time I should have finished 
collecting data and conducting analysis. 
If this research has raised any issues or concerns, these can be raised to the Chair of the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee at: 
 
Chair of Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology 
King Henry I Street, 
Portsmouth, 
Hampshire, 
PO1 2DY 
 
Your participation has contributed to further our knowledge in an under-researched area.  
 
Many thanks for taking part in my research! 
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Appendix V 
Participant Consent and Instructions (Chapter 2 – Study 1b) 
 
Consent 
 
This study is the second study to develop a new attitude scale to measure negative attitudes towards 
others. In particular, the statements below are taken from an existing prejudice measure (Levinson 
& Sanford, 1944), which addressed one particular group (i.e. Jewish people). In contemporary 
attitude research this group is no longer suitable, hence the need to develop one for a suitable 
group. The original measure was also much longer and therefore difficult to administer in certain 
settings (e.g. investigations into online hate). 
I understand that the study is anonymous. This means that although you will be asked to sign this 
informed consent form and provide your age and gender, these data will be kept separate and 
therefore cannot be linked together. My data and are being collected as part of a PhD research 
project, supervised by Aldert Vrij. 
 
My data will be kept in a locked cabinet for a period of at least five years after any resulting 
publication. 
 
My data are to be held confidentially and will be kept in a locked cabinet for a period of at least 
five years after any resulting publication. Only the research and supervisors will have access to 
them.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary and I have the right to withdraw my participation any time and 
for any reason during the study, and immediately after participation, without penalty. However, 
because data is stored in a de-identified way, it will not be possible to withdraw my data after the 
date of participation. 
 
I will be able to obtain general information about the results of this study by contacting Sarah 
Rohlfing after 30th June 2014 (please note that as participation is anonymous it will not be possible 
to access feedback on individual performance). 
 
If you have any questions about the above, please ask the researcher personally before continuing 
with the study. 
 
If you agree to the above, which I sincerely hope you do, please sign and date below which 
indicates your consent to take part in the study. 
 
……………………………..   …………….. 
(Signature)     (Date) 
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Instructions 
 
To complete this study, please rate the statements below (i.e. circle the appropriate number) based 
on how accurate you find the stereotypes to be for Gypsies. In particular, please rate each of the 
statements based on its general applicability of the stereotype to Gypsies and not how you 
personally feel about the group.  A 1 indicates the statement does not fit Gypsies at all, a 10 
indicates that it fits them perfectly. 
 
Please note that the ratings do not indicate that you are in agreement of the stereotypes towards 
Gypsies. They are merely to indicate the suitability of the items for this particular group. Please 
also note that your participation is anonymous (you only need to provide your age and gender) and 
that the rating scales are displayed on both sides of the pages. 
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Appendix VI 
Participant Debrief (Chapter 2 – Study 1b) 
Research on attitudes has a long history in psychology. Much of this research has focussed on 
positive or negative attitudes toward one particular group of people. Classic social psychology has 
suggested that attitudes towards others have been associated with stereotypes and prejudice which 
in turn and that the consequence of ordinary categorisation of others (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981). 
Ehrlich (1973) even went as far as arguing that no one can escape the existing attitudes and 
stereotypes which have been assigned to major ethnic groups. Stereotypes are also being used in 
propaganda by several websites (for example, the Ku Klux Klan), which can result in reinforcing 
existing negative perceptions, and may even lead to negative behaviour towards others (Chau & 
Xu, 2007). Many people have some degree of stereotypes towards others, but this does not always 
result in negative actions against them. Another difficulty with stereotypes is however, that 
stereotypes are automatically activated and people are often not aware of these negative thoughts 
processes and perceptions, which makes them very resistant to change (Devine, 1989).  
 
The aim of this study is to develop an attitude scale which allows us to measure attitudes towards 
Roma and Travellers as part of a bigger research programme. As you may have noticed, the 
statements you rated referred to the term Gypsy instead of the less offensive term Roma and 
Travellers. I deliberate chose this term because people tend to be more familiar with it and tend to 
see these groups as one. However, it should be noted that these groups are distinctive from each 
other and outside of this study are seen so. This study is based on an original attitude scale 
developed by Levinson and Sanford in 1944.   
 
As part of my PhD, I am developing an adapted version of the original scale which addresses 
Gypsies. Part of this process involves to test whether the stereotypes of the statements we selected 
in the first study indeed suit Gypsies or not. This is the reason for the study you participated in 
today. The results from today will enable me to finalise this new scale and allows me to use it as 
part of another of my PhD studies. The new scale also has the advantage that it will be less time 
consuming (for both, participants and researchers) than the original. 
If you would like to know more about this research and the findings, please contact Sarah Rohlfing 
at sarah.rohlfing@port.ac.uk after the 30th June 2012 by which time I should have finished 
collecting data and conducting analysis. 
If this research has raised any issues or concerns, these can be raised to the Chair of the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee at: 
 
Chair of Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology 
King Henry I Street, 
Portsmouth, 
Hampshire, 
PO1 2DY 
 
Your participation has contributed to further our knowledge in an under-researched area.  
 
Many thanks for taking part in my research! 
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Appendix VII 
Participant Consent & Instructions Session One (Chapter 3 - Study 2) 
Pre- consent information 
 
What does participation in this study involve? 
 
There are two parts to this study. 
 
(1) First, you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire. This looks at your general attitude 
towards different groups of people. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions and they 
can easily be answered by ticking ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’.  This part of the study should take no 
longer than 10 minutes. 
 
(2) The second part of the study involves taking part in an anonymous online chat between you and 
2 or 3 other ‘chatters’. Because this part requires this amount of other participants, I will contact 
you as soon as there are enough volunteers. The online chat will be completely anonymous (i.e., 
you will not meet the other ‘chatters’) and will involve the discussions of a specific topic. The 
actual discussion topic will be specified on the day/time of the chat –but be assured that it will be a 
topic for which no prior knowledge or experience is required!. 
The online chat will be followed by a few questions about your “chat experience” and some 
general questions about the discussion topic. All in all, the second part of the study should take 
no longer than 45 minutes. 
 
Once you have completed both parts of the study, I will provide a full debriefing (i.e. tell you about 
the specific ins and outs of the study). 
 
Finally, despite the rapid growth of internet technology, so far, we know very little about online 
interaction and how particular topics are discussed in online environments. So, your participation in 
this study contributes to our understanding of this new area of research. 
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 Consent 
 
My study is an investigation into online social interactions during instant messaging. 
The questions below make up the first part of my study. The questionnaire will establish your 
knowledge and views on a few controversial topics before proceeding to the actual online chat 
discussion in part two. Although there are several topics covered in the questions below, not all of them 
will relate to the discussion you will participate in. Please be assured that your participation is 
anonymous. There will be no web cam in the second part. There will be no right or wrong answers to 
any of the questions in the questionnaire or the online chat discussion. 
 
After you have completed the first questionnaire, I will contact you as soon as possible to arrange a 
suitable time for you to complete the second part of my study.  
Please note there may take a few days before I contact you because I need to make sure that I recruit 
enough participants for your group. 
 
- I understand that my responses are anonymous. This means that I will not be identifiable to any other 
participants I talk to during the discussion task. However, I understand that the set-up of the study (i.e. 
its completion over two sessions) requires the researcher to contact me to arrange for a suitable 
date/time. Yet, I am aware that once I completed the study, the researcher will delete any email 
correspondence and my responses will be stored in a de-identifiable way (i.e. the responses will only be 
linked to a uniquely assigned participant number). My data and are being collected as part of a PhD 
research project, supervised by Aldert Vrij. 
 
- My data are to be held confidentially. Any hardcopies of my data will be kept in a locked cabinet for a 
period of at least five years after any resulting publication. My electronic responses will be kept on a 
password protected computer only the researcher and the supervisory team have access to. 
 
- Participation is entirely voluntary and I have the right to withdraw my participation any time and for 
any reason during the study, and immediately after participation, without penalty. However, because 
data is stored in a de-identified way, it will not be possible to withdraw my data after the date of 
participation. 
 
- I will be able to obtain general and individual information about the results of this study by contacting 
Sarah Rohlfing after 30th June 2015 stating my uniquely assigned participant number. 
 
If you have any questions at this point, or during the questions, please do not hesitate to contact 
me (sarah.rohlfing@port.ac.uk) before continuing with the study. 
• Finally, if you agree to the above, which I sincerely hope you do, please make a note of your 
unique participant number (below) and use the following link (which indicates your consent) to 
take you to the first part of my study. 
Your Participant Number is () 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/onlinedispartone 
Thank you very much for your participation and for your time! 
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Participant Instructions – Session One 
 
Please rate each of the following items, using the scales provided below them and by ticking the 
number which best indicates how you currently feel about them. Please pay attention to each rating 
scale as these might differ throughout the questionnaire (for example, they change from being 7 
rating points to 4). 
 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in my study on online interaction. I very much 
appreciate your time! 
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Appendix VIII 
Overall Participant Instructions Session Two (Chapter 3 - Study 2) 
Many thanks for agreeing to complete the second part of my study today. 
At (provide TIME) please follow the first link provided below (if clicking on it does not work, 
please copy and paste it into your web browser to access this part of the study).  
Please do not start beforehand as I am trying to provide everyone with an equal opportunity. I am 
not investigating what people know before the chat, but instead only interested in natural 
interactions between people. 
In this first part, there will be 4 questions, including stating your participant number, which 
is (provide PPT no). In this part of the study, you will also receive instructions of the entire study 
and get given the discussion topic including some information about it. 
After you completed the first 4 questions, there will be a page stating "AT THIS STAGE YOU 
MUST HAVE COMPLETED THE ONLINE CHAT ROOM INTERACTION BEFORE 
PROCEEDING WITH THE REST OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE". This will act as a prompt to 
enter the chat room. In order to do so, please follow the second link provided below, or of this does 
not work, copy it into a new window/page of your web browser.  
PLEASE DO NOT CLOSE THE BROWSER WINDOW WITH THE QUESTIONS, AS 
YOU WILL NEED TO GET BACK TO THAT PAGE AFTER YOU COMPLETED THE 
CHAT. 
On the chat room page, it will ask you for a name or alias. Please enter ONLY your participant 
number into the field! You may also change the colour of your writing if you like. Once you hit 
enter, you will be in the chat room.  
I will also be entering the chat room, but will only monitor that everything is going okay and that 
no one has any technical problems.  
Once all participants have entered the chat room, I will give the okay to start with the discussion. I 
WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY WAY THOUGH. 
At the end of the chat, I will only give the okay for you to go back to the questionnaire on the first 
browser window, as the questions from that stage on will refer to your chat you have just 
completed. Please also close the chat room at this stage. 
Once you are back at the questionnaire, it will take you about another 10-15 minutes to complete it. 
After completing the questionnaire, you have also completed your participation in my study. 
Thank you very much again for your help and please let me know if there are any problems or 
questions at any time. 
 
First link (pre-and post-task questions): https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/QSPMZZR 
Second link (Chat room): http://www.chatzy.com/21765797454746 
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Session Two: Pre-Task Instructions and Topic Information 
 
Please sit yourself down comfortably by the desk in front of the computer screen. 
 
In a minute, I will ask you to use the computer and the appointed chat-room to discuss your 
opinions and views with other chat room users about the actions of Basildon Council in evicting 
the Gypsies from Dale Farm. If you ever need to introduce yourself to the other chap from users, 
please only state your participant number to ensure anonymity. 
 
I understand that for some given topic may be sensitive, which is why I need to make sure that you 
are happy with everything before we can begin. 
 
Please be reminded that you have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and that I am 
happy to answer any questions before and after you have participated. 
 
It is important that you pay attention to everything that everyone says doing your online chat, as 
you may be asked some questions about this including who said what afterwards. 
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Appendix IX 
Fact Sheet- Dale Farm Eviction (Chapter 3 – Study 2) 
Dale Farm is a plot of land in Essex, United Kingdom. The side was previously used as a scrap and 
breaker’s yard. Up until October 2011, Dale Farm’s residents included predominantly Irish 
Travelers and some Romani. Half of the side is a legal camp with planning permission for 
occupation as a Traveller site, whereas at the other half, despite being legally owned by the 
Travelers, has been established without authorisation and planning permission.  The former Dale 
farm residents state that they applied for planning permissions for the site on several attempts, but 
the council denied this on each occasion. In October 2011, the High Court ruled the eviction of the 
illegal side. Dale Farm residents have been forcibly evicted. The legal battle between the Dale 
Farm residents and Essex’s Basildon Council has taken 10 years, cost £18 million and during the 
eviction riot police hat to be deployed. At its height, Dale Farm housed over 1000 people, making 
it the largest Traveller community in the UK. The Travelers have been offered social housing, but 
rejected it, because this arrangement does not agree with their existing culture. If the Dale Farm 
residents had been allowed to stay, planning laws would have to be revised throughout the UK. 
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Appendix X 
Manipulation Statements (Chapter 3 – Study 2) 
Aiming to Reinforce or Refute Stereotypes Towards Roma and Travellers 
 
Reinforcing 
1. “I cannot believe that Basildon Council took so long to evict those Gypsies and that their 
best explanation to be allowed to evict them was that the Gypsies did not have planning 
permission!” 
2. “I could not build an extension to my house without planning permission, so why should 
they? And also, the cleaning up of the land is going to take a very long time and will cost 
the taxpayer an astonishing £18 million!” 
3. “It may be their own land but what makes them so special that they can avoid playing by 
the rules and simply doing what they like?!” 
4. “It is their own fault they were evicted for breaking the rules!” 
5. “Gypsies do not pay taxes anyway! If they want to stay where they are, they should start 
contributing towards society for once!” 
6. “Even if they have no place to go now, it is their own fault and maybe they should have 
thought about that before they made themselves such bad names everywhere!” 
7. “The reputation of being thieves and uncivilised must be true, otherwise why does this 
reputation follow them literally everywhere they go?!” 
8. “The Council even gave them alternative housing suggestions, so what are they moaning 
about?!”  
9. “I would not want to live next to or in the same area as Gypsies!” 
10. “TV programmes like big fat Gypsy wedding demonstrated a true picture of what they are 
really like!” 
11. “They are Travellers; the clue is in the name! They are not meant to stay in one place 
anyway!” 
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Refuting 
 
1. “I cannot believe that Basildon Council evicted the Gypsies just because they didn’t have 
planning permission!” 
2. “They had absolutely no choice than build their homes without planning permission, as 
they did apply for planning permission at the council, but the council continuously rejected 
them!” 
3. “They even built their own waste water systems there and I would therefore argue that they 
improved the area instead of it simply being a deserted scrap yard!” 
4. “It is even the Gypsies’ land, they bought it off the scrap yard owner and so should they be 
allowed to do what they like?!” 
5. “They have no place to go now and in addition to that, the taxpayer will end up paying £18 
million. Why?” 
6. “The Council’s alternative housing for them does not consider, not appreciate the Gypsy 
culture, traditions or ways of living. What would the general population do if they were 
forced to live in caravans all of a sudden with no choice?!”  
7. “What about their children, who are settled into schools and will lose their friends?” 
8. “I think it was the fact that they are Gypsies which made the Council want them to leave! 
What would they say or do if it was themselves in the situation of the Gypsies?!” 
9. “Who can blame them for wanting to stay where they were and defend the only space they 
were allowed to stay, with the prospect of nowhere to go to and not being allowed to stay 
in most places for very long anyway?” 
10. “I think it was also the old stereotypes of Gypsies being thieves and the general 
misunderstanding of the general public towards Gypsy culture, putting pressure on the 
council to get rid of them.” 
11. “TV programmes like big fat Gypsy wedding probably did not help the Gypsies in 
counteracting existing stereotypes. 
12. “The language used in the build-up to the eviction was no different to the language the 
Nazis used in the build-up to the Holocaust!” 
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Initial Neutral Statements 
1. “I guess Basildon Council evicted the Gypsies as a matter of principle, because this legal 
debate had been going on for about 10 years now.” 
 
2. “Apparently, those Gypsies had no planning permissions to build those houses they lived 
in, but on the other hand there was the rumour that there were several planning applications 
prior to them building, but the council rejected them all.” 
 
3. “They improved the site they lived on and even built their own waste water systems, but 
now that they have been evicted, it will apparently cost the taxpayer £18 million to clean 
the site up, which at the current financial climate is clearly not helpful for anyone.” 
 
4. “It is the Gypsies’ land; they bought it off the scrap yard owner a long time ago. Perhaps 
the council should have thought about the consequences that this sale may have on their 
community at the time and bought the land themselves.” 
 
5. “There was the argument that the evicted Gypsies have nowhere to go now, but has that not 
always been their tradition, to travel and not stay in one place for very long?” 
 
6. “The Council made some alternative housing available for them, what the Gypsies make of 
this offer is up to them.”  
 
7.  “It may have played a factor in the lead up to the eviction that they are Gypsies. There are 
some stereotypes about Gypsies, including them being accused of being thieves, 
uncivilised and unclean. These stereotypes may have been adding pressure from the 
community onto the council.” 
 
8. “Perhaps the Gypsies really wanted to stay where they were, otherwise they would not 
have invested all this time and money to keep the place and make it their home, but is it 
right then to defend this place with barriers and threats of violence?” 
 
9. “It may also have a negative impact on Gypsy children’s education and social support, 
including the loss of friends and them lacking to bond with other non-Gypsies when they 
are being forced to move on.” 
 
10. “TV programme like big fat Gypsy wedding could even have a negative impact on existing 
stereotypes about Gypsies.” 
 
11. “The council was obliged to evict them, because it is the law and the council does not 
make the law.” 
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Appendix XI 
Example Discussion Transcripts (Chapter 3 – Study 2) 
 
Please note, that in the first example the confederate has been assigned participant number 290 and 
in the second example number 9 (responses of the confederate are marked in bold) 
 
Discussion Group 68 – Aiming to Reinforce Stereotypes  
 
Sarah Researcher started the chat 55 minutes ago 
280 joined the chat 58 seconds ago 
267 joined the chat 40 seconds ago 
Sarah Researcher: Hi there, we are just waiting on the others before I will let you start 
290 joined the chat 
Sarah Researcher: We are just waiting in one more to join you, so I would say we give it a few 
more moments 
Sarah Researcher: Okay I would say we give it until 18:40 (3more minutes) then you can start, 
even if that means without the last person. 
Sarah Researcher: Okay please start when you are ready 
290: Okay 
267: Hello 
290: Hi everyone. So.. what did everyone think about the dale farm eviction then? 
280: i think they were right to evict them 
267: I have very mixed views, although I'd probably air towards the councils side 
290: I agree, 280. I'd say it was justified 
267: However I do see that if your culture wants to live a certain way, you should have that choice 
and can therefore see why they didn't accept social housing, however in terms of the actual 
eviction I do think it was the right choice 
290: To be honest, I'm surprised it took so long 
284 joined the chat 
290: hmm yes. But i suppose if you're going to break the rules, then you deserve to be 
evicted. If i can't build an extension on my own house without planning permission then 
there's no way they should be able to build. 
267: Yes I do agree with you, and for the fact that we have to buy land to live on, so there's no 
reason they should be able to get land for free. if they want to live how they do, that's fine but we 
shouldn't be at a disadvantage because of it 
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284: I agree 290 as rules were broken so the eviction was necessary 
280: i agree, they broke the law, they couldnt predict the outcome of it 
290: If they are travellers anyway, isn't the clue in the name? what i don't understand is why 
did they want to build permanent housing? 
290: The council gave them alternative housing suggestions too, which I thought was fair 
290: Well...almost too fair! 
284: I agree that they were given a fair alternative which they chose not too accept 
280: exactly 
267: But I think to an extent it could have been assumed they wouldn't accept as they obviously 
have a very strong culture, so was that just to appease them rather than to actually offer it to them? 
I do agree that the eviction was correct, I just believe that many would have biased views due to 
stereotyping of the culture 
284: Yeah there is a negative stereotype associated with the culture but that shouldn't have been an 
issue when considering the eviction surely? 
290: I suppose, 267, that there is a negative stereotype. But the fact that they broke the rules 
and then built anyway only adds fuel to the fire. 
284:  
280: i dont think its based on the stereotpye, they broke the rules, thats why they were evicted 
284: Harsh 
267: I mean biased opinions about the whole situation rather than the decision of eviction 
290: But the question is posed as to why this reputation follows them everywhere they go? 
Surely there must be an element of truth to it? 
290: I'll admit that I would not want to live next to or in the same area as gypsies again. This 
is based from experience though, and not a stereotype 
284: Reputations can be built on the actions of individuals rather than a whole culture though 
280: why not? what was your issue with them? 
267: But how many people truely know about the traveller culture and what they believe in, why 
they travel etc because I know I don't! All I know is it's a culture that's been around for a long time 
yet phrases such as 'gypsy' are so badly related to - this is due to what we've heard/learnt from 
originally a small number of individuals and not what the whole culture is about 
284: Yeah completely true 
290: They left the land in an awful state, they were threatening towards the public and were 
a complete hassle with the council. This time they were not on their own land, though. 
284: Even so you cannot assume that is the case for them all? 
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267: But 290, your experience has caused you to create a stereotype by saying you wouldn't want 
to live near gypsies again you're insinuating that you believe this would happen again with 
different groups of people which I do believe is a stereotype or at least a huge generalisation 
290: I just think that if they are breaking rules, or not on their own land or creating a hassle 
in society then they should not be allowed to stay there. Of course I'm sure this is not the case 
with all travellers, but it's most certainly the case for what I have dealt with in the past. 
290: And by hassle I mean threatening, ignoring council requests, etc 
290: I appreciate that they have their own culture that they should be able to live out, but 
that's going to be very difficult in a society of tax payers who, therefore, contribute to the 
society as a whole. 
267: Many people do the above (threats, ignoring council requests) and many go a step further and 
ignore court orders or cause serious, harmful crimes such as murder of GBH, but that doesn't mean 
the whole population do those things such as not the whole traveler community would do as you've 
said 
284: Well I'm sure if I'd had personal experiences like that I'd take certain measures to avoid that 
again 
267: Unless you're suggesting eradicating the whole traveler community you'll always get certain 
individuals who will do certain things that will keep up their bad name, however you could say 
that for the rest of us too. To get rid of all the people who do or could potentially cause us 
problems you'd have to eradicate the entire worlds population 
290: Of course 267, I don't think that those people you mentioned are better than travellers, 
but it does mean that I have little sympathy for examples such as Dale Farm when they were 
given warning, which was ignored, and they were evicted! I'd have the same view of someone 
who was evicted from their house 
267 joined the chat 38 seconds ago 
284: Yeah I think for Dale Farm the warnings were clear, the alternative was presented and 
ignored and therefore eviction was the only option left 
267: And as I said earlier in the chat, I do agree that the dale farm eviction was the correct course 
of action, it's just the stigma and aftermath I have problems with  
284: Aftermath? 
290: It's using their culture as an excuse not to abide by the law that I have a problem with, 
that's all. 
290: what do you think, 280? 
267: By aftermath I just meant the ever heightened stereotyping etc 
284: Oh right 
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280: i agree with 284 
284: Why's that? 
280: the warnings were clear, they knew they had to leave, they are the ones that created the hassle 
290: I agree 
284: Fair enough, although there still deserve a certain degree of sympathy in my opinion 
290: to the traveller population, perhaps, but to those at Dale Farm I have very little. 
280: maybe sympathy in the fact they were rejected of planning permission several times, but this 
doesnt mean they could just break the rules 
267: I wouldn't necessarily agree sympathy, more just understanding 
Sarah Researcher: Okay guys. Thank you very much for your great contribution tonight. Can I 
ask you to please leave the chat room now and return to the rest of your questionnaires? 
290: Could we not say the same to them though? Did they try to understand why it is that 
planning permission was not granted? The uproar it would have caused? 
290: Okay, thank you  
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Discussion Group 58- Aiming to Refute Stereotypes 
Sarah Researcher started the chat 59 minutes ago 
59 joined the chat 2 minutes ago 
Sarah Researcher: Hello there, we spare just waiting on the others and then I will let you 
start  
59 joined the chat 95 seconds ago 
50 joined the chat 90 seconds ago 
59: No problem  
9 joined the chat 51 seconds ago 
50: OK 
9 joined the chat  
Sarah Researcher: we are just waiting on one more group member. If they do not join us 
is the next 3/4 minutes I will let you start without them so you will not need to hang about 
9: Okay  
Sarah Researcher: okay guys, looks like the last person is not going to join us today. 
Thank you very much for helping me today and please start when you are ready  
9: Alright. So, what did you guys make of the Dale Farm eviction? Know much about 
it in the past? 
50: I don't know much.. just read about it now honestly.. 
9: Like when it actually happened 
59: I didn't i heard about it on the news but not in depth 
59: Does anyone know how long ago it was? 
50: I think in the questionnaire said 2011 
9: Same here, 59. I did study it a bit at college too.. must have been about 3 years ago 
59: Ah I see , does anyone have an opinion on what should of happened? 
50: since you two probably know more than me, would you mind telling me what is the 
controversy about? I was reading that part of the land had the rights to be occupied as 
travellers site, part didn't but was owned by them.. is this correct> 
9: I heard they're living (pretty much) down the road from the site in a bad state :/ 
50: so is that the reason why they were evicted? 
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9: Well, one of the main debates is... should they have been evicted? They owned the 
land, but some of it was green belt so they couldn't build without permission 
59: 50, thats all that ive read i'm afraid. I think it has cost way to much if they were not 
creating problems for the surrounding community? 
50: yeah I got that 9.. 
59: or maybe they were, people didn't understand their culture? 
59: cousing conflict? 
50: If they were evicted, do they still own the land? 
59: **causing 
9: Well, i can't help but think the negative stereotypes played a role in their eviction 
9: I mean, if it was any other sub-culture in the U.K., would they have been treated 
the same? 
59: totally agree 9! 
50: yes.. but it's also true that there are some differences in the culture which make it 
difficult living in harmony - not saying one or the other is right 
9: 50.. well, that's part of it. I'm assuming not - but how can they just do that? 
59: Personally I dont know much about the travelling culture but surely part is to no 
remain in the same site for a long time? 
9: what do you mean, 50? 
59: *not 
50: I don't know.. I think that on one side if they shouldn't have been living there it's fair 
that something was done about. on the other hand, I think circumstances should have been 
considered. perhaps it was possible to change the status of the land so that it was legal 
living there 
9: 59.. These guys were known as "gypsies", but I think the term "traveller" is 
slightly misleading for this case study. These guys built housing.. a large community.. 
even sewage systems (if i remember correctly from college!) 
59: Surely it would have also cost less! 
9: They weren't going anywhere 
59: Ah i see thank you, 9! 
59: meaning with the cost of court battles etc 
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50: 9 I think that when there are strong cultural differences it may be difficult to live close 
by, share spaces etc 
50: 59 probably yes 
9: Ah, I see, 50. So do you guys think they should have been evicted? Or not? I'm 
more on the side of not 
59: I think if there were major implication to the pre existing communinties then no, why 
fix things if it isn't broke? 
9: And I just googled it.. it cost the tax payer £18 million to clear up everything after 
the eviction - what a waste! and to worsen their condition of living too.. I think that's 
disgusting 
50: no I think that some friction is bound to happen, but I wouldn't say that this mean the 
travellers were to go. who says they should leave and not the british who didn't like them? 
what I mean is just that it us understandable to have difficulties when there are differences 
59: Totally agree 9! Obviously, there are disagreements in shared culture, but nothing so 
major to waste £18 million! 
50: 59 I agree with that, I wonder if it was really necessary. I mean, the fact that was a 
greenland was actually the only reason? 
50: Do you think that the opinion of the public may have put pressure on the decision? 
59: The reseaon being its a green land, sure they had already built on it. Therefore it has 
gone past the point of preservation? 
9: Exactly, guys. That's why I can't help but think that negative stereotypes 
(especially from programmes like My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding) may have been a 
factor in this 
59: Yes, totally. Again referring to the sterotypes. 
9: They did build on the green belt land.. that was their error. But to evict them for 
it? Why not just knock it all down (the stuff that shouldnt have been there anyway) 
59: I think the minority who were fame hungry, have blurred preceptions of their true 
culture 
59: I think that it is totally unfair, that one mistake has cost them so dearly 
50: 9 what would be the difference between knocking things down and evicting them? 
they couldn't live there anyway and they must have paid for what they built 
59: also surely the damage to the green land had already been done? 
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9: The difference being that the majority (including the young kids who went to local 
schools there) shouldnt suffer by the actions of the minority 
9: A lot of buildings were OK to be there 
9: I'm not too sure, 59 
50: 59 I don't agree on considering it "just a mistake"... but yeah sure they could have just 
given a fine or such and asked them to pay for getting permission to build 
59: but the actions of the minority, by building them would have proably been used by the 
majority therefore beneifitting them? 
50: 9 I don't get it.. are you in favour or against the eviction then? 
9: Against it. I felt that a) yes, they should have been punished, but b) a lot less 
harshly 
50: 9 I think I agree with you 
59: Does anyone know now what the land is used for? 
50: no 
9: If we really do live in a society where everyone is equal.. then that should be the 
case 
50: that would be interesting to know.. 
9: and yeah.. it's pretty much just land now 
9: After the clean up 
9: Like I said, the gypsies have gone down the road and pretty much live (effectively) 
in the slums 
59: So they have disrubed families lives in where a fine or less harsh punishment could 
have been given 
9: I just wonder.. what was really achieved by the council? 
59: *disrupted 
9: Yeah, pretty much 
59: Agree 9! howevere this may have been done due to public demand 
59: *however 
9: This is why I hate to generalise groups of people 
9: It's so easy, but I always try to avoid it 
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9: Have you guys had much personal experience with gypsies in the past? Or just 
from the media etc? 
50: I guess it's a normal mechanism.. 
59: in any comunity or group you ae going to get all diffeerent kinds of people, a 
generalisation cannot be made although it happens 
50: I had met them when I was a kid in a camping area abroad 
59: In my job I have met many , mostly pleasent 
50: so where does the negative opinion about them come from? 
59: media, reality tv programmes, also exaggerations of stories 
59: Land that they have accompanied near me, was left in a terrible stae 
59: *state 
9: I've had some fairly neutral experiences with them, too. Some good some bad. I 
think for some people, it's easy to point the finger of blame.. and this may largely be 
pointed at gypsies because they are different.. they have a different culture.. a 
difference way of doing things (SOMETIMES) haha.. not that I wanna generalise  
59: Agree 9! 
59: although my old work was trashed because of their inter rivalry 
50: I think the problem is that it's part of the human nature to feel like a group and keep 
outsiders... out. I may sound more equal if it didn't happen, but it does. I wonder if we 
should rather accept it and see how it is possible to accept differences.. I don't if it makes 
sense 
Sarah Researcher: okay guys. Thank you so much for your great contribution to this 
discussion. Can you please return to your questionnaires please and leave the chat room? 
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Appendix XII 
Participant Debrief (Chapter 3 – Study 2) 
Many thanks for taking part in my research! I hope you have enjoyed participating. 
 
Research on online hatred has largely focused on webpage content analyses and the persuasive effects of 
materials peoples are exposed to on hate websites. Social identity theory and persuasion have not been 
investigated together, yet both seem to have strong links to hate behaviour. Hence, this is the focus of this 
research. The effects of online group interactions on individuals is a further area that has been neglected in 
the literature and is therefore also being examined. 
 
This research investigates how individuals are influenced by others and how someone may identify with a 
group when interacting online with other in-group members. There were three different types of groups, 
which were pre-grouped by the responses they gave in first session of this study. The criteria for the pre-
grouping were the attitudes (pro, neutral, against) expressed towards a minority group, in this case Gypsies. 
Also, a confederate (third or fourth discussion group member) led the conversation either to refute or 
reinforce existing attitudes of all participants.  
 
From existing attitude research, it is expected that participants whose opinions are neutral towards Gypsies 
will be most persuaded towards the direction of influence compared to the other participants. This is because 
their attitude strength is somewhat weaker/less made up than those who hold either pro or anti sympathetic 
attitudes towards Gypsies. In particular, participants whose attitudes were either against or for Gypsies are 
said to have already formed strong attitudes and used counter-arguments, which should stop them from being 
persuaded by counter-argumentative positions. They are therefore expected to remain at their initial 
standpoint.  
 
The set-up of this type of research is new and one hopefully shed light on whether individuals are influenced 
by other group members in an online setting in a similar way as they may be in a face-to-face interaction. 
 
In the vital attempt to get people honest opinions, I would like to ask you not to reveal the true aim of 
the study to any of your friends or colleagues in case they may take part in my research. 
 
If you would like to know more about this research and the findings please contact me at 
Sarah.Rohlfing@port.ac.uk after the 31st August 2014, by which time I should have finished collecting data 
and started to conduct the analyses. 
 
If this research has raised any issues or concerns these can be raised to the Chair of the Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee at:  
Chair of Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology 
King Henry I Street, 
Portsmouth, 
Hampshire, 
PO1 2DY 
 
Alternatively, if you are a University of Portsmouth member of staff or student, you can contact the 
University of Portsmouth counselling service at: 
The Nuffield Centre 
St. Michael’s Road 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2ED 
02392 843157 
 
Your participation has contributed further to our knowledge in and under researched area and might even 
contribute towards tackling the shoes of online hatred in real life. Many thanks! 
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Appendix XIII 
Initial Coding Scheme – Content Analytic (Chapter 4 – Study 3) 
1 Dark Gray (highlighted) Generally hostile/insulting 
2 Light Blue (highlighted) Indirect violence/incitement to violence by others/wishing 
violence on Emma (i.e. someone should do XXX to 
her…) 
3 Yellow (Highlighted) Direct violence against individual/woman, (i.e. I would 
kill, hurt, punch etc.) 
4 Blue Violence against a ‘group’ (US citizens, Low-income, 
Blacks etc.) 
5 Blue (highlighted) General prejudice 
6 Olive (highlighted) Addressing Emma West directly 
7 Light Grey (highlighted) General racist jokes 
8 Dark red (highlighted)  
 
Low level of racism 
9 Pink (highlighted) Medium level of racism 
10 Medium Green 
(highlighted with green 
writing)  
High level of racism/ sub human (e.g. calling black 
people monkeys) 
 
11 Dark Blue Text 2 lighter 
40% 
General sexual remarks, including, directed at Emma or 
about the content 
12 Gold General Threats 
13 Green (highlighted) Drug/mental health related remarks 
14 Purple Re-posting (later deleted most of those comments) 
15 Red (highlighted) Feelings of posters/commenters (i.e. shame, sadness, 
embarrassment etc.) Part of condemnation of Emma’s 
actions/behaviour 
16 Teal (highlighted) Remarks about Emma’s child 
17 Light Green (highlighted) Condemning Emma and other racists/ anti-racist 
18 Light green Generally Supporting Emma 
19 Accent 2 red darker 25% Wannabe scientific (social scientific explanations for/ 
against a race their traits, superiority etc.) 
20 Orange accent 6 darker 
25% 
Posting Emma’s details/information about 
her/investigation 
21 Purple accent 4 darker 
25% 
Feeling sorry for Emma 
22 Orange Accent 6 darker 
50% 
Black people cannot be racist and comments related to it 
(i.e. all races can/cannot be racist) 
23 Red Accent 2 lighter 60 % Remarks regarding trolls (i.e. identifying or accusing 
other users as trolls and suggesting to ignore or mark 
them as spam/report them 
24 Black, Text 1 lighter 50% General Governmental/Policies/Legislation/historical 
remarks (blaming Government, socio-economic climate, 
UK colonial history & treatment during those times, 
border control, UN, EU etc.) 
2             25 Light Blue Sorry/apologetic for content of the video/Emma’s 
actions/racism, stating not everyone is like it in the UK, 
part of condemnation code. 
26 Yellow Referral to celebs (John Terry’s wife etc.) 
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1 This code does not relate to the comments we deleted for their un-relatedness or 
abbreviated application. Instead this code refers to comments, which we did not fit into any other 
code or were unrelated to the research question/online hatred. 
27 Black (original colour) 
 
General remarks, not fitting any category 1 
 
28 Red writing and black 
highlight 
Remarks about education, or lack of (Emma’s education, 
racists’ education are assumed to be low) 
 ------------------- 
      or        
                         
Manual insertion of lines to indicate where 
posters/commenters are able to engage directly with 
other posters/commenters in sequential and related 
posts (displayed at the start and end of sequence to 
each other) 
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Appendix XIV 
Participant Consent and Instructions (Chapter 5 – Study 4) 
Consent 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether attitudes towards anonymity on the Internet have 
changed over time. In addition, this study aims to determine what terms or phrases people may perceive 
to be hateful, in order to compare these with relevant current legislation. 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be required to complete a survey on only one occasion, 
which will last approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Yet, there are no time restrictions on how long you may 
take to complete it. To keep your anonymity, you can complete the survey online and will not need to 
attend any sessions in person. However, there will be some questions relating to your demographics 
such as your age, gender and your place of residence. Then, there will be a series of questions relating 
to how anonymous you perceive yourself to be on the Internet and you will be required to rate some 
provocative statements with respect to whether you think they are hateful or not and whether such 
statement should be illegal or not. Please note that you will be able to decline answering questions you 
do not wish to answer. 
 
Your anonymous responses will be kept securely by the principal investigator. In particular, the data 
will be stored electronically on a password protected computer. The data may be presented to others at 
scientific meetings, or published as a project report, academic dissertation, scientific paper or book, or 
in future research studies approved by an appropriate ethics committee. Your responses will not be 
passed to anyone outside the study team without your expressed written permission. The exception to 
this will be any regulatory authority, who may have the legal right to access the data for the purpose of 
conducting an investigation in exceptional cases. The raw data (your responses) will be retained for five 
years following publication (In line with APA guidance). When it is no longer required, the data will be 
disposed of securely. 
 
You can stop any test at any time, or withdraw from the study at any time before finishing the survey, 
without giving a reason if you do not wish to. However, please note that because your responses will be 
anonymous, it will not be possible for you to withdraw once you have completed the survey. 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study, you should speak to the principal investigator in the 
first instance if this is appropriate or to the supervisor (both detailed below). If the concern or complaint 
is not resolved by the principal investigator or supervisor, you should contact the head of department Dr 
Sherria Hoskins, Sherria.Hoskins@port.ac.uk. If the complaint remains unresolved, please contact the 
University complaints officer (0239284 3642, complaintsadvise@port.ac.uk). 
 
Principal investigator: Sarah Rohlfing 
Telephone: 02392846614 
Email: Sarah.Rohlfing@port.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Aldert Vrij 
Telephone: 02392846319 
Email: Aldert.Vrij@port.ac.uk 
 
This research is being self-funded by the principal researcher (Sarah Rohlfing). None of the researchers 
of the study staff will receive any financial reward for conducting the study, other than the normal 
salary or bursary as an employee or student of the University. 
 
This study has been scientifically and ethically reviewed and given favourable ethical opinion by the 
Science Faculty Ethics Committee. 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to share your views with me. 
 
 
If you agree to the above, which I sincerely hope you do, please click the next button below which indicates 
your consent to take part in the study. 
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Participant Instructions (Per Survey Section) 
 
First of all, I would like to learn a little bit about your background (whilst maintaining your anonymity of 
course!). After that, I would like to know a bit more about your use of different social networking sites. 
Could you please provide the following personal information? 
 
In this section, I'd like to hear more about your own personal use of social media. For each of the following 
statements, please do use the response that best describes your use of social media. Four example, for the 
statements referring to your membership of social media sites and your mobile phone usage in relation to 
your use of the sites, you can simply select yes or no. In addition, for the statements referring to the 
frequency of your social media use, you could answer by typing things like several times a day, daily, 
weekly, monthly, less than once a month, or never etc. 
 
In this section, I am interested in your views on some strong statements. People differ in what they actually 
consider to be offensive or hateful, especially in the context of social media. I am interested in finding out 
your personal views and just how hateful you think the statement below. 
 
The statements below are all actual statements that people have posted online over the last four years, which 
have been taken Word for word (or in fact, letter by letter) from social media websites. You may find some 
of them unpleasant or upsetting. So, with that in mind, I'd be grateful if you could write each one according 
to your view on how hateful you think it is. Then, I'd be interested to know whether you think making the 
statements should be legal (i.e. whether or not the person making that statement should or should not be 
allowed legally, to make that statement publicly) or not, so you need to provide a rating for that too. 
 
So to recap, for each statement you will provide two ratings - how hateful you think of this and then whether 
or not it should be legal to say such a thing. However, before I ask you to make these ratings, I would like to 
learn how you personally define 'online hatred' (i.e. what does the phrase 'online hatred' mean to you?). 
Please use the box below to describe in your own words your understanding of the term online hatred. 
 
Now we are going to the statements that I mentioned above. Remember you are giving to ratings for each 
statement, by selecting one response option for hatefulness and one for whether you think the statement 
should be criminal or not. As before, this response options are displayed below each statement. 
 
No I'd like to learn more about your views on a range of issues relating to our online and non-virtual real 
lives. Below you will find different attitude statements. The first lot concerns the expressions of strong or 
offensive use either online or offline. The second lot concerns the question of who should be blamed for 
and/or held responsible for dealing with online hate. Here, I'd like you to tell me the extent to which you 
agree with each of these statements. Please choose one of the response options besides the statement. 
 
Glossary of terms: 
Online anonymity - No sharing of personal data and all use of Webcams 
Face-to-face - In person interactions, does not include webcams 
Introduction of Smartphones - Smartphones were first introduced in 2007 and widely accessible by 2008 
Introduction of Facebook - Although founded in 2004, introduction here refers to Facebook's worldwide 
popularity and use, which was approximately in 2009 
Popularity of Twitter - Twitter was founded in 2006, but here the popularity of Twitter refers to the time 
when it was ranked third of the top 10 social networking sites in 2012 
 
You have now read the last section of this questionnaire (you will be pleased to know!). Here, I'd like to turn 
to the issue of unlimited on the Internet. So finally, I briefly like you to tell me about how anonymous you 
feel on the Internet and whether you think anonymity plays a role in the way you behave online. As you did 
in the last section, please use one of the response options beside each statement to let me know how much 
you agree or disagree with it. 
 
Thank you very much for your views and your time I don't have anything else to ask you, but if you think 
I've missed anything out, or if you have any comments you would like to share with me, please do so in the 
text box below. 
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Appendix XV 
Full List of Proposed Measures’ Statements (Chapter 5) 
 
Hatefulness and Criminality 
Control statements: 
(1) “British is nothing but a 1707political construct”; 
(2) “Why can’t we all just stick TOGETHER? When will you people realise it is a COLOUR and 
colour is not synonymous with being British”. 
Offensive statements:  
(1) “You're skin color is not british so youre not british” 
(2) “To be British, one must have poise and refinement. Black people possess neither of those 
qualities – they're just a bunch of dumb, boorish, violent thugs” 
(3) “If they are black or mixed race they are African, not British” 
(4) “Im okay with everyone.... except muslims.. they do not know how to integrate and they always 
make a mess anywhere they go. and their fucking religion of Allahdin”  
(5) “BLACK PEOPLE ARE SUPERIOR TO WHITES. WE ARE MORE TALENTED, SMARTER 
AND MORE BEAUTIFUL. Whites are useless” 
(6) “Trouble is .. blacks and muslims in the 3rd world are lazy”  
(7) “She's a woman, why is she allowed to leave the kitchen?”  
(8) “I don’t usually have a problem with blacks, just your gang culture but thats it. and Muslims 
are the main problem, they hate all non muslims, not just whites but black people as well. and 
whats wrong with mosques? err maybe because they brainwash people in to hateing other 
people and commiting Jihad, and they are just Dirty scum, their not even worth talking about.”  
(9) “FUCKING blacks, indians, pakis and polish and all of you! Go back to your own countries! 
Dont come over here and nick the jobs for us YOUNGERS! Fucking idiots!!!?” 
Borderline criminal statements: 
(1) “Why don't whites go to nigger and paki countries? Because whites are smarter and have better 
countries” 
(2) Niggers ruin everything they touch. Looks like they ruined Great Britain too”  
(3) “So what if whites are descended from Africans? We're smarter, less prone to violence, and in 
every way superior. Black people are lesser evolved apemen” 
(4) “Whites have achieved everything in human history, niggers, pakis and Irish haven't done 
anything.” 
Criminal statements: 
(1) “Dont speak but kill all the non whites on tram fucking invaders” 
(2) “DEATH TO THE WHITE RACE. KILL ALL WIPE THEM OUT” 
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(3) “I agree that racism is a huge problem, and I have an ingenious idea for how we can eradicate 
it. Simply kill all niggers, chinks, Jews, etc., and we won't have anyone to be racist against. 
Problem solved.” 
 
Effects of online hate 
(1) “Online posts, regardless of their content, are no more than words and can’t hurt anyone in the 
real-world.” 
(2) “Social divisions are not related to anything said online”. 
(3) “Online threats do not pose a threat to anyone in the real world”. 
(4) “It is okay to say nasty things online because words cannot hurt anyone in the real world”. 
(5) “Online hatred does not lead to offline hatred”. 
(6) “Racist online posts can lead to social divisions in real life”. 
 
Online versus offline hate 
(1) “Regardless of whether hate crimes are committed online or offline, all hate crimes are equally 
wrong.” 
(2) “Offline hate is worse than online hate because it can involve physical confrontation”. 
(3) “Not knowing who is targeting you is worse than knowing who is targeting you.” 
(4) “The effects of offline hate crimes are worse than those of online hate crimes.” 
(5) “Being targeted in person is worse than being targeted online.” 
(6) “Face-to-face physical threats are worse than anonymous online threats.” 
(7) “Online bullying affects people more than face-to-face bullying.” 
(8) “Being bullied online is worse than being bullied face-to-face.” 
(9) “Online hatred is worse than offline hatred because the re-victimisation is ongoing.” 
 
Freedom of expression 
(1) “No one should be allowed to say offensive things to hurt others online.” 
(2) “People should be allowed to say whatever they want regardless of whether this is online or 
offline.” 
(3) “People posting offensive things about others should be arrested.” 
(4) “Legislation should not dictate what people can or cannot say online.” 
(5) “You shouldn’t be allowed to say things online that you wouldn’t say to someone’s face.” 
(6) “The police should investigate all hateful online posts.” 
(7) “The police should arrest people posting hateful things online.” 
 
Responsibility-accountability 
Victim:  
(1) “It is your own responsibility to stop being bullied online by simply turning off the machine.” 
(2) “If people don’t like what they read online, they should just leave the site.” 
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(3) “People who are bullied online should simply ignore the bullies.” 
(4) “People being bullied online have only got themselves to blame.” 
Internet Service Providers: 
(1) “Internet Service Providers should be held responsible for investigating hateful online posts.” 
(2) “It is the Internet Service Providers’ responsibility to remove hateful content that has been 
posted on their websites.” 
(3) “Internet Service Providers are to blame for allowing offensive online posts on their websites.” 
Poster: 
“It is not the poster’s responsibility to consider how others might perceive their posts.” 
Police: 
“It’s not up to the police to investigate people posting hateful things about others online.” 
 
Online anonymity 
(1) “The evolving of the Internet doesn’t influence how anonymous I am online.” 
(2) “I am more anonymous on social media web sites, such as Twitter, than in face-to-face 
interactions.” 
(3) “I feel as anonymous as I did before the media recently highlighted the increased number of 
legal consequences for people posting hateful things online.” 
(4) The Internet doesn’t make me completely anonymous.” 
(5) Regardless of the recent increase in media coverage of the legal consequences of hateful online 
posting in social media, I feel I remain anonymous online.” 
(6) “I’d post nasty things online even if I didn’t actually mean them because no one knows it is 
me.” 
(7) “I feel less anonymous now since the number of legal consequences for people posting hateful 
things online increased (as reported by the media).” 
(8) “I feel as anonymous online as I did before the popularity of Twitter.” 
(9) “Recent publicised consequences for people posting nasty things on social media make me feel 
less anonymous online.” 
(10) “Since the introduction of Twitter, I don’t feel as anonymous online.” 
(11) “Before the introduction of smartphones I felt more anonymous online.” 
(12) “Anonymity doesn’t determine what I say towards others online.” 
(13) “On the Internet, I feel completely anonymous.” 
(14) “As the Internet becomes more advanced, I become less anonymous.” 
(15) “I feel as anonymous online as I did before the introduction of Facebook.” 
(16) “I feel bolder about expressing my opinions online than I do in person.” 
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(17) “I’d behave differently online if I knew I could be identified.” 
(18) “I wouldn’t say certain things online if my friends knew it was me in case they’d judge me.” 
(19) “I feel more anonymous online if I use a username (alias) instead of my real name.” 
(20) “I feel I can say things online that I would never say out loud.” 
(21) “I wouldn’t have posted certain things online, if I could be identified.” 
(22) “I felt more anonymous online before Facebook.” 
(23) “Current legal pressure on Internet service providers to reveal people’s identities when they 
behave badly online makes me feel less anonymous online.”  
(24) “I’d remove some things I previously posted online if I thought they could be traced back to 
me.” 
(25) “The recent increase in media coverage of investigations into hateful online posting makes me 
now feel less anonymous online.” 
(26) “Anonymity doesn’t determine how I behave online.” 
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Appendix XVI 
Participant Debrief (Chapter 5 – Study 4) 
Thank you for taking part in my survey. Whilst there is no direct benefit to you for your 
participation, the purpose of the survey was to investigate whether the attitudes towards anonymity 
on the Internet have changed all the time and whether perceptions of online hate much current 
legislation. Psychological research in the area of online hatred is relatively new whereas the 
Internet continues to evolve rapidly. Therefore, the possible relationship between anonymity and 
online hatred has not been explored yet. Specifically, we are interested in whether people perceive 
themselves to be anonymous online, given that there is more transparency on the Internet now than 
before. In addition, whilst there is relevant legislation regulating online hatred, we are also 
interested in whether people's perceptions on online hatred actually match this legislation. 
 
Given the nature of the survey, the posting of provocative statements was required in order to 
achieve its aims. Some of the statements use all reflect sentiments that could be subject to interest 
from the criminal justice system. The rationale was to be able to investigate whether people's 
perceptions of criminality match actual legislation governing hate speech. Therefore, whilst the 
statements were deliberately chosen for their provocative and illegal and/or offensive content, these 
do not reflect the views of the research team in any way! 
We hope that by examining the relationship between perceptions of anonymity and online hatred 
we will gain a better understanding of the issues surrounding this controversial topic. 
 
If you become distressed as a result of completing the survey staff and students can contact the 
University of Portsmouth counselling/well-being services on (023) 9284 3157 or via email 
wellbeing@port.ac.uk, or, if you are not a student or member of staff of the University of 
Portsmouth you can contact victim support on (0845) 303 0900, who will be able to put you in 
touch with an appropriate person to talk to. 
 
Please get in touch with either myself if you have any further concerns or questions. My contact 
details are as follows:  
Department of Psychology 
King Henry Building 
King Henry I Street 
Portsmouth 
Hampshire 
PO1 2DY 
Telephone (023) 9284 6614 
Email: Sarah.Rohlfing@port.ac.uk 
 
Thank you once again for agreeing to participate in the study! 
 
Sarah 
 
If the concern or complaint is not resolved by the principal investigator or supervisor, you should 
contact the head of department Dr Sherria Hoskins, Sherria.Hoskins@port.ac.uk 
If the complaint remains and resolved, please contact the University complaints officer (0239 284 
3642, complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk). 
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UPR16- Ethics Checklist 
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Appendix XVIII 
 Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapter 2) 
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 Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapter 3) 
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 Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapter 4) 
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 Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapter 5) 
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Appendix XXII 
 “Who is Really British Anyway?” A Thematic Analysis of Responses to Online Hate 
Materials- Publication Version (Cyberpsychology) 
“Who is really British anyway?”: A thematic analysis of 
responses to online hate materials 
Sarah Rohlfing1, Stefanie Sonnenberg2 
1,2 Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, UK 
Abstract 
This article aims to add to the relatively small body of literature on online hatred. In particular, it 
focuses on the role social networking sites may play in the development of polarisation, by exploring 
how online users respond to explicit online hate materials. Specifically, this article discusses the 
ways in which a self-selected sample of YouTube users responded, via posting online comments, 
to a video clip in which a White female train passenger (called Emma) could be seen to racially to 
abuse other passengers. Thematic analysis of the YouTube comments identified four main themes: 
(1) Making Sense of Emma, which encapsulated posters' attempts to find explanations for Emma’s 
behaviour; (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, which described posters’ attempts to oppose Emma’s 
racism by means of resorting to aggressive, hateful language; (3) Us versus Them, which 
encapsulated posters' tendencies to categorise themselves and other posters into in- and 
outgroups, based on their particular stance on racism; (4) Contesting Britishness, which expressed 
posters' attempts to articulate (and contest) what it means to be British. Whilst the current analysis 
provides some evidence that hateful web content can fuel aggressive and hateful responses, many 
of the comments analysed here emphasised common group membership, alongside people’s right 
to claim membership in a particular social category (i.e. Britishness). The current evidence, 
therefore, suggests that, at least in the specific context of this study, hateful web content may not 
necessarily lead to an automatic endorsement or escalation of hatred. 
Keywords: Thematic analysis; YouTube; online hatred; national identity; racism 
Introduction 
On the 21st of March 2016, 3,3 billion people worldwide were online (Internet Live Stats, 
2016a). The relatively recent emergence of social networking sites (SNSs) has 
contributed noticeably to the growing numbers of Internet users. For example, Facebook 
had 1.6 billion users in March 2016 (Internet Live Stats, 2016b), and YouTube claimed, 
that in 2015, one billion users visited its page per month (YouTube, n.d.). 
Despite their immense popularity, some SNSs have recently come under critical scrutiny. 
In Britain, for example, there is increasing government concern about the Internet’s role 
in the incitement of hatred, including racial hatred. There have also been claims by some 
researchers, advocacy groups, Internet service providers (ISPs), and charities that 
websites promoting hatred may contribute to the development and exacerbation of 
radical attitudes and behaviours and, as such, foster terrorist sympathies (e.g. Foxman 
& Wolf, 2013; Perry, 2000; Stern, 2002). However, to date, claims regarding the 
persuasive power of the Internet remain largely based on anecdotal observations, 
common sense assumptions, and on government concerns regarding the protection of 
members of the public. 
The existence of hateful materials online seems indisputable (e.g. it can be evidenced by 
certain key word searches). In addition, online hate materials, including propaganda 
video clips on websites, such as YouTube, are regularly found on computers seized from 
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terrorist suspects (e.g. the Boston Bombers, see: Robi, 2013; or the Lee Rigby 
murderers, see: Swinford, 2013). Consequently, lawmakers across the globe have begun 
to amend and develop legislation to account for the evolution of the Internet into a 
potential medium for stirring up and promoting hatred. In the United Kingdom alone, 
this legislation includes the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, the Public Order Act 
1986, the Malicious Communications Act, 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Communications Act 2003, the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Consequently, in the 
United Kingdom, several arrests and convictions have been made in relation to the 
publication and distribution of online materials with the intent to incite racial hatred (e.g. 
Colin White, see: BBC News, 2016; Ihjaz Ali, Kabir Ahmed, & Tazwan Javed, see: BBC 
News, 2012; Joshua Bonehill-Paine, see: Jewish News Online, 2015; Matthew Doyle, see: 
Burrows, 2016; Teenager, see: Crown Prosecution Service, 2010). Arrests have also 
been made in Australia, China, Dubai, Russia and Kazakhstan where several people have 
been convicted of inciting hate via social media, including ethnic hatred (e.g. Ai Takagi, 
see: AFP, 2016; Alkhanashvili, see: Kazakhstan Newsline, 2015; Mukhtar, see: Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty, 2015; Pu Zhiquaing, see: Phillips, 2015; Tatyana Shevtsova-
Valova, see: Latest.com, 2015), religious hatred (e.g. Yklas Kabduakasov, see: Spencer, 
2015; UAE national, see: Agarib, 2016) and extremism (e.g. Vadim Tyumentsev, see: 
Reuters, 2015). 
Academic research exploring online hatred has begun to emerge in several social 
sciences (mainly sociology and criminology). So far, this research has tended to have 
two main analytic foci, namely on providing (1) detailed descriptions of online hate 
materials or (2) characterisations of polarised individuals/groups. For example, research 
on online hate materials has focused on outlining the specific contents of hate-promoting 
websites and has provided insights into the use of propaganda to polarise and recruit 
new members to common ideological causes (e.g. Anti-Defamation League, 2005; 
Blazak, 2001; Bostdorff, 2004; Douglas, 2007; Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; 
Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003; Levin, 2002; McNamee, Peterson, & Peña, 2010; 
Perry, 2000; Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Zhou, Reid, Qin, Chen, & Lai, 2005). Research 
focusing on understanding the type of individual or group who produces hateful materials 
or hate speech online has tended to concentrate specifically on people who are already 
polarised, thus identifying not only some personality traits associated with hate speech 
but also some of the ways in which polarised individuals or groups share their ideology 
and deliberately use prejudice to create conflict between groups (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; 
Cammaerts, 2009; De Koster & Houtman, 2008; Doane, 2006; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; 
Ezekiel, 2002; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002; Green, Abelson, & Garnett, 1999; Jacks & 
Adler, 2015; Wojcieszak, 2010). 
However, thus far, research tapping into the broader processes underlying the 
development of online hatred remains limited – despite the reported increase in ‘hate 
blogging’, especially on SNSs, over time (e.g. Chau & Xu, 2007; Citron & Norton, 2011) 
and the recent surge in arrests and convictions for SNS-related hate offences. In 
particular, there is limited empirical evidence investigating how Internet users might 
respond to hateful online web content displayed on ordinary SNSs (i.e. YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter). In particular, whilst one might expect to come across 
hateful/polarising content on certain websites (i.e. English Defence League, Stormfront), 
one might not expect to see such content during their visit to their familiar SNSs. As a 
result, we know little about how Internet users might respond to or be influenced by 
hateful online materials displayed on SNSs. 
Many SNSs and online news web sites now allow, and even encourage, online users to 
express their views or responses to different web contents (including specific statements, 
pictures, video clips or TV programmes) via posting/commenting. These posts or 
comments are usually displayed publicly and, in turn, often seem to elicit further 
comments/posts from other users – who might agree or disagree with either the initial 
poster or with the web content in question. It seems therefore plausible that certain web 
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content could lead SNS users to respond to such content in a polarised manner. These 
polarised responses could, in turn, lead to (virtual) conflicts amongst SNS users. 
In fact, such virtual conflicts can be observed in so-called online ‘trolling’, where certain 
individuals (i.e. ‘trolls’) intentionally aim to stir responses amongst users. Trolling has 
been attributed to online anonymity (Hardaker, 2010; Herring, Job-Sluder, Scheckler, & 
Barab, 2002), which, in turn, links to the so called online disinhibition effect (ODE; Suler, 
2004). In particular, the ODE is thought to be the result of a lack of social constraints 
mediated, predominantly, by online anonymity (Joinson, 1998; Suler, 2004). Whilst not 
all behaviour associated with online disinhibition has to be negative (i.e. increased self-
disclosure), as noted above, online disinhibition can encompass negative communication, 
such as offensive language, harsh criticisms, anger, hatred and threats (Suler, 2004). 
Suler (2004) referred to this form of the ODE as ‘toxic’ online disinhibition. 
Accordingly, Coffey and Woolworth (2004) found that whilst people’s responses to an 
alleged racially motivated murder reported in an anonymous online newspaper 
discussion board resulted in expressions of insults, racism, abuse and hatred (i.e. 
polarisation), no such responses were observed when the incident was discussed in a 
face-to-face meeting. They consequently attributed these polarised responses expressed 
online to online anonymity. In addition, Peddinti, Ross, and Cappos (2014) found that 
compared to identifiable Twitter users, anonymous users were less inhibited in relation 
to their Twitter activity. They also found that there are more anonymous Twitter users 
following sensitive topics, such as pornography, than identifiable ones. 
Further, Doughty, Lawson, Linehan, Rowland, and Bennett (2014) found that 
controversial television broadcasts elicited many polarised (i.e. anti-social, abusive, 
negative, aggressive and hostile tweets - a phenomenon frequently referred to as 
‘flaming’ (O’Sullivan & Flanagin, 2003; Suler, 2004; Turnage, 2008). In Doughty et al.’s 
(2014) study ‘flaming’, which is described as a negative aspect of the ODE, tended to be 
directed at the individuals or specific communities depicted in these broadcasts. In 
addition, Lange (2007) and Moor, Heuvelman, and Verleur (2010) investigated possible 
causes of ‘flaming’ behaviour on YouTube and found that people predominantly ‘flamed’ 
to express their disagreement with certain video or comment content. They also found 
that a small number of users ‘flamed’ for mere entertainment (Moor et al., 2010) and 
enjoyment (Lange, 2007). Lange (2007) and Moor et al.’s (2010) findings also indicate 
that, although ‘flaming’ seems prevalent on YouTube, it is not always perceived to be 
harmful, even by the recipients or ‘targets’ of ‘flames’. 
Moreover, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) explored discursive strategies of racist and anti-
racist supporters expressed on online news web sites. They found that moral 
disengagement is a very common strategy used by those supporting racism in order to 
justify or ‘feel okay’ about their views. They also found that those who opposed racist 
views/acts rarely used this strategy when expressing their views online. Given that 
expressions of racial attitudes are no longer socially acceptable (Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960; Furnham, 1986; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007; Joinson, 1998; Steinfeldt et 
al., 2010), it does not seem surprising that moral disengagement is predominantly 
observed in those supporting racist attitudes. 
Current evidence therefore presents some strategies through which the expression of 
certain attitudes (i.e. racial) can be justified. In addition, it suggests that SNS content 
may not only facilitate discussions amongst online users but can also lead to attitude 
polarisation. However, to what extent does controversial web content succeed in 
influencing or changing people’s actual attitudes or views? 
Steinfeldt et al. (2010) found that online newspaper forums often provide misinformation 
about specific groups (i.e. American Indians, in their case) which, in turn, can reinforce 
existing negative stereotypes and thus facilitate the expression of racist attitudes. More 
specifically, Lee and Leets (2002) argue that White supremacist web content can 
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influence attitudes and views of polarised as well as ‘neutral’ adolescent online users. 
Furthermore, Rauch and Schanz (2013) found that, in the context of White supremacist 
online content, frequency of Facebook use influenced users in one of two ways. In 
particular, compared to infrequent Facebook users, frequent users were both more likely 
to agree with or reject racist messages (e.g. about White superiority), thus suggesting 
that those who frequently use Facebook are at higher risk of responding in a polarised 
manner to its content compared to those who infrequently use it. 
In sum, the evidence outlined above suggests that the content of materials posted on 
online forums or SNSs can influence and polarise the expression of people’s views as well 
as lead to online abuse– even in cases where the initial web content is not specifically 
problematic or hateful. Yet, the extent to which explicit online hate materials might elicit 
hateful responses in online users more generally remains unexplored. For example, given 
recent media coverage (e.g. Castle, 2013; McNab, 2015; Nirvana News, 2016; Poch, 
2015; Risen, 2014) focusing on the use of YouTube and other social media sites (e.g. for 
promoting domestic violence or for terrorist propaganda and recruitment), it seems 
increasingly likely that people come across hateful content without necessarily seeking 
to do so. This then, raises the question of how SNS users in general might respond 
to explicit hate materials. 
This study therefore aims to explore the following research question: How do YouTube 
users respond to online materials that can be described as explicitly inciting hatred? 
Our research question here is deliberately broad in order to allow for a qualitative, 
bottom-up and inductively-driven analytic approach – which has been deemed the most 
appropriate research strategy for under-researched areas (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is 
therefore important to stress that this study aims to offer an in-depth understanding of 
people’s responses to a very specific type of online hate material (i.e. a video clip with 
racist content) within a particular SNS context (i.e. YouTube). In other words, this study 
seeks to provide a detailed description of the qualitative nature of people’s online 
responses in a specific context – that is, it does not set out to make any claims about 
online responses to hateful materials in general. However, the authors hope that the 
qualitative findings outlined below will provide a springboard for further quantitative 
research in this field to evaluate the extent to which the key findings can be generalised. 
Method 
Materials 
Data source. This analysis was based on comments made by users of the social 
networking site YouTube in response to a particular video clip uploaded on its website. 
The video clip depicted a White woman who racially abused other passengers. The 
woman, later identified as Emma West, was travelling with her toddler son on the London 
underground in October 2011. The scene, which lasted approximately five minutes, was 
filmed by a passenger on his/her mobile phone who subsequently uploaded it on 28th 
November 2011 as a video clip onto YouTube (for a detailed description of the clip’s 
content, please see below). The clip prompted an unprecedented number of viewers to 
respond to its content via YouTube’s commenting feature – and these responses provided 
the raw data for this study. 
The nature of our choice of analytic materials was therefore somewhat opportunistic. In 
particular, when the video clip in question went viral online, the authors became aware 
of the analytic potential the accompanying comments presented for addressing the 
current research question. To the authors’ knowledge, the video clip was the first of its 
kind (in the UK) to have elicited such large numbers of views and comments. Using this 
data source, therefore, had several methodological advantages. First, the voluntary 
exposure of YouTubers to the clip’s content circumvented any ethical concerns an 
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experimental design (i.e. the experimental use of hateful stimuli) would have posed. 
Second, users’ voluntary choice to comment on the clip’s content was likely to render 
responses more ecological valid than responses elicited in experimental settings. Third, 
unlike in many laboratory experiments, there was no researcher engagement with 
‘respondents’, thus circumventing experimenter bias or social desirability effects. 
The time-frame for data collection, in turn, was determined by the sheer volume of online 
comments made in response to the YouTube clip. Forty-eight hours after the clip’s 
upload, the authors decided that the volume of comments was more than sufficient whilst 
still presenting a manageable analytic task. Also, the original video clip was removed at 
approximately the same time because the police started a criminal investigation of the 
woman depicted in the clip. 
Consequently, the original raw data consisted of 71.295 comments. The actual content 
of the video clip is described below, followed by an outline of the different types of 
YouTubers’ users’ responses the clip elicited after its upload, as well as the legal 
consequences Emma West (i.e. the woman depicted in the video clip) faced for her 
behaviour. 
Ethical considerations. The online comments (see above) that constituted the data 
source for this study were available within the public domain. As such, the responses 
were visible and freely accessible to anyone using YouTube. YouTube’s terms of service 
explicitly state that, by uploading/posting content (including comments) onto the site, 
users automatically consent to this content being used (i.e. reproduced, distributed, 
prepared in derivative works) by third parties. However, in order to ensure that the 
YouTubers whose comments formed the basis of the analysis could not be identified 
further, all user names were anonymised. 
The YouTube video clip. At the start of the video clip Emma West can be heard posing 
the rhetorical question “...what has the UK come to...” - which she then proceeds to 
answer herself by stating “...a load of black people and a load of f***ing Polish”. Emma 
then verbally attacks several fellow passengers for “not being English”, as well as telling 
them to “go back to their own country”. Next, a Black woman asks Emma to refrain from 
swearing for the sake of the children present on the train. In response, Emma demands 
the Black woman state which country she is from, to which the Black women responds 
that she, too, is English. Emma appears not to believe her. The clip continues by depicting 
Emma telling the same woman to “go back” to her “own country”. Emma then attempts 
to specify which country the Black woman should “go back” to; she is, however, unable 
to articulate this correctly. In particular, she refers to an awkward combination of the 
two countries Nicaragua and Siberia, which in this specific combination sounds to other 
passengers like the racially offensive term N****R. This, in turn, can be seen to upset a 
young Black man behind Emma so much that he stands up, visibly agitated, in response 
to which two fellow passengers immediately get up and quickly calm him down; he then 
returns to his seat. Shortly after, a young White woman can be seen to rush towards the 
upset young Black man and embrace him. During this, Emma can be seen to argue with 
other female passengers calling out “You ain’t f***ing British! You are Black!” Then a 
baby’s cries can be heard, to which a seemingly angry White woman steps forward and 
shouts at Emma to “shut up” for waking up her baby. The woman can then be heard 
stating that she is English and asking Emma what she has to say to her. Whilst the 
argument between the two women continues, the video clip finishes. 
Online YouTube responses. The video clip went viral after its upload and was viewed 
on YouTube more than 3 million times within the first 48 hours of its upload. Viewers’ 
responses included comments making death threats towards Emma, her child, and other 
YouTubers, general threats of violence, as well as offensive and racist comments, which 
resulted in YouTube’s removal of the clip from their website after approximately 48 
hours. Since then, Emma West was arrested and charged with a racially aggravated 
public order offence. Emma pleaded guilty to racially aggravated harassment, alarm or 
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distress. Additionally, several copies of the video clip have re-emerged on YouTube, 
resulting in an estimated 11 million views to date, including repeat viewings. 
Analytic Strategy 
Data preparation. YouTube comments to the video clip were first imported into 
Microsoft Word and then formatted uniformly (Arial, size 12 with single line and one 
paragraph spacing between posts) to provide visual ease during the analytic process. 
This also aided initial familiarisation with the content. Next, comments that solely 
consisted of Computer-Mediated-Communication (CMC) abbreviation acronyms (Baron, 
2004) such as LOL, and response tokens such as yeah, were deleted if the connection or 
relevance to other comments could not be easily established. Additionally, repeat 
comments made by the same users (i.e. displaying the same verbatim content) and 
comments made in a foreign language (30 in total) were deleted, leaving approximately 
71.000 comments for analysis. 
Data analysis. Based on the relative lack of existing research in this area, as well as 
the absence of an overall theoretical framework with which to account for how online 
users respond to online hate materials on SNSs, a bottom up, inductive approach to the 
data was taken. Overall, the thematic analytic process followed Allen, Bromely, Kuyken, 
and Sonnenberg’s (2009) procedure. Generally, Thematic Analysis (TA) permits for a 
degree of epistemological and theoretical flexibility and is therefore not bound or limited 
to any specific pre-existing theoretical framework - yet, it does allow for the 
consideration of relevant theories during the analytic process (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
This flexibility thus allows for the identification of themes at both the semantic (i.e. 
‘micro’) and the latent (i.e. ‘macro’) level of analysis (Allen et al., 2009; Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Given the broad inductive scope of our research question, both levels of analysis 
are drawn on here. 
The thematic analytic process involved reading and re-reading the entire data set several 
times to become more familiar with the data and to identify themes related to the overall 
research question. A theme was deemed as such if, first, it tapped into relevant aspects 
concerning the overall research question and, second, if it represented a response-trend 
across the entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Reading and re-reading the data set 
continued throughout the formulation of themes, ensuring that the final themes 
remained data driven and that the chosen YouTube extracts (i.e. comments) accurately 
illustrated the corresponding theme/sub-theme. Themes were compared and were either 
separated further to show different nuances in meaning, or grouped together according 
to their overlap with one another (Allen et al., 2009). This process allowed for the 
development of an analytic hierarchy, by ordering the data into overarching themes and 
corresponding sub-themes (Allen et al., 2009). An overarching theme was defined as 
such if it appeared to be more inclusive (i.e. higher in the thematic hierarchy) and 
possessed greater analytic scope and explanatory strength than a sub-theme (Gleibs, 
Sonnenberg, & Haslam, 2014). Overall, the aim of the thematic coding process was to 
identify and organise emerging themes that were internally homogenous, externally 
heterogeneous and had explanatory power (Allen et al., 2009). Attention was also paid 
to prevalence which was determined by the frequency of responses that illustrated each 
theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Results 
Overall, the majority of responses condemned the content of the video clip. Analysis of 
YouTube users’ responses to the video identified four overarching themes: (1) Making 
Sense of Emma, (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, (3) Us versus Them, and (4) Contesting 
Britishness, with the latter two being most prevalent. These main themes are examined 
in detail below under separate section headings. Each section includes a broad definition 
and a narrative description of the respective theme content as well as evidence from the 
actual online comments. Corresponding sub-themes will be presented as sub-headings. 
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It should be noted that here, as in other qualitative analyses (see Gleibs et al., 2014), is 
a degree of overlap between themes. For example, all themes reflect how posters, to 
some extent, attempted to position themselves (and other posters) in relation to racism. 
It should also be noted that many of the extracts below contain grammatical and spelling 
errors – which were only corrected in some cases to help clarify the meaning of these 
extracts. 
Making Sense of Emma 
Posters were obviously stirred by the content of the video clip and their responses often 
took a stance on racism. The video content seemed to evoke a range of negative 
emotions (i.e. expressions of distress) in several respondents. These emotions included 
shame (“Such a rude, ignorant women makes me ashamed to be British”), disgust and 
embarrassment (“You disgust me. You are the reason I am sometimes embarrassed to 
admit that I'm British.”), upset (“This video sickens me. She needs a reality check. I'm 
deeply upset by this footage.”), and shock (“I'm actually shocked! I can't believe what I 
have just watched?!"; “I am so shocked and appalled by this woman...”). 
Notably, respondents who expressed negative emotions condemned what they saw as 
Emma’s overt, racist behaviour. Many posters seemed to deal with what they had seen 
in the video clip by attempting to make sense of Emma and her behaviour. This sense-
making focused on Emma’s personal characteristics, and particularly on attempting to 
attribute Emma's behaviour to internal, intra-psychic processes (i.e. alcohol and/or drug 
consumption): 
OMG that woman is vile. And obviously either drunk or on drugs (judging 
from facial expressions and slurring). Luckily we don't all feel like her and 
she is one of a minority of people.. (Poster A) 
This extract demonstrates how many respondents who disagreed with Emma’s racist 
behaviour, tended to attribute her behaviour to negative personal characteristics, which, 
in turn, enabled them to distance themselves from Emma. This distancing is evidenced 
by “we don’t all feel like her and she is one of a minority” which, not only rejects racism 
but also positions the poster in opposition to Emma and other perceived racists and thus 
removes any basis for socially identifying with her. As will become clear later, the process 
of distancing also relates to another theme, namely Us versus Them. 
The link between disapproval of Emma’s behaviour and attempts to make sense of it by 
focusing on Emma’s perceived negative personal and socio-economic characteristics 
becomes even clearer in the extract below. Specifically, here the poster attempts to 
make sense of Emma’s behaviour by explicitly referring to her perceived low intelligence, 
low education, and low socio-economic status. Moreover, here these personal 
characteristics (i.e. negative stereotypes) are seen to be associated directly with racist 
attitudes: 
The fact she can't string her opinions without saying F*** says a lot more 
about her intelligence. would she happen to be on benefits and live in a 
council home by any chance? Its usually those people that moan about 
others but are happy to scrounge benefits and freebies of others who work 
in Britain and pay taxes like the people she insults (Poster B) 
Here, there is an allusion to Emma’s racism as a direct consequence of her perceived low 
intelligence and low socio-economic status. In particular, these attributions seem to 
serve primarily to label Emma as a racist – in other words, as one of “those people” (i.e. 
an out-group member). Here, this strategy to position Emma as a racist (i.e. an out-
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group member) further seems to serve as a means of making sense of Emma’s 
behaviour. 
In addition to explaining Emma’s behaviour on the basis of a perceived lack of education, 
the following extract invokes a comparison between Emma and immigrants (i.e. 
immigrants "have more skills" and better work ethics than Emma). This comparison 
further serves as a way of discrediting Emma. The poster also tries to makes sense of 
Emma’s behaviour by linking it to a particular lifestyle (i.e. sexual transgression and 
work avoidance), which has been linked with poverty (Parisi, 1998): 
This is what happens when u don't get an education that informs you of the 
realities of immigration. immigrants of all races have to work twice as hard 
to get jobs here and often have many more skills, in speaking several 
languages. I wonder what this ignorant fuck's skills are? probably shagging 
around and talking about how 'blacks' have ruined the country when she 
probably has never held down a job in her life! (Poster C) 
Making sense of Emma’s behaviour was also often associated with reference to Emma’s 
role as a mother (i.e. "a bad mother" and "a bad role model"). In particular, responses 
frequently expressed concern for Emma's child, such as “I feel sorry for her little boy”, 
“she (i.e. Emma) used the child as a shield”, “I hope social services will take her child 
away", or “poor child”. This, then, corresponds to broader strategies that have been 
observed in the media (Thomas, 1998) which aim to discredit single mothers through 
negative stereotyping and their portrayal as immoral and neglectful. 
By referring to Emma and/or other perceived racist posters in hateful terms, comments 
frequently went beyond simply trying to make sense of Emma’s behaviour, attempting 
to take a stance on racism: 
Most of,if not all of the people backing this horrible cunt are unemployed 
dole spongers who use foreigners as an excuse for not getting a job.Waists 
of space racist pricks. most of the English football team are black. Show 
some respect (Poster D) 
This, then, goes beyond trying to make sense of Emma: here, insulting and negatively 
stereotyping Emma and other racists serves to demonstrate the poster’s opposition to 
their views. As will be seen, this use of hostile and aggressive language also links to the 
next theme (i.e. Meeting Hatred with Hatred). Also, the poster’s reference here to the 
ethnic diversity of the English football team – a symbol of national pride – foreshadows 
the final theme Contesting Britishness. 
Overall, Making Sense of Emma encapsulated respondents’ attempts to understand and 
explain Emma. Specifically, respondents drew on a range of negative stereotypes both 
on a personal level (i.e. invoking alcohol/drug abuse, low intelligence, low education, 
‘bad mother/role model’) and a social level (i.e. invoking a low socio-economic status) 
in order to account for Emma’s behaviour and to distance themselves from (Emma’s) 
racist views by positioning her as ‘other’ (i.e. an out-group member). This process 
frequently involved the use of strong, hateful language as the following extract 
illustrates:  
Its funny how this silly lady thinks its 'the blacks' that are ruining her country 
when she is sitting on a tram with her son clearly on drugs and carrying on 
and the only person decent enough to tell her not to swear in front of kids 
is black..... I know who I would rather live next door two, the black lady and 
not the coked up whore. (Poster E) 
Meeting Hatred with Hatred 
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This thick bitch would have got kicked the fuk out of by me the dik head in 
the back that takes his bag off why didnt he do anything.. Faggot bitch 
would get killed lil tart if i was there i would kill the bitch !!!! FUK YU DIE 
BITCH (Poster F) 
This extract epitomises the essence of Meeting Hatred with Hatred as another 
overarching theme in this analysis. In particular, comments encapsulated by this theme 
depicted posters’ tendency to strongly object to Emma's behaviour by means of 
demeaning and dehumanising her. Specifically, and somewhat paradoxically, many 
posters responded to Emma’s behaviour by using hateful (including racist/abusive) and 
aggressive language, such as “she has a mentality like Hitler”, “she shouldn’t be allowed 
to breed”, “ugly ass throwback gobshite of a tredless bucketpussy usless eater oxygen 
thieving minus 80 I.Q”, “lazy”, "whore", "cunt", "chav", “slag”, “anti-social, scum-sucking 
retard”, "pikey", “albino monkey”, or “honkey”. This use of hateful language in response 
to Emma's behaviour seems paradoxical in so far as it reflects an attempt to counter 
Emma’s apparent racism and hatred with further expressions of hatred (hence Meeting 
Hatred with Hatred). 
Along similar lines, posters frequently dehumanised Emma by referring to her as “a piece 
of filth”, "gutter trash", “White trash”, “mosh mault”, “monstrosity”, “plankton”, “a 
thing” or a "scum (bag)". These terms invoke a perceived lack of humanity on Emma’s 
part, thus placing her outside ‘normal’ human society and calling for her social exclusion 
(e.g. into "the sewer/gutter/trash", a place where society discards its unwanted waste). 
The dehumanisation of Emma thus represents another way in which posters attempted 
to distance themselves from her and the video’s content. 
In addition, posters who condemned Emma’s behaviour called for her punishment, albeit 
on a symbolical level rather than a literal one. For example, posters referred to “this lazy 
sponging cunt should be put down by a vet. Although animals are better looking that 
that scum.I sugest she goes back to where she came from the sewer”. As these examples 
illustrate, Emma’s dehumanisation and calls for her punishment frequently went hand in 
hand – indeed, the latter seemed predicated on the former. These calls for punishment 
seemed to underscore further posters’ apparent opposition to racism. Further calls for 
Emma’s punishment included “hitting her”, “knocking her out", “beating her”, “stabbing 
her”, “slashing her throat”, "deporting her", "locking her up in the sewer with the rats", 
or to "rot in hell" – which, again, highlight posters’ opposition to Emma's views and 
behaviour. 
Overall, Meeting Hatred with Hatred encapsulated one particular method posters used to 
express their disagreement with the video clip’s content. In other words, in their use of 
aggressive, abusive, threatening, and hateful language, posters attempted to distance 
themselves from Emma’s expressions of racism. These attempts at distancing are also 
evident in the following theme. 
Us versus Them 
This prevalent theme describes how posters attempted to either distance themselves 
from or affiliate with Emma and her views by invoking a sense of “us” versus “them”. 
This, in turn, echoes previous work focussing social identity processes (e.g. Blackwood, 
Hopkins, Reicher, 2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). For example, posters 
condemning Emma tended to position themselves alongside other posters who shared 
their own seemingly anti-racist position – whilst, at the same time, distancing themselves 
from those who advocated or supported Emma's views (and vice versa). In particular, 
those posters who did not share Emma's views tended to refer to her and those who 
shared her views, as ‘them’ - in other words, as out-group members. Posters opposing 
racism also tended to refer to other like-minded YouTube users as us, that is, as in-group 
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members. Us versus Them consisted of two sub-themes that were labelled Sense of 
Injustice and Sense of Deprivation. 
As already indicated, many posters condemned racist views and consequently distanced 
themselves from Emma: 
@Participant X1: […] All racism is wrong. This woman is an embarassment 
to where I come from. Hate engenders hate. Even the biggest, most 
intolerant racists must recognise exceptions to their misplaced and ignorant 
rules. Why not try giving everyone the benefit of the doubt? I don't want to 
be mistaken for someone like you, or this stupid woman on the video, so 
why should I assume anything about anyone else? (Poster G) 
This poster distances him/herself from racism in two ways: first, on a social level, by 
calling “all racism wrong” and by labelling racists, as a group, as “intolerant” and 
“ignorant” and second, on a personal level, by describing Emma in negative terms, calling 
her an “embarrassment”, “stupid”, and “I don’t want to be mistaken for (i.e. associated 
with) someone like you” (i.e. someone with racist views). Conversely, posters supporting 
Emma’s views attempted to distance themselves from immigrants and immigration 
supporters: 
@Participant X2: True, that was adorable how she stood up for her race and 
the bravery to say what everyone was thinking in front of adversity and to 
all the immigrant invaders who came to enforce their foreign oppressive 
laws and genocide [on] the land of the indigenous Whites. (Poster H) 
This comment displays categorical thinking through its use of distancing pronouns, such 
as “their” foreign oppressive laws, implying that laws were not voted for or made 
by us (i.e. here, White people). Consequently, the poster here distinguishes between the 
in-group self (i.e. the ‘us’ supporting Emma’s views) and ‘the other’ or out-group (i.e. 
those opposing Emma). Specifically, the above terminology depicts ‘us’ as good, while 
‘they’ are bad. Here, the contrast between negative terms, such as “invaders”, 
“oppressive”, “genocide”, “indigenous White", and positive terms, such as “adorable”, 
“stood up” and “bravery” emphasises the distinction between the in-group and out-group 
(i.e. perceived racial differences). The term ‘genocide’ here also links to a perceived 
threat, ostensibly posed by immigrants, to posters’ social identity (i.e. social identity 
threat; Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Reicher et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 
2013) which will be discussed in more detail under Contesting Britishness. 
Some comments in support of Emma not only created a sense of Us versus Them through 
use of in-/out-group defining pronouns, but also by displaying high levels of hostility 
towards out-group members, as illustrated in the following quote: 
GOOD FOR HER! THEY CAN ALL FUCK OFF BACK TO WHERE THEY BELONG, 
AND THE TRAITORS WHO BROUGHT THEM TO THE U.K. MUST BE ARRESTED 
AND FUCKNG EXECUTED FOR TREASON!!! FUCK OFF! FUCK OFF! FUCK 
OFF!!! (Poster I) 
This comment clearly demonstrates the poster’s positive self-representation and 
negative other-representation, through out-group defining pronouns (i.e. they/them) 
and, in doing so, distances him/herself not only from ‘foreigners’ (i.e. ‘they’ do not 
‘belong’ in the UK), but also from those people in the UK who support immigration (i.e. 
"traitors", who should be "executed for treason"). 
This hostility towards immigration supporters indicates a certain degree of conflict as the 
recipients of this hostility also belong to a potential us (i.e. the British). Here, British 
nationals supporting immigration are categorised as out-group members by those 
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opposing immigration which suggests that hostility expressed towards ostensible out-
group members serves as a strategy to create inter-group conflict and justify action 
against them. 
Overall then, Us versus Them tapped into broad social identity processes. That is, the 
theme and its two subordinate themes (see below) encapsulated posters' attempts to 
position themselves and other posters in line with the construction of in- and out-groups. 
As such, respondents' positioning frequently drew on the issue of immigration – which is 
exemplified by the following sub-themes, Sense of Injustice and Sense of Deprivation. 
Sense of injustice. This sub-theme illustrates the way in which posters constructed a 
sense of Us versus Them by invoking immigration. In particular, those who voiced racist 
views tended to express their perceived sense of injustice by claiming that immigrants 
receive preferential treatment. Respondents who opposed racist views tended to argue 
that everyone “born in Britain” should be considered "just as British as we (i.e. White 
British) are" and therefore "have the same rights to live in Britain" (i.e. here, a sense of 
injustice consisted of denying immigrants their right to claim to be born in Britain as 
Britishness). These types of responses also related to notions of ‘Britishness’ and link to 
the final theme Contesting Britishness. There were also many posters who argued that 
immigration was an inevitable consequence of Britain's colonial history: 
Hey lady - you don't like people from other countries or ethnic backgrounds 
in your country or calling them British or English - you guys started it! 
invading and looting all those other countries, staying in India, Pakistan, 
parts of Africa etc - now it's our turn!! PS. - rest of Britain who aren't racist 
like this stupid cow - we love you, we love your pubs, your beer & stouts, 
your football and your culture. Peace! (Poster J) 
Again, here, a sense of Us versus Them is created through use of specific out-group-
defining pronouns (i.e. you and your to address Emma and other British people), and in-
group defining pronouns (i.e. our and we in relation to members of other countries and 
ethnic minorities). The poster also proclaims immigration an inevitable and direct 
consequence of British colonialism. In particular, his/her references 
to invading and looting express a sense of unfairness and injustice towards people from 
Britain's former colonies. Whilst this also suggests that s/he identifies as non-British, the 
poster also distinguishes between two different versions of British identity, namely a 
non-racist and racist British one, thereby differentiating between different types of British 
national group membership. 
There were, however, also posters who endorsed Emma's stance on immigration: 
[…] Islamic extremests do run round screaming "kill the infidel" and the 
police stand by and do absilutely nothing!. One law for black and another 
for white isn't working, any more than a housing or education policy that 
discriminates against established nationals, and merely fosters disharmony. 
(Poster K) 
Although this poster does not directly categorise him/herself as a member of a specific 
in-group, this comment creates a sense of Us versus Them (i.e. Islamists extremists and 
Black people versus White people) through ethnic stereotyping. In particular, this post 
implies that all Muslims are Islamic extremists and not White – a misleading fusion which 
is likely to reinforce existing negative stereotypes. More specifically, the comment 
expresses discontent concerning the British establishment (i.e. laws and government 
policy), whereby the British criminal justice system is accused of unjustly differentiating 
between groups by "discriminating against established nationals”. 
Whilst the poster in the above extract implicitly suggests that current laws/policies are 
unfair and contribute towards social division, other posters accused the British 
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government and criminal justice system explicitly of committing injustices against those 
who are ‘really British’. Specifically, their sense of injustice referred to accusations of 
perceived persecution of ‘real Brits’ for ‘minor crimes’, such as "expressing politically 
incorrect views", whilst maintaining that ‘severe’ crimes, such as "murder", "rape", or 
"burning poppies in the street", committed by those ‘non-British’ (i.e. immigrants) 
"remain unpunished". 
Thus, some responses to the video clip accused the British government of applying 
different rules to different people (i.e. favouring immigrants and discriminating against 
‘the British’) - which directly related to posters’ own attempts to differentiate between 
groups (i.e. Us versus Them). This sense of injustice (i.e. the claim that the 
establishment unjustly differentiates between groups) here also relates to the next sub-
theme. 
Sense of deprivation. The comments falling under this sub-theme conveyed posters’ 
sense of feeling deprived. In particular, those holding racist and anti-immigration views 
tended to express a sense of deprivation via creating a sense of Us versus Them (i.e. 
here ‘us’ versus ‘foreigners’). Some posters blamed ‘foreigners’ for their own financial 
insecurity and unemployment, including familiar phrases, such as “they take our jobs”, 
“they are prioritised for housing” and “they receive special benefits and free health care”, 
whilst "we lose out to them”. Consequently, and as illustrated in the following extract, 
posters also expressed their sense of deprivation by drawing explicit group distinctions 
(i.e. racial out-grouping): 
I wish more people would stand up for what they believe in we have a 
freedom of speech but somehow this has been withdrawn with this and 
why??? she has an opinion and is expressing it..... if people are offended 
then sorry they shouldn't watch it or be here to be offended against it..... 
we have got too many immigrants due to legislation..... and what a load of 
**** it is..... white population lose out on housing jobs and benefits because 
of foreigners..... how is that fair??? (Poster L) 
The above reference to "the white population losing out on housing, jobs, and benefits 
because of foreigners..." not only suggests a sense of deprivation in general but, 
particularly, a sense of ‘us’ being deprived compared to ‘them’ (i.e. see fraternal relative 
deprivation; Runciman, 1966). For instance, ‘our’ (i.e. White British) socio-economic 
insecurity is here, blamed on ‘them’ (i.e. immigrants). 
Overall, the theme Us versus Them reflected social identity processes as posters 
attempted to distinguish between different in- and out-groups (e.g. Blackwood et al., 
2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). In 
particular, posters attempted to align themselves with other posters whose views they 
shared (Us) and to differentiate themselves from those whose views they opposed 
(versus Them). In doing so, comments frequently touched on notions of ‘Britishness’ – 
and thus specifically on the issue of who should be included in this social category and 
who constitutes Us. This then, relates to Contesting Britishness, the final theme, to which 
we will turn next. 
Contesting Britishness 
In the majority of posts, attempts were made to define what it means to be British by 
constructing and contesting different versions of British national identity. Here, posters 
did not simply try to position themselves in relation to Emma - instead, this theme 
indicates the extent to which respondents attempt to go beyond taking a specific stance 
on racism. In particular, this prevalent theme describes posters’ ambivalence about the 
notion of ‘Britishness’ or national identity content, by capturing the ways in which 
comments contested the criteria by which ‘Britishness’ should appropriately be 
defined. This is perhaps unsurprising especially as the video clip showed Emma 
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challenging the British identity of a Black fellow passenger (i.e. referring to her as non-
British). Also, given the diversity of YouTube users, one might expect variations in 
posters’ references to national identity and sense of Britishness. 
Whilst endorsement of racist views and an anti-immigration stance need not necessarily 
go hand in hand, there frequently appeared to be a degree of overlap between the two. 
For example, here, respondents who positively embraced immigration did not always 
seem to differentiate between racism on the one hand and anti-immigration on the other. 
They therefore frequently referred to those who rejected immigration as racists. 
Overall, respondents’ accounts of the criteria defining ‘Britishness’ ranged from being 
“multi-cultural", "tolerant", "accepting of others", "patriotic", "born in Britain", "White", 
to "holding a British passport", or rejecting the existence of ‘true Britishness’ altogether: 
She doesn't have respect. No one is PURE english no more, not even the 
queen and the royal family is and I bet she isn't either. I'm mixed my father 
is english and my mum's thai, I was born here in the UK and I am a BRITISH. 
I follow every thing she does. .. I do the same as she, what just because My 
mum's from a different country? Just because these people are different 
colour means there not British.. HOW SHE WAS SAYING THIS IS MY 
BRITAIN.. NO BITCH THIS IS OUR BRITAIN. LIVE WITH IT! (Poster M) 
Here, the poster clearly rejects Emma's version of ‘Britishness’ and, particularly, the view 
that anyone can be considered ‘purely’ British – including the ultimate symbol of 
‘Britishness’, namely the Royal Family (ETHNOS, 2005). In particular, s/he rejects the 
idea that ‘Britishness’ can be determined by one's skin colour. In doing so, this poster 
not only distances him/herself from Emma's views, s/he also implicitly affirms 
immigrants’ and non-White people’s right to claim a British identity. 
The following two sub-themes relate to the degree to which the boundaries of 
‘Britishness’ are understood as inclusive of ‘others’. These were Britishness Under 
Threat, in which multiculturalism was claimed to be either the ‘undoing’ of ‘Britishness’ 
or, conversely, as its very essence, and “We are all Immigrants”, in which notions of 
'Britishness’ were explicitly linked to Britain’s history. 
Britishness under threat. The content of a number of posts seemed to express fears 
that Britain might be ‘losing’ its ‘Britishness’ due to immigration. In particular, these 
fears tended to relate to posters’ perceived inability/restriction to express their 
‘Britishness’ (i.e. not being allowed to “fly the George Cross on St. George's Day”, or to 
“refer to Christmas”). In other words, here, ‘Britishness’ is seen to be under threat. Along 
the same lines, some posters expressed a sense of identity threat by references to 
“cultural genocide” or “cultural cleansing” in relation to immigration. Here, such 
references create a sense of social identity threat (Branscombe et al., 1999; Reicher et 
al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2013) amongst those supporting Emma whilst simultaneously 
invoking conflict with the perceived out-group (i.e. foreigners). 
Interestingly, most posters who self-identified as English appeared to endorse a British 
national identity (rather than an English one). In particular, respondents who explicitly 
referred to their English heritage rarely voiced concerns about losing their Englishness – 
instead, when national identity was seen to be under threat this tended to be expressed 
in terms of the British losing their ‘Britishness’. In addition, posters frequently 
differentiated between a British we/this country from a non-British them/other 
countries (Condor, 2000): 
She has a valid point, albeit her language is really strong. The white, working 
classes in this country are becoming increasingly marginalised by the flood 
of immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe.She's frustrated and 
angry. The present and preceding governments have failed her for years, 
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and all she sees on public transport are ugly, threatening black and brown 
faces.Welcome to Tony 'War Criminal' Blair's vision of Britain for the 21st 
century. (Poster N) 
Here, the British government is reproached for allowing “the flood of immigrants” into 
Britain – the poster thus distances him/herself from the government’s vision of Britain. 
This distancing is further emphasised by stating that the government “have failed” the 
“White working classes” which, together with references to “ugly, threatening black and 
brown faces”, underscore the poster’s sense of threat to his/her national identity. Also, 
the poster’s use of the term "marginalisation" is interesting here. First, the term conveys 
a sense of (relative) deprivation for which s/he holds immigrants responsible (see also 
above). Second, the use of this particular term here expresses a sense of identity threat 
by implying that White people have become a minority in Britain. 
However, many other posters rejected this notion of Britishness Under 
Threat altogether. These posters argued in favour of immigration, suggesting that it 
enhances and enriches ‘Britishness’. This, in turn, was linked to calls for greater equal 
rights in terms of who should be allowed to call themselves British: 
I'm British (white) and know I have no greater right to call myself British 
than those who became citizens today. I hope the ignorant minority of white 
nationalists will flow into our cultural past, but I doubt it. No society ever 
lives without ignorance, prejudice or racism completely. I would say I'm 
ashamed of this woman but I see no connection between myself an her just 
because of our race. Don't get frustrated by her ignorance, Britain's a 
multicultural society, an I'm proud of that. (Poster O) 
Here, then, multiculturalism becomes the very essence of what it means to be British – 
which is in direct opposition to the views and behaviour depicted in the YouTube video. 
The poster clearly dis-identifies with Emma (i.e. "see no connection with her") and 
distances him/herself from White nationalists in general (i.e. by referring to them as 
"ignorant"). Rather than threatening British national identity, here multiculturalism is 
construed as defining ‘Britishness’. 
Other posters argued that throughout British history different cultural groups came to 
Britain and therefore shaped ‘Britishness’. This not only gives people the right to call 
themselves British, it also undermines ‘Britishness’ as a fixed category. Some posters 
even suggested that “We (i.e. the British) are all Immigrants” – a claim which we will 
discuss next. 
“We are all immigrants”. Many YouTube comments explicitly and positively embraced 
immigration, especially given Britain’s colonial history. For example, some posters 
responded to those rejecting immigration by suggesting that, under British Empire rule, 
people from British colonies had not only been encouraged but, at times forced, to live 
in Britain: 
Did anybody force the British to buy African slaves? By buying Africans, they 
made them British. The same history told me that the British used extreme 
force to capture several African settlements. They even sent the leaders of 
some of these settlements into exile. An example is King JaJa of Opobo. The 
British traveled for Months to look for Africa. They found Africa and raped 
her. They have to bear the consequences of their actions. No complaints is 
entertained from any British about Africans (Poster P) 
This then raises the issue of who has the right to call him/herself British and bestow this 
identity on others. The specific argument here is that African descendants have the same 
right to call themselves British based on their ancestral history. Here, people who reject 
immigration are being reminded, that, although Britain’s colonial history might appear 
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glorious to some, British history is rooted in the (bleak) past of those living in the colonies 
– which, in turn, here justifies immigration. 
The YouTube comments also challenged Emma’s concept of ‘Britishness’ by referring to 
Britain’s pre-colonial history. For example, some posters undermined Emma’s notion of 
‘Britishness’ by suggesting that: 
if you look at the history of britain [we] are pretty much all immigrants… a 
mix of roman and saxons and norman and viking… further back you hav the 
celts and the picts… who came from somewhere else in europe… (Poster Q) 
Again, the argument here is that ‘Britishness’ is, in fact, a function of the nation’s cultural 
diversity – and as this diversity is evident in ancient British history, no one should thus 
be considered more or less British. The implication here is that there is no inherent or 
fixed essence to ‘Britishness’; instead, as Britain’s history and present continue to be 
shaped by cultural diversity and multiculturalism, what it means to be British evolves 
and expands. This position, then, lead to an advocacy of tolerance and diversity, which 
is reflected in the following extract: 
There are good and bad in every race. Every one has a right to there own 
opinion but no one has the right to disrespect and abuse people based on 
there race and religion this is not freedom of speech. White people are not 
the only ones who contribute to this country every where you go you will 
see black and brown doctors, teachers, politicians, police officers and 
soldier’s many have died for this country. Do you know why? Because this 
is our country! We are different but equal! Peace (Poster R) 
Overall, as a prevalent theme, Contesting Britishness encapsulated attempts to define 
‘Britishness’– in other words, it captured efforts to define ‘us’. Specifically, respondents 
contested the criteria that determine who should and should not qualify as British, which 
often related to immigration. This contestation sometimes included perceived threats to 
posters’ sense of Britishness (i.e. social identity threat; Branscombe et al., 1999; Reicher 
et al., 2008). However, for many others, Britishness constituted a broad, flexible and 
evolving social category with immigration/multiculturalism at its very heart. 
In sum, the current analysis indicates that YouTubers responded to explicit hate 
materials by attempting to define or contest the meaning of posters’ national (i.e. here, 
predominantly British) identity. Responses also frequently served to position users 
according to their stance on racism. As such, whilst some YouTubers responded in a 
racist, aggressive and abusive manner, the majority of posters did not automatically 
endorse, or raise their responses beyond, the level of hatred displayed in the video clip. 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to explore how general users of a particular SNS (i.e. 
YouTube) responded to online materials which could be construed as explicitly inciting 
hatred. To address this objective, comments in response to a YouTube video clip which 
depicted ‘Emma’, a White female train passenger racially abusing other passengers, were 
analysed. 
Thematic Analysis (TA; Braun & Clarke, 2006) identified four superordinate themes: 
(1) Making Sense of Emma, (2) Meeting Hatred with Hatred, (3) Us versus Them, and 
(4) Contesting Britishness. Making Sense of Emma depicted attempts to explain Emma 
and her behaviour by invoking both intra-personal and social level explanations (i.e. 
alcohol/drug abuse, lack of intelligence, lack of educational and/or low socio-economic 
status) which also served to distance posters from Emma. Meeting Hatred with 
Hatred captured ‘inflamed’ responses to the video clip’s content where hateful language 
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was used, including calls for symbolic punishment, to express opposition to Emma and 
the views embodied by her. Us versus Them captured posters’ attempts to construct in- 
and out-groups in order to position themselves according to their own stance on racism. 
This positioning frequently occurred with reference to immigration and related to 
expressions of a sense of injustice and perceived relative deprivation. The final 
theme, Contesting Britishness, depicted attempts to define (or contest) the British 
national identity, especially in relation to Britain’s colonial history and immigration. 
Whilst some YouTubers expressed a sense of their national identity being under threat, 
others suggested that there is no such thing as ‘Britishness’ – and, for some, 
immigration/ multiculturalism constituted the very essence of ‘Britishness’. These 
themes link to existing theories as well as previous empirical findings which will be 
discussed below. 
Posters frequently attempted to distance themselves from Emma’s behaviour by 
positioning her as an out-group member (i.e. a racist). This, in turn, was achieved 
through invoking negative stereotypes (i.e. low intelligence, low socio-economic and 
single mother status) and the use of hateful, dehumanising language. Similar distancing 
strategies have been observed in previous work (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & 
Woolworth, 2004; Douglas et al., 2005; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; 
Moghaddam, 2005; Mols & Jetten, 2014; Steinfeldt et al., 2010) where the use of 
(hateful) language has been described as a means of creating negative social 
comparisons and reinforcing existing stereotypes – or ‘othering’. Here, this ‘othering’ 
strategy served not only as a means of Making sense of Emma but, paradoxically, also 
led to Meeting hatred with hatred, as expressed in Emma’s dehumanisation. 
The dehumanision of perceived out-group members has been observed previously as a 
common linguistic ‘othering’ strategy (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; 
Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016; Moghaddam, 2005). Dehumanisation of perceived of out-group 
members has also been associated with attempts to foster a sense of moral 
righteousness or moral disengagement (Cammaerts, 2009; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016) and 
the creation of a sense of in-group superiority (Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley, & Muntele 
Hendres, 2012; Mumford et al., 2008). For instance, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) found 
that racists used moral disengagement strategies such as dehumanisation to justify 
expressions of their views. Interestingly, in this study, dehumanisation was used by both 
those who supported or opposed racist attitudes to justify expressing their views. In line 
with this, some sub-themes (i.e. Sense of deprivation, Sense of injustice and Britishness 
under threat) echo some of Faulkner and Bliuc’s (2016) moral disengagement themes. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested (e.g. Moghaddam, 2005) that one of the functions 
of dehumanisation is to enable in-group members to justify punitive treatments of 
individual out-group members and out-groups – which, in this study, was reflected in 
posters’ demands for Emma’s symbolic punishment. Similar calls for symbolic 
punishment have also been observed in other online hate contexts (e.g. Angie et al., 
2011; Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et al., 2014; Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012). Some 
posters’ attempts to counter Emma’s apparent racism with further expressions of hatred 
(i.e. Meeting hatred with hatred) seem to be in line with existing ‘flaming’ research 
(Coffey & Woolworth, 2004; Doughty et al., 2014, Lange, 2007; Moor et al., 2010). In 
particular, there was some evidence of ‘flaming’ (i.e. use of aggressive/abusive/racist 
language to oppose certain web content) in the online comments examined here. 
Specifically, posters appeared to use hateful language, or ‘flames’, not only to express 
their disagreement with the video clip, but also in order to mirror the norms conveyed 
in the video clip (i.e. as evidenced by Emma’s own aggressive, racist, insulting and 
hostile language and behaviour). This corresponds to previous research on online 
aggression which suggests that aggressive expressions on the Internet are often a 
reaction to perceived aggression from others (Law, Shapka, Domene, & Gagne, 2012). 
The most prominent themes identified in the current analysis – namely, Us versus 
Them and Contesting Britishness – explicitly tapped into social identity processes and, 
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as such, not only correspond to previous findings but also fit within a broader social 
identity approach (Blackwood et al., 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; Turner et al., 1987; Verkuyten, 2013). For example, Angie et al. (2011) relate the 
use of negative stereotyping and categorical thinking – as evidenced by ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
– to social identity formation. In particular, Angie et al. (2011) found the use of 
categorical thinking more prominent in non-violent ideological groups than in violent 
ones. Categorical ‘us-versus-them’ thinking was also observed by Blackwood et al. 
(2012), Bliuc et al. (2012) and Reicher et al. (2008). In line with previous work, in order 
to confirm their identification with like-minded respondents, or their group identity (i.e. 
here, non-racists), many posters in this study adopted similar categorical thinking 
strategies to those identified in previous work (e.g. Angie et al., 2011; Charteris-Black, 
2006). 
Posters who supported Emma’s behaviour also distinguished between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – 
specifically by using terminology that depicted ‘us’ as good and ‘them’ as bad. This, too, 
corresponds to previous observations that positive self-representation is often pitched 
against negative other-presentation (Douglas et al., 2005; Verkuyten, 2013) in order to 
create negative social comparisons which, in turn, aims to establish a sense of legitimacy 
and to persuade like-minded others (Charteris-Black, 2006). Here, negative other-
presentations was frequently linked to expressions of a sense of injustice or relative 
deprivation. For example, posters who endorsed Emma’s views tended to claim that 
immigrants and ethnic minorities were in receipt of preferential treatment by the State 
or by the police - which, in turn, mirrors previous findings (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 
2004; Douglas et al., 2005; Mols & Jetten, 2014). These posters also invoked the notion 
of socio-economic insecurity as a consequence of immigration; attributing blame to 
immigrants has previously been linked to scapegoating, disgruntled sentiments, 
prejudice and hate crimes towards minority groups (Bowling & Phillips, 2003; Sibbitt, 
1997; Young, 1999; for a detailed review see Walters, 2011).3 
Taken together, these findings closely relate to the concept of social identity threat 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Reicher et al., 2008, Verkuyten, 2013) which derives from 
the social identity perspective (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2012, 2013, 2015; Reicher et al., 
2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Whilst there are different types of 
social identity threat, the current findings relate most closely to what Branscombe et al. 
(1999) have termed ‘distinctiveness threat’ (i.e. the fear that one’s group distinctiveness 
is prevented or undermined). This suggests that perceived threats to one’s group’s 
identity may lead to discrimination including expressions of overt racism and hostility 
(Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Reicher et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2013). 
In line with previous findings (e.g. Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016), posters in this study, who 
supported racist views, attempted to justify their opinions by expressing a perceived 
sense of threat to the distinctiveness of their social (i.e. national) identity (Branscombe 
et al., 1999) on the basis of immigration. It has been shown previously that one of the 
responses to multiculturalism can be the expression of a perceived (national) identity 
threat (Mols & Jetten, 2014; Sindic, 2008). Issues relating to perceived social identity 
threat were also evident in our final theme – namely, Contesting Britishness. In 
particular, posters who supported racist views invoked as sense socio-economic threat 
to the White British working class. 
Another way in which the themes Us versus Them and Contesting Britishness tapped into 
social identity processes relates to YouTubers’ contestation of their national identity as 
British. In particular, Faulkner and Bliuc (2016) previously observed how Australians 
disputed in online newspaper comments the perceived values and characteristics 
considered representative of their national identity. In addition, differences in people’s 
versions of ‘Britishness’ have been identified previously (e.g. Condor, 1997). In 
particular, differing accounts of ‘Britishness’ are frequently found in political discourse 
where they serve as rhetorical tools to influence people’s interests and behaviours 
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according to political agendas (Sindic, 2008). Therefore, as political agendas change, so 
might the boundaries/definitions of ‘Britishness’. 
Along similar lines, national identities are not fixed and, as Cohen (1994) has argued, 
their boundaries are generally ‘fuzzy’. Thus, national identities are continuously re-
defined through interactions with different 'others' (Condor, 2000; Hopkins & Murdoch, 
1999). 
Exposure to Online Hate Materials and Escalation 
Coffey and Woolworth (2004) observed that some online discussions can be 
characterised by escalation (i.e. in terms of racism, aggression, abuse). However, in the 
context of the present study, the authors did not find any straightforward evidence of 
escalation; instead, posters’ responses seemed more complex and, as discussed above, 
often contested relevant social categories (i.e. ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘Britishness’). One 
reason for the lack of evidence of escalation here is likely to be found in the relative short 
time-span (i.e. 48 hours) posters had available to respond to the video clip (i.e. before 
the clips’ removal from YouTube). 
Another likely reason is the asynchronous nature of the responses under investigation 
here and the corresponding non-sequential way in which posts were displayed on 
YouTube: unlike in Coffey and Woolworth’s study (2004), given the volume of 
simultaneous responses to the YouTube video, posters were rarely able to respond 
sequentially (i.e. directly) to specific others. Some respondents attempted to overcome 
this issue by creating a response sequence addressing other posters directly (i.e. starting 
their responses with an '@' and indicating the recipient’s username). Yet, by the time 
their posts were displayed, given the sheer number and speed of postings, these 
attempts at creating response sequences would have been hard to identify visually (i.e. 
they would have appeared ‘lost’ amongst hundreds of other comments). 
The potential differences between synchronous versus asynchronous communication and 
user density in online spaces have been highlighted previously (Wojcieszak, 2010). In 
particular, Wojcieszak (2010) questioned whether online response synchrony and user 
density would facilitate or prevent people from responding in a more polarised (i.e. 
escalated) manner over time. Thus, the relative short time, asynchrony and density of 
the comments analysed here might, in part, have prevented further polarisation and 
escalation of hateful responses. The specific relationship between response time, 
asynchrony, density and escalation of hateful responses therefore warrants further 
investigation in order to clarify the possible factors contributing to polarised responses. 
Finally, whilst collating the online comments, it was observed that several respondents 
were removing their comments from the website. This removal seemed prompted by 
other respondents’ appeals to the service providers (i.e. YouTube) or the police to delete 
or investigate certain comments for their perceived offensive and illegal nature (i.e. hate 
speech and/or incitement to racial hatred). Therefore, the removal of posts seemed 
related to posters’ concerns about potential legal consequences and a decreased sense 
of online anonymity. More importantly, the observed removal of posts suggests that a 
certain degree of self-policing is practiced online. 
It was also observed that some posters blocked or spammed others who expressed racist 
views, as well as advised others to do the same (via commenting). Consequently, 
responses by blocked or spammed posters became no longer visible to anyone on 
YouTube, suggesting that online hate materials can, in fact, elicit self-censorship. This 
self-censorship, in turn, seems to further support the finding that social networking users 
do not always automatically endorse online hate materials. 
Limitations 
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First, as with qualitative work in general, one of the limitations of this study lies in the 
fact that the current findings cannot be generalised (e.g. across all online hate materials 
or different SNS). Here, responses to a certain, racially motivated hate incident on one 
specific SNS (i.e. YouTube) were explored. The authors therefore cannot claim to explain 
hatred across all SNSs or all hate-motivated incidents, such as those based on disability, 
faith, gender, transgender or subculture. Instead, the broad focus of the current research 
question aimed to provide a starting point for research by exploring the nature of online 
replies to explicit hate materials. In particular, the present study aimed to shift the 
currently dominant ‘end-product approach’ (i.e. already polarised individuals/groups and 
their content/interactions) to a focus on the potential processes underlying the 
development of polarisation in the context of online hatred. We found that whilst online 
racism can lead to some degree of polarisation, the majority of responses did not suggest 
polarisation per se, but instead indicated social identity processes at play (i.e. reflecting 
the construction of in- and out-groups, illustrating respondents’ group affiliations). 
Second, whilst one of the study’s strengths lies in the realistic nature of the data, this 
observational approach prevents the authors from making inferences about the 
representativeness of the responses (e.g. the sample might not represent users across 
other SNSs). The authors neither had access to respondents’ demographics, nor could 
they determine whether respondents posted with multiple or different user names (i.e. 
identities). Yet, given the substantial number of comments in response to the video clip 
(i.e. over 71,000 posts), it is unlikely that these were exclusive to a specific 
(demographic) group – instead, there was evidence of some diversity in backgrounds 
(e.g. gender, ethnicity, geographic location). 
Finally, as in previous studies (e.g. Coffey & Woolworth, 2004), the findings do not allow 
the authors to draw inferences about the effects that the relatively short period of time 
in which people were able to respond to the video clip might have had on the content of 
their posts. In particular, it remains unclear whether longer-term online interactions 
result in repeated and/or increased expressions of hatred or whether long-term 
interactions/discussions change direction and automatically lose focus, therefore 
reducing or diverting expressions of hatred. 
Conclusion 
Expressions of hatred (e.g. racism) are more and more becoming a feature of life online, 
especially on social networking sites (e.g. YouTube). It is therefore becoming increasingly 
important to understand how ‘everyday’ online users respond to and engage with such 
hateful materials. Many YouTubers who responded to the hateful online material 
analysed here condemned its content. As such, the findings obtained in the current 
context indicate that online hatred may not always be automatically endorsed by online 
users; instead, we observed a degree of contestations in online users’ responses. Whilst 
the current findings cannot be generalised, we nevertheless hope they provide a 
springboard for future research which should take into account not only a wider variety 
of hate materials but also different social networking sites.  
Notes 
1. This comment was made in response to another comment, expressing opposition to 
the poster’s views. 
2. Please note that this comment was also made in response to another comment. In 
this instance, the comment was aimed at a poster who shared the views of this particular 
poster. 
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3. At the time of the video clip's upload (e.g. October 2011), Britain was in an economic 
recession and characterised by socio-economic insecurity. This may therefore have 
exacerbated posters’ sense of relative material and financial deprivation. 
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